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Introduction to Thinking the Problematic: 
Decentring as Method and Ethos
Oliver Leistert & Isabell Schrickel
Our occupation with problems (and of problems with us), the entanglement 
of problems and ideas, and their relations with thought, concepts and solu-
tions, the universality, generosity and violence of problems, and the con-
tinued problems we cultivate in order not to develop a sense of problems, 
a sense that would affirm their transformative offerings and expose us to 
a risk – these are the topics that the contributions to this volume revolve 
around in rather different spins. The book is a contribution to the problem 
of how, when, where and why problems matter, and for whom, and there-
fore to the inescapable and unmistakable catastrophic resonances that are 
occuring when modern societies continue to cultivate their amor fati with 
false problems, ‘that are only possible through various confusions between 
terms that had been previously separated and constructed, but whose modes 
of construction are no longer put into question’, as Didier Debaise recalls 
(2018: 20). Thinking the problematic might therefore as well mean an endeavour 
for decentring our thinking in order to think again, and to put the modes 
of construction of problems into question. This sounds quaint, as common 
sense has it that thinking is obviously part of everyday life. But when we look 
beyond the cognitive activity as such and understand thinking as a process 
in and after which a difference has been made – and this difference does not 
entail, for the moment, any limitations – it turns out that neither common 
sense nor everyday life help us to engage in the process of thinking. Quite to 
the contrary: their role is to stabilise, to make certain and to establish conti-
nuity – a sound milieu for false problems to f lourish in. 
The force of thinking to transform what it has captured is thus the topic 
here, and as such it is one way to explore what a problematic might turn out 
to be – a positive conception of a problem. Most of us know this force from 
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events that shook us and had an impact on how we situate ourselves in the 
world. In retrospect, however, the actual problematic tends to hide within 
historical narratives of progress that value the solutions of problems, but not 
their original stating. Many branches of science and discourses of science 
and technology, especially in their instrumental, solutionist and result-ori-
ented reasonings, are still subject to this constraint. 
The term problematic is not fixed, and has never been.1 There are, in fact, 
significant variations in its use and description that prove the vitality of the 
term or, bluntly stated, its existence as a force on the plane of immanence, as 
Gilles Deleuze might have it. Whereas some philosophers, scientists, activ-
ists and thinkers refer to problems, and tend to address a problematic, oth-
ers refer to a problematisation and focus on an activity – the construction 
of a problem. In addition, an important strand of problematisation refers 
to ontology and ethos, to the living and how to live. Indeed, turning to the 
problematic implicates us in the problematisation of ontologies of thought/
thinking,2 a paradoxical phrase at first glance, as Western cultures tend to 
separate thinking and being, leading to a dramatic devaluation of ontology 
as a field of thought in general. The division of the two has enshrined ontol-
ogy as being primarily studied in academic ivory towers by experts, without 
further consequences than a thesis without a readership.
In light of this domestication of problems we attempt to contribute to 
a more recent intellectual engagement with several original and critical 
contributions to a positive understanding of problems and the problematic, 
cultivated primarily in the 20th century French philosophical and epistemo-
logical traditions. In contrast to the various negative concepts of problems 
that are prevalent in particular disciplines or other philosophical traditions 
– problems as cognitive obstacles, as a relation between the known and the 
1  For an etymological definition of the word problem, see Schrickel, this volume, p.50. 
2  The historicisation of ontology gained profound traction in a truly pluralistic perspec-
tive not long ago when anthropologists started to study ontologies in comparative ways 
without recasting alien concepts onto abstract modern terms. Although the beginning of 
these ef forts can be dated back to the 1980s, considering for example Marilyn Strathern’s 
The Gender of the Gif t (1988), it is only recently that it was expressed programmatically with 
Charbonnier et al.’s Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology Af ter Anthropology (2016). See also 
Viveiros de Castro’s Cannibal Metaphysics (2014) for a sense of the intricacies of a truly plu-
ralist universe and the role of concepts therein. For a history of the concept of problems in 
the history of philosophy from antiquity onwards, see Bianco (2018).
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unknown, or as a conf lict between different ideas for instance (Maniglier 
2019) – the authors of this volume engage with philosophers, activists and 
historical contexts of the problematic that questioned the prevailing pas-
sive, ahistorical, deficient and solution-oriented character of the notion of 
the problem in many ways, called for a break-up of the problem-solution 
coupling and argued for problematisation as a process of transformative 
engagement. Taking a particular intellectual ethos in the French philosoph-
ical and epistemological tradition, where problems have been understood as 
a truly creative and intrinsically productive force, as a starting point, this 
volume  attempts to trace the problematic throughout a variety of authors 
and cases, through philosophy, epistemology and a series of practical en-
deavours. We seek to trace both the genealogy of thinking the problematic 
and the seeds of these intellectual projects in discourses around inter- and 
transdisciplinarity, the scientific orientation towards ‘real-world problems’ 
and the ‘problems of modern societies’, and the role of the concept in the his-
tories of systems thinking, public planning and sustainability science. Espe-
cially at times when science policy is so heavily geared towards big problems 
and grand challenges – public health, global sustainability or the adoption of 
artificial intelligence – it seems apt to problematise, historicise and compli-
cate the problematic anew. 
With this project we built on the previous achievements of a number of 
workshops, discussions and publications that picked up the threads of the 
problematic in recent years. The research project Transdisciplinarity and the 
humanities: Problems, methods, histories, concepts (2011-2013) at Kingston Uni-
versity London noticed – quite similar to our experience at CCP – also the 
lack of theoretical work on the concept of the problem and dedicated their 
first workshop, From Science and Technology Studies to the Humanities (2012), to 
the concept. Peter Osborne observed that although transdisciplinarity as a 
research methodology is broadly oriented towards the collaborative solution 
of societal problems, such as environmental sustainability and health and 
problems in the ‘life-world’ (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008), it seems entirely un-
clear what a problem is. Is it ‘something that requires the positing of prac-
tical solutions, or is a problem, primarily, something that defines a shared 
field of inquiry (a problematic), the investigation of which may take radically 
unexpected turns, leading to a reproblematisation – critical or otherwise – 
of the original issue?’ (Osborne 2015: 13). Since the programmatic of a prac-
tical rationality of states or state-like entities as organisers and sponsors of 
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this kind of research will certainly want to maintain control over the form 
of the process of disbursement, and ensure accountability and applicability, 
there is a systemic preference for solutions to the detriment of the process 
of problematising what is actually at stake. Thus, he concludes, inter- and 
transdisciplinarity have lost the more radical socio-political content asso-
ciated with the rise of these movements in the years around 1970. Osborne 
and his colleagues then propose to involve European ‘theory’ (French theory, 
German critical theory, literary criticism) in transdisciplinary research, as 
they provide approaches to ref lexively iterative processes of problem defini-
tion, investigation and reformulation.3 The problematic was also recently the 
subject of a special issue of Angelaki, edited by Sean Bowden and Mark G.E. 
Kelly, summoning some of the finest minds to produce new connections or 
differences among the canonical and the less canonical French epistemolo-
gists and philosophers that have enriched the discourses in the humanities 
and other disciplines in the 20th century in unprecedented ways.4 Martin 
Savransky also edited an exciting collection of papers for a special issue of 
Theory, Culture & Society on the problematic, with which many of our interests 
resonate, and some of which we will return to later in this introduction.
This volume attempts to open up the problematic, too. The contributions 
of Esther Meyer and Isabell Schrickel, in particular, trace the critical produc-
tivity of the concept in different historical, scientific and practical contexts 
and add to the problematics of inter- and transdisciplinarity. Jean-Baptiste 
Vuillerod and Thomas Ebke return to the genealogies and structural func-
tions of this term in French theory. Celia Lury composes a methodology for 
the individuation of a problematic of the contemporary. Christoph Brunner 
and Martin Savransky suggest operative building blocks for the cultivation 
of situations that harness the transformative powers of problems. To engage 
with different problematics here then addresses the limits of our thinking, 
too, by offering different accounts from a variety of fields that, surprising-
ly enough, to date have never been assembled in one book. We have found 
ourselves in dialogue more than once during the finalisation of this work-
3  In the same winter of 2012, another workshop at Goldsmiths College in London critically 
mobilised in a similar manner the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in particular 
to discuss the problem of transdisciplinarity and the problematic dynamics to re-discipli-
narise and re-establish itself on a transcendent element (see Collett 2019).
4  For a brief overview of all contributions see Bowden/Kelly 2018.
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shop’s outcomes regarding the impossibility of determining the limits of 
the problematic, and take this as an encouraging detail of its relevance in 
a genealogical perspective. It turned out, after we provisionally ended our 
conversations, that it remains an open project to thoroughly look beyond the 
more recent receptions and interest that the problem of the problematic has 
received.
Lineages of problems and problematisation
The history and philosophy of science is rich with famous problems being 
solved and has provided a great variety of strategies of problem-solving: ab-
straction, analogy, divide and conquer, hypothesis testing, lateral thinking, 
proofs, trial and error, or workarounds –  numerous tools and approaches 
to overcome problems have been developed throughout history. Problems 
solved assure us in often anecdotal ways of the constant progress in modern 
science, and problems unsolved are seen as epistemic puzzles that are being 
confronted with confidence and faith in future problem-solving capacities. 
In a positivist concept of science as a properly demarcated and ahistorical 
endeavour problems function as some kind of placeholder for the time span 
needed to find the solution. Problems are obstacles to be removed, means to 
test specific solutions, they are negative states of uncertainty, ignorance and 
methodological imperfection bound to dissipate with the solutions that sci-
entific and technological progress yield. Consequently, traditions like logical 
positivism rejected the ‘great questions’: philosophical, metaphysical, vital 
and singular problems are in fact Scheinprobleme (Carnap 2005 [1928]) – pseu-
doproblems – which are incapable of solution not because of their profundity 
but because they pose nothing to be solved. 
On the one hand we could simply acknowledge the fact that these tradi-
tions drew the limits of scientific jurisdiction and the boundaries of scientific 
and non-scientific disciplines – in their case between physics and philosoph-
ical metaphysics, Freudian psychoanalysis or Marxist social criticism – so 
neatly and sorted out their scope and area of responsibility in quite transpar-
ent – yet polemical – ways. But also, the solutions derived from such neatly 
demarcated scientific fields will always reach beyond. Solutions come into 
existence as theoretical perspectives, as socio-technical arrangements and 
pathways, as products and services. Solutions become effective by bringing 
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together concepts, objects, tools, techniques, scientists, institutions and 
publics in new ways. Sometimes, solutions consolidate the problem by deep-
ening the goals and values already visible as the basis on which the problem 
emerged, and sometimes solutions open up paths for transformations and 
alternative futures. There is always some excess in solutions, as they could 
have been otherwise. Thus, solutions are always more than scientific –  as 
they are always already problematic, too. For a long time, the history and 
philosophy of science did not pay much attention to either the notion of the 
problem or the solution. One will search in vain for comprehensive entries 
on these lemmata in encyclopaedias of philosophy or science, and their reach 
beyond colloquial meanings and explorations of these operational terms 
even today (Mittelstraß et al. 2005-2016; Serres/Farouki 1997; Lecourt 2006). 
This is astonishing, not least as we have come to acknowledge for a long time 
now that we are indeed surrounded and impregnated by scientific applica-
tions and products, embedded in infrastructures and policy cultures that 
are based on scientific expertise and technological solutions that our soci-
eties co-evolve with.
It has been widely recognised that the French epistemological tradition, 
which established itself over several generations in close examination and 
discussion with contemporary science, has provided essential perspectives 
and new avenues to engage with modern science and its problems and the 
role of knowledge in society more broadly. The struggles over epistemology 
in France during the 1960s, for example, are evaluated today as instances of 
important mutual exchanges between the sciences, philosophy and society, 
providing novel techniques and tools for argumentation, thought and action, 
and a specific mode to ref lect on the role of science in society (Erdur 2018). 
These epistemological, philosophical and theoretical engagements became 
important undercurrents and intellectual resources in debates over inter- 
and transdisciplinarity that emerged during the late 1960s and that led to the 
establishment of new institutions, academic fields and approaches to solving 
real-world problems (Klein 2014). The subsequent rise of the various fields 
of historical, philosophical and social analysis of science during the 1960s 
and 1970s – science studies and the history and sociology of science and sci-
ence and technology studies a little later – also had a close connection to, and 
drew major impulses for analysing and questioning processes of knowledge 
production and their role in public affairs from these engagements, which 
has been acknowledged until recently (Biagioli 1999; Biagioli 2001). And fi-
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nally, the vast potential of these writings for a constructive critique of sci-
ence policy and the prevalent organisation of problem-oriented transdis-
ciplinary science has recently been rediscovered, as we have seen (Osborne 
2015; Collett 2019; Maniglier 2019). 
These strands are picked up by Meyer and Schrickel in their contribu-
tions to this volume. Esther Meyer provides a critical assessment of dis-
courses and constructions of problems of sustainable development in recent 
transdisciplinary (td) sustainability sciences, and asks ‘How can we think 
of methodologies for td sustainability research that are coherent with epis-
temologies of the problematic?’ She suggests mobilising the philosophy of 
Gilbert Simondon, as he offers a ‘radically transdisciplinary’ alternative to 
the mechanical concept of development covered in the hegemonic versions of 
sustainable development, in particular through his theory of individuation, 
where a problematic arises as a resonance between an exteriority and an in-
teriority. Meyer refers to several approaches in recent td sustainability re-
search that take such an initial situation as a methodological starting point, 
including her colleagues and Meyer’s own method of ‘thinking practice of 
problematic designing’.
Isabell Schrickel offers in her contribution a historical account of 
an epistemic shift characterising the years around 1970, and discusses the 
symptomatic conjuncture of the notion of the problem in it. The rise of ‘prob-
lem-talk’ – from ‘wicked problems’ to the ‘world problematique’ – signifies 
a shift in epistemic sensibilities at the time, Schrickel argues, where new in-
stitutions and forms of knowledge were constructed around problems that 
would allow societies to change, to adapt, or to intervene in their futures. 
She does not suggest that there is a particularly strong connection between 
the writings of the authors subsumed under the label of French theory, with 
their nuanced approaches to the problematic, and, for instance, the simulta-
neous considerations of planning experts, systems analysts and bureaucrats 
from agencies such as the OECD, the Club of Rome and other institutions 
who put the ‘problems of modern societies’ on their agenda. Schrickel ob-
serves, however, that they share the idea of a positive conception of problems 
as intrinsically productive and transformative instances, and a sensibility 
for the lurking danger of instrumentalising problems, for example in order 
to maintain a status quo or to make particular policy options more likely 
than others. She embeds her observations in a broader historical analysis of 
the political situation and the academic landscape of those years, and dis-
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cusses emerging fields of research, new institutional set-ups and systems 
approaches as indices of a post-positivist understanding of problems and the 
problem as an epistemic design for situations that call for change and trans-
formation. Since the historical filiations between systems thinking, the in-
ter- and transdisciplinarity movements and the French intellectual tradition 
are often emphasised (Klein 2014; Osborne 2015; Maniglier 2019) but rarely 
f leshed out, Schrickel’s paper offers some additional contextualisation for 
an unexpected proximity.
It remains undisputed that the most explicit and focused conceptual 
elaborations of the problem of the problematic were made long before these 
international debates and transfers, in early 20th century France, and we 
have to acknowledge Elie During’s intervention from 2004 to reinstate Hen-
ry Bergson as an important figure in the history of problematics. In addition, 
During reiterates a list of historical philosophers and thinkers all sharing ‘a 
concern for what has been called a history of problems’ (During 2004: 18): 
Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault, 
Louis Althusser and Gilles Deleuze. In the meantime, the list was expanded 
by authors such as Gilbert Simondon, John Dewey, Isabelle Stengers, Étienne 
Souriau and others, some of whom the contributions of this volume discuss. 
The term ‘problématique’ itself appears to have been invented by Bachelard 
in his Le Rationalisme Appliqué (1966 [1949], translated partially in 2012) and 
has since become a common term in the French scholarly education up until 
today, as Patrice Maniglier reminds us (2012: 21). 
Nonetheless, as Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod shows in his contribution to 
this volume, we have to make place for a second origin of the notion of the 
problematic in 20th century French philosophy. Vuillerod opens up a differ-
ent lineage through Jacques Martin, who never published any of his works 
due to his early death in 1964, but apparently introduced a particular concep-
tualisation of the term in France in his masters thesis. Martin was close to 
Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser, who acknowledged in For Marx: ‘With-
out a theory of the history of theoretical formations it would be impossible 
to grasp and indicate the specific difference that distinguishes two differ-
ent theoretical formations. I thought it possible to borrow for this purpose 
the concept of a “problematic” from Jacques Martin to designate the partic-
ular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the location to be assigned 
to this specific difference, and the concept of an “epistemological break” from 
Gaston Bachelard to designate the mutation in the theoretical problematic 
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contemporary with the foundation of a scientific discipline’ (Althusser 1969: 
32). While it seems plausible that Martin has taken the term from Bachelard 
during his lectures, as Kelly speculates (2018: 156), Vuillerod studied and 
recently published Martin’s masters thesis and proposes in this volume ‘a 
new genealogical perspective on the problematic’ (Martin 2020). According 
to Vuillerod, the epistemological debates on the historicity of mathematical 
concepts, thought and development between Lautman and Cavaillès in the 
Société Française de Philosophie, under the direction of Jean Wahl in Feb-
ruary 1939, mark the first discursive appearance of the term problematic in 
France, to which Heidegger and Hegel, both translated in parts at that time, 
contributed.5 Martin wrote his thesis ‘The individuum in Hegel’ in 1947, while 
translating Hegel’s The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate into French. As Vuil-
lerod reports, in his thesis, Martin reads Hegel through the lens of Marx, in 
order to achieve a concept of the individual that is rooted in its social and 
historical conditions and mediated by them. More generally, ‘the institution 
of the problematic means the elaboration of a particular perspective of read-
ing, in light of a problem raised by the history of philosophy’, as Vuillerod 
describes Martin’s use of the problematic. This reading turns out to be highly 
original and productive as it creates a passage to open the Marxist field of 
thought to the history of philosophy. 
Althusser took the inspiration offered by Martin much further and dra-
matised it: while for Martin the problematic raised a diachronic point of 
view in order to integrate Hegel with Marx, for Althusser the problematic 
designates a general critical rupture and order in theory, for the first time 
manifested in Marx’s The German Ideology. By way of this dramatisation, Al-
thusser’s programme to philosophically ground Marxism and restitute Marx 
as a critical philosopher from the vulgarisation of the Stalinist doctrine, and 
from the Marxist humanism founded on a naïve concept of the subject, em-
braced Martin’s problematic as a general epistemic operator of theoretical 
formations.6 Vuillerod’s contribution therefore demonstrates that the travel 
of concepts enriches an intellectual climate that seeks – notwithstanding 
5  See the works of Cavaillès (Cavaillès/Canguilhem 1994) and Lautman (Lautman/Duf fy 
2010); for contextualising Lautman, see Duf fy 2018; for Cavaillés, see Cassou-Noguès 2018.
6  See Kelly 2018 for a meticulous reconstruction of Althusser’s problematic and, interestingly, 
Foucault and his episteme in this matter.
Oliver Leistert & Isabell Schrickel18
differences in thought – some broad conceptual commonalities7 to signify a 
decisive break with the pre-war generation. In this case, it might have been 
Wahl’s overarching authority on Hegel in France that spurred Martin’s con-
ceptual productivity.
Only a few elaborations can be found on the general commonalities of 
problem concepts throughout the decades. But whether they are called prob-
lems, problematic or problematisations, one apparent commonality ref lects 
on a constitutive positionality, such as being situated and in between, medi-
ating or connecting, and therefore sharing a processural, at times even func-
tional, propensity that finds singular expressions more often than regular 
ones. A problematic might be understood as a transparent proxy of and bet-
ween subjects, objects and environments, mastering the illusion that there is 
a direct, non-discursive, universal line between them, ultimately some sort 
of epistemological, or even ontological, melting pot. Bachelard sketched an 
image of the problem that indicates the positional f lexibility of the problem. 
In his neat phrase from 1949, the position taken by the object is the subject of 
the problem, and the position of the cogito that of the consciousness of the 
problem (Bachelard 1966 [1949]: 74). It thus turns out that problems are dis-
tributed and co-relational through diverse domains, because their position-
ality seems not to be restricted axiomatically. The history of problems then 
is the history of stating and exploring these entanglements and correlations, 
whether in the field of the history of sciences, the domain that Bachelard ex-
clusively refers to, or in other domains until today.
For Bachelard, problematisation was the very signature of a scientific ra-
tionality, as opposed to opinion and dogma, which merely derives its claims 
from empirical facts. Against such ‘obstacles épistémologiques’ any scien-
tific, rational and objective knowledge must construct its problematising 
path (Bachelard 1966 [1949]). Similarly to Thomas Kuhn in his inf luential The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 [1962]), Bachelard believed in some sci-
entific culture and that the prevailing rationality was in fact a ‘corrational-
ity’ jointly applied by the ‘union of the workers of the proof’. For him, the 
practice and progress of science was warranted by the rational, dialectical 
exchange between critical minds as the source of objective control, verifi-
7  Occurrences of such travelling concepts amongst philosophers and thinkers in the post-
war decades in France concern terms such as dispositif, discourse, simulacrum, simulation 
and genealogy, to name just a few.
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cation, confirmation, instruction and normativity, and the rational coordi-
nation and codification of truths in a system of knowledge. At first glance, 
Kuhn’s concept of the ‘paradigm’ is very close to this idea. A paradigm com-
prises the key theories, instruments, values and trainings constitutive for a 
period of ‘normal science’ and it provides model problems and solutions to a 
community of scholars permitting the accumulation of puzzle solutions and 
thus the stabilisation of a paradigm. Kuhn, however, clearly distinguished 
between ‘really pressing problems, e.g. a cure for cancer or the design of a 
lasting peace’ and puzzles mainly serving to test ‘skill in solution’, lacking 
any criterion of ‘goodness’, ‘intrinsic value’ or interesting and important 
outcomes (Kuhn 1996 [1962]: 36-37). The latter characterise normal science, 
which is positioned then as a rather controlled and cautious endeavour. And 
whereas in Kuhn’s Structure paradigm shifts are primarily understood as 
historical-institutional events, when a choice has to be made ‘between in-
compatible modes of community life’ (Kuhn 1996 [1962]: 94), Bachelard’s po-
lemical definition of rationality located the progress of science in the critical 
consciousness of the scientists themselves and their problematising paths, 
ultimately constituting the scientific community, which ‘will be united in the 
proof once we have the guarantee of having clearly posed the same problem’ 
(Bachelard 1966 [1949]: 31).
His academic successor and historian of the sciences of the living, Georg-
es Canguilhem, developed a different positionality of problems within his 
historical epistemology. Thomas Ebke reconstructs in his contribution to 
this volume Canguilhem’s architectural positionality of problems in relation 
to concepts and scientific theories. Ebke hereby diverges from recent read-
ings connecting Canguilhem with Bergson, as he foregrounds an Aristotel-
ean lineage that resides within what is known as analyse réf lexive in France, a 
strand of thought Canguilhem exposes in his early, formative works. It refers, 
amongst other things, to the dialectical operation of judgement outlined in 
Aristoteles’ Topics. What Ebke emphasises is that it models a process that ini-
tiates a problem to be judged by its premise, and that it is within this dis-
junctive operation that the contents of a concept are explicated as it disjuncts 
from the problem, thereby also exposing the historicity of scientific judge-
ments in relation to that problem. Philosophy then, as it addresses problems 
that instigate scientific concepts, reactualises these disjunct problems and 
reinserts them into the scientific process, as Ebke explains. Canguilhem, 
even from the impoverished perspective of a logical syllogism, introduces 
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historical epistemology as a watchguard of normativity in the scientific pro-
cess, a political project, as Ebke concludes.
Towards an ethos
It is the very late Foucault who, in an interview with Paul Rabinow, takes up 
the concept of a problematic and, rather surprisingly, relates his works in 
the history of thought to the rediscovery of ‘a general form of problematisa-
tions’ (Foucault 1984: 389).8 For him – and this is where Foucault provides a 
glimpse into the reconstruction of an ethos as opposed to a morality based 
on transcendental laws – problematisations are discernible within discur-
sive responses to difficulties that are transformative in the sense that they 
react to and effect practical solutions. Problematisations are instigated by 
some uncertainty in a specific field and provoke simultaneously different, at 
times even contradicting, solutions. This explains why stating a problem is 
much more difficult than stating its solution, as Bergson put it in the con-
text of speculative problems: a problematisation articulates difficulties in 
manifold ways and thereby develops the conditions under which possible 
responses can be given. This is a situated practice of thought, rich in con-
text and seldom possible to reconstruct backwards, since the specific work 
of thought in the form of problematisations cannot be grasped after the fact, 
as a succession of representations, because ‘while carrying out the work of 
thought under the experimental form of a historico-practical test imposed 
by our present’, it is ‘inseparable from the modes of problematisation our 
present makes us capable of’ as Stengers (2019: 11) explains the immanent 
distribution of forces that at the same time impose and capacitate, or even 
capacitate by imposition. For Foucault, the ability to problematise turns out 
to be a condition of freedom, through which he probes a thoroughly posi-
tive problematic conception and a freedom freed from transcendental bur-
den and authority.9 Paul Macherey further suggests that Foucault’s notion 
of thought is intrinsically connected to a manifestation of a limit, or an un-
8  Although it should be stated that he remains rather cautious by setting the phrase condi-
tionally, as if he wanted to signal the impossibility of this endeavour.
9  How problematisations concern ethics and freedom in Deleuze’s and Foucault’s works has 
been analysed by Erinn Gilson (2014).
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certainty, as ‘the subject opens up for itself a domain of intervention, inside 
not outside the system, by taking the position from which a certain claim 
to freedom becomes meaningful’ (Macherey 1998: 101). Here again, the posi-
tionality returns as a condition to thought, and the singular turns out to be 
of the universal (‘in the system’) as a condition for a transformation, whereas 
if it was of the general, freedom would, once again, become abstracted and 
thus f loat outside the system.
The Belgium philosopher, historian of science, activist and former chem-
ist Isabelle Stengers has contributed to an actualisation of the problem-ethos 
nexus in two distinct manners: firstly, for a while now, together with Didi-
er Debaise, Martin Savransky and others, she demonstrates how to apply 
pragmatistic concepts from the philosophy of William James as tools that 
can operate as instigators for problematic practices (see below, and Savran-
sky and Brunner in this volume). And secondly, she recently took up Fou-
cault’s notion of problematisation as a form of ‘transformative engagement’. 
As modification of ‘the relation we entertain to our own reasons’ (Stengers 
2019: 3), she seeks an experimentation with consequences. Here, the method 
of application must emerge in the encounter with the problem, and the value 
of knowledge refers to one’s own limits (see also Lury in this volume). This 
problematic shares the Deleuzian dramatisation of an idea to be actualised 
as a problem once it takes possession of its bearer, who is violently forced 
to think and becomes herself part of a thought as much as this becoming 
transforms the parts involved. The outcome, in the form of a new structure, 
is a hypothetical problem with its field of possible solutions, ‘issued from 
the problematising power of the idea which selects and mobilizes what the 
problem needs in order to determine itself and to receive the solution it de-
serves’ (2019: 7). Stengers proposes that the Deleuzian notion of an idea that 
has powers to insist and demand actualisation, but never fully exhausts ac-
tualisation, is what demarcates the problematising subject that is referenced 
by Foucault and whose truth is a demand by a transformation originating in 
practices. ‘If modes of problematisation are formed on the basis of practic-
es, they also relay the concerns whose insistence these practices manifested’ 
(2019: 10), she writes, and the concept of relaying is one of those prolific en-
richments by Stengers to the modes of the problematic. By nature practices 
are situated and by nature they are a diagnosis of their milieu, of what is 
possible, a test of concerns without judgement. Here, problems serve as tools 
for an ethopoiesis – the fabrication of a situationally limited ethics. 
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In addition, Stengers introduces Étienne Souriau (2015 [1943]) to the 
lineage of historians of problems, because his concept of ‘questioning situ-
ations’ that prey upon those who admit to them establishes an ontological 
risk in the form of a problematic, as the answer to the problem may remain 
insufficient, and simultaneously imposes a responsibility, as the problema-
tisation must resist already existing, ready-made solutions (on Souriau, see 
also Savransky in this volume). Transformations instigated by such a risky 
situation may fail, which very much resembles James’ concept of a genuine 
option (see Stengers 2009), while at the same time Souriau shares Deleuze’s 
concept of the Idea as the bearer of the thinker, although in a ‘less violent’ 
tune, as Stengers explains (2019: 8).
From situated knowledges to the cultivation of situations
This ontological or epistemological positionality characteristic of the prob-
lematic is echoed many times in recent observations and proposals. Maybe 
(now) most prominently, and not that long after Foucault’s death in 1984, 
Donna Haraway invested her thought (and anger) into the outline of a sit-
uated knowledge (1988) that in many ways, knowingly or not, resembles el-
ements that are familiar from the works attributed by During and others to 
the historians of problems: embodied objectivity, limited location, partial 
perspectives and situated knowledge are proposals that ultimately concern 
an ethical practice in the form of an accountability based on webs of connec-
tions and the simultaneous interrelatedness of the epistemological, ontolog-
ical, ethical and political planes. Reading Haraway’s proposal today remains 
instructive because (amongst other reasons) one of its most prominent po-
lemical antagonists is the spectre of relativism. Relativism figured as a dis-
cursive tool to devalue all self-limiting epistemologies as it sets up the false, 
but exclusive, binary between relativism and objectivism. Haraway rightly 
points out that ‘the “equality” of positioning is a denial of responsibility and 
critical inquiry. Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalisation in the 
ideologies of objectivity. […] But it is precisely in the politics and epistemolo-
gy of partial perspectives that the possibility of sustained, rational, objective 
enquiry rests’ (Haraway 1988: 584). 
Sadly, these polemics that position an unfettered objectivism on the one 
side and an unconstrained relativism on the other, continue to resonate up 
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until today within discourses on the normative frameworks and scopes of 
the sciences. Setting up relativism as the other of objectivity is a perfect ex-
ample of a false problem that only a scientist’s reason could come up with 
in order to retain his exclusive and exhaustive access to truth. Today, these 
polemical attacks on what back then was called postmodernism are instanc-
es of powerful strategies to delegitimise any kind of problematisation that 
questions and limits scientific practices and knowledge productions. Posi-
tionality, in this polemic, equals relativism, an absurd rhetoric motivated by 
an authoritarian judgement struggling for legitimation. As it is evident that 
the disputes Haraway refers to are truly false problems, their many returns 
signify the political stakes inherent to them. At the core, it pertains to weak-
ening the view that science is practice and facts are made, a product, and not 
an expression of nature herself, as the term ‘laws of nature’ still proposes. 
The purification and rhetorics of science as nature’s language still has out-
spoken purchase in the battle for funding and self-legitimation. This con-
tinued immunisation strategy of scientific reason has been nurtured by, and 
entered into a new process of naturalisation with, the advent of today’s data 
science, so called big data, algorithmic processing and what still, or again, is 
referred to as artificial intelligence. Here, the phantasma of a general, unsit-
uated objectivity has re-emerged as digital data now get treated as splatters 
of the real.10 
10  This recent and ongoing regression in scientific practices instigated by the abundance of 
data and cheap processing power increasingly reduces many branches of science to mere 
engineering tasks. While this development is not new per se, and, of course, Haraway was 
among the first feminists to address the capital-driven technologist attitude of science 
(2004 [1985]), what can now be observed all along formerly methodologically diverse 
fields is a reduction of diversity in science through the application of the same, of ten pat-
ented and thus black-boxed, bundles of algorithms, and partially even the same training 
datasets. Louise Amoore reports that ‘scientific data begin to incorporate the emotional, 
af fective, and speculative domains, while, on the other hand, knowledges considered to 
be “non-scientific” are authorized as science. […] the degrees of doubt always already pres-
ent within mathematical probability multiply and take flight as imaginable, if not strictly 
calculable, possibilities’ (2013: 10). Such a ‘speculative’ calculus attempts to objectify – or 
reify – the virtual by replacing it with the possible a computer can process. This operation 
of capture extends the reach of formalised methods beyond probabilities, the episteme 
of modern societies, into the realm of possibilities whose only limit is computability itself, 
therefore constructing an unlimited upgradeable plane. The prospects for a feminist data 
science (D’Ignacio/Klein 2020), for instance, however reasonable in itself and well intend-
ed, carry the burden of possibly turning out to function more as a vindication than a cure. 
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Haraway, intervening into this polemical debate against postmodernism, 
unambiguously drew the line for any claims to objectivity in the necessity of 
partiality, because in return this retains and cultivates plurality and diversi-
ty. This obliging relation continues to form, up until today, the conditions of 
the possibilities of knowledges that a subject can relate to herself, even when 
the grounds appear to have shifted today: ‘Positioning is, therefore, the prac-
tice in grounding knowledge […] Positioning implies responsibility for our 
enabling practices’ (1988: 587). Haraway later (2008: 71) rephrased this ethical 
backstop as ‘response-ability’, which bears a more positive conception that 
at the same time is scaled down to a subject’s dimension of apprehension: a 
pragmatic care of the problematic. 
Situating objectivity with partial perspective, and with what is of impor-
tance, resonates well with Didier Debaise’s problematisation of ‘the bifur-
cation of Nature’. He is showing, with recourse to Alfred North Whitehead, 
that scientific reasoning has taken the position of nature’s original expres-
sions, masking thereby in a second operation the rich pluralism inherent in 
nature, as nature is reduced to the limitations of a scientific axiomatic and 
localisable matter within an absurd reductionist concept of time. This leads 
to severe confusions ‘where everything is reversed: operations replace ontol-
ogy, and abstraction replaces the concreteness of things, and the possibility 
of the knowledge of existence in itself’ (Debaise 2017: 26). To ‘take the tool 
for the universe’ lets thought oscillate freely in false problems, between ‘pri-
mary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities, of which ‘all of the divisions between beings, 
all the oppositions between their attributes and their aspects, are derived: 
existence and value; real nature and apparent nature; fact and interpretation’ 
(Debaise 2017: 2). What is more, the reification of this bifurcation effectuates 
a delegitimation of other metaphysics. Only scientific reason has access to 
the real, causing ‘a desertification of all modes of existence: the reduction of 
mental beings to simple representations, of fictions to imaginary realities, of 
values to subjective projections onto nature’ (Debaise 2018: 22). Maybe the 
late Foucault sensed this power of desertification when he felt the obligation 
to the archaeological and genealogical restitution of practices of care from 
antiquity in his history of sexuality after the first volume.
On the real problem of data justice – in contrast to the false problem of data ethics – see, 
in an explorative manner, Dencik et al. 2019. 
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In any case, against these ‘active anesthesia of thought’ (Debaise 2018: 
23) that domesticated the problematic as a problem-solution calculus of sci-
entific reason, a fresh take on the restitution of the relevance of experience 
in a minor tune continues to spread. By way of setting up obligations in the 
form of pragmatism’s ‘genuine options’ (William James), any claims by ab-
stractions to an exclusive access to truth are undercut and rendered impos-
sible. This way, the concept of truth undergoes a massive reform, as truth 
now signifies the ability to convey from within a situation all the constraints 
necessary. This way, truth and present converge – whereas scientific reason 
would separate from without (or from God’s perspective, as Haraway called 
it) all that is inside and therefore unfit for claims on truth. Truth becomes 
inclusive as it excludes any reach beyond its situational present. Program-
matically, it ‘enrages any majority thinking’ (Stengers/Debaise 2017: 19), as it 
subverts and annihilates the authoritarian grip on the distribution of truth. 
This pragmatist reformulation of truth has been embedded within many ex-
ercises and narratives for the cultivation of problems.11 
In this vein, Martin Savransky, in his contribution, returns to James’ 
concept of a ‘fringe’ that constitutes a vector of indetermination in thought, 
acting as a generative force of the problematic. Speculating on the title of 
our book, Thinking the Problematic, Savransky points to the paradoxes con-
tained therein, as he suggests that in it thought folds back on itself. With ref-
erence to Deleuze’s deconstruction of the representational image of thought, 
Savransky narrates how problems have withered into an epistemic obstacle 
to be overcome under the reign of instrumental reason – a matter of puz-
zle-solving, amounting to an impossible attempt to exhaust the problematic 
with one universally valid reason. For Savransky, thinking the problematic 
means to learn how to sustain and entertain the insistent possibility con-
tained within a problematic. For this, he returns to Souriau’s ontology of 
intensities, because it problematises heterogenesis. Souriau exemplifies het-
erogenesis with sculpting, as the statue is a generative problem that turns 
the sculptor into its means. Intensification thus involves metamorphosis of 
a work done, Savransky argues, and this leads him to speculate how to con-
jure the problematic, and to look for arts and practices of other modalities 
of truth speaking, such as the oracle’s practice of veridiction that demands 
11  Such exercises can be found, for instance, in Breaking the Spell (Pignarre/Stengers 2011) or 
related works (Savransky 2016; Stengers 2015).
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a transformative response by the consultee. Thinking the problematic, he 
concludes, may, rather simply, amount to trusting the possible for its gen-
erativity.
For Savransky, Stengers, and likewise for many other authors mentioned 
in this introduction – in many ways also for Michel Foucault – a productive 
source of reasoning about problems remains one specific exercise that sets 
out to perform the transformative arts of the problematic without restraint. 
The anti-representational thought brought about by Gilles Deleuze’s Dif fer-
ence and Repetition (1994 [1968]) stands out in rigour and generosity (as does The 
Logic of Sense (1990 [1969]). The continuity of Deleuze’s formative works within 
the more recent literature on the problematic prevails, because Deleuze most 
explicitly formulates a genuinely positive concept of problems, which situ-
ates them ‘on the side of events, affections, or accidents rather than on that 
of theorematic essences’ (187). Further, Deleuze, in a truly original style, has 
deconstructed and unmade the bifurcation of nature as he shows the con-
ceptual poverty it produced. A careful reception of these works of Deleuze 
taps into a richness in problematic thought that remains unmatched, espe-
cially when considering chapters 3 and 4 of Dif ference and Repetition, where 
Deleuze presents the problem as a qualifier of ontological relevance. ‘The 
problem of thought is tied not to essences but to the evaluation of what is 
important and what is not’ (189). This echoes the Whiteheadean metaphysical 
ethos of ‘asserting importance as a primary category of the experience of na-
ture’ (Debaise 2018: 25). If the problematic maintains importance, meaning 
both being important and opening the senses to what is important, then it 
retains a generativity or inventiveness that takes hold of bodies and minds 
alike. This possibly violent force is full of surprises and difficult, if not im-
possible, to govern without losing its grip – that is, its importance. Problems 
are in correspondence with, to and from, norms and normativity, as they in-
stigate new practices that test and individuate the milieu they are positioned 
in. Their primary operation to decentre and change not only targets perspec-
tives and positions but axiomatics, too – these order-codings of construct-
ed necessity delimiting all that is possible. While this may sound pathetic, 
it should be stressed that the activity of problematisation is discursive and 
subjective, molar and micro: we can find axiomatisations all around, whose 
function it is to continuously discriminate between ground and figure, to 
enable scales that themselves enable units of measure, and this way provide 
the necessary means for the implementation of norms and normativity. Put 
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differently, by way of problematisations we actively un-categorise the cate-
gorised and tap into the ‘chaosmosis’, as Félix Guattari (1995) has named this 
generic mess in his unprecedented conceptual generosity. When some of our 
senses are positioned to dispose of false certainties generated by exclusive 
access to truth by scientific reasoning, our aptitude towards a pluralist rea-
soning and non-judgemental but inclusive concept of truth gains traction.   
On such a plane Christoph Brunner, in this book, investigates the condi-
tions for a politics constituted by the ‘collactive’, a collective relaying acts. He 
takes inspiration from the rejection of classical modes of critique by Stefano 
Harney and Fred Moton, who call for a new mode of critique that escapes 
the illusion of an autonomous oppositional subject and that refuses the com-
mon sense orderings of truth this subject is aligned with. Instead, it is in 
the movement of f light, in a durational concern, that the act lingers. In a 
conf luence of a range of concepts from Bergson, Deleuze and James, Brun-
ner distils a shared critique of common sense, before he turns to Bergson’s 
method of intuition and Deleuze’s take on it in order to turn it into a specu-
lative-pragmatic process of problematisation aiming – through affirmation 
– at an invention of the present to overcome the present, a process of becom-
ing relationally. An example he gives for a reconceptualisation of time is the 
Afrofuturist multiplication of temporalities. Problems as transversal opera-
tors effectuate in Brunner’s praise for movement the possibility of an in-act, 
a slipping into the event without beginning but ‘with a joy of entering the 
interplay of durations’. Ultimately, this resistance against the present turns 
to ‘the inventive powers of shape-shifting that present intuitively’. 
Problems are figured to belong to instigators of change and transfor-
mation, to pertain to the necessity to develop, at length and with precision 
also, in the works of Gilbert Simondon. The works he cites in his thesis that 
he defended in 1958 range from cybernetics to the pre-Socratic apeiron. 
Brian Massumi, himself a philosopher of problems, assumes that Simon-
don’s ecological philosophy was intellectually inaccessible in most times, not 
only because it is only now being translated, but because it lacked a climate 
of openness towards ontological concerns in the 80s and 90s, when the long 
paradigmatic idea of constructivism ‘was in fact unequal to the question of 
ontogenesis that it was called upon to take up by virtue of the juncture at 
which it found itself’ (Massumi 2009: 37). The constructivists’ own legitima-
tion rested in an ontological disdain that can be considered as a discursive 
necessity of that time in order to theoretically posit social or cultural per-
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spectives on things and their subject positions. ‘Ontology, several genera-
tions of theorists were taught, was the enemy. Epistemology, which always 
carries ontological presuppositions of one kind or another, was at best a false 
friend. Finding a path to ontogenesis by unabashedly bringing the two to-
gether again, albeit in a new way, was simply inconceivable’ (ibid). But there 
is more to Simondon’s untimeliness. As his theory expresses complex be-
comings with only very few genetic concepts and without a general principle, 
he developed an ‘integral inventivism’ (Massumi) that equally concerns mat-
ter as it concerns thought and ideas – an impossible architecture of theory 
for constructivism and most of the humanities until recently. 
This theory of qualitative change cuts radically through the world’s dis-
tribution into disciplines – not only because a world divided into disciplines 
causes unsolvable epistemological obstacles for such a genetic endeavour, 
but, even more relevant, their founding principle to discriminate and order 
the real in their logic, this very abstraction, is causing the construction of 
disciplines that implicitly import normative assumptions. Simondon’s sen-
sibility here echoes his close knowledge of the works of his teacher Georges 
Canguilhem, who analysed the recurrent installation of the junction between 
the normal and the pathological in the sciences of the living. This spurred Si-
mondon to reject psychology: ‘The constitution of two spaces [the normal and 
the pathological] only expresses the essential bi-polarity of normativity for a 
psychological classification, and obfuscates the implicit sociology and social 
technics’ (Simondon 2005: 270). Consequently, he refers to psychosociology 
in his theory to underline the necessary and inseparable relation of the inte-
rior and of the exterior for an individuation of beings. 
A problem for Simondon is what ‘resolves an anterior incompatibility 
through the apparition of a new systematic; what was tension and incompat-
ibility becomes functional structure’ (Simondon, quoted in Voss 2018: 100). 
This new functional structure, otherwise said, is the outcome of a formative 
process, initiated by a problem: ‘To solve a problem is to be able to step over 
it, to be capable of recasting the forms that are given within the problem and 
in which it consists’ (Simondon 2016: 156). But as Daniela Voss, in her con-
sideration of the role of problems in Simondon‘s works, states, ‘there is not 
really a generality to problems, much more they differentiate the individua-
tion of non-living and living beings, and attribute a degree of indeterminacy 
in particular to psychosocial beings’ (Voss 2018: 109). Problems gain traction 
through transductive operations, ‘by which a structure appears in the do-
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main of a problematic, that is, as that which provides the resolution of the 
posed problems’ (Simondon 2009: 11). This solution is never predetermined, 
but has required an act of invention to be established, for the creation of a 
new passage between alien structures and potential energies to be actual-
ised. Furthermore, this processural immanence implies the possibility of 
ethics, too, which for Simondon is expressed through the valuation of acts 
in their capacity for transductions. From this perspective, ‘[e]thics is nothing 
other than the affirmation of the inventions of life in all its forms, the setting 
into resonance of their differences, the reactivation of the openness of the 
pre-individual and the creation of new solutions to tensions, which generate 
new forms of living’, writes Elisabeth Grosz in her concise chapter on Simon-
don (2017: 206-7). 
It follows that individuation can not be known in the common sense, as 
Celia Lury commences her contribution to this volume, because the know-
ing subject itself individuates with the problematic. The individuation of the 
problematic is the methodological concern Lury develops. And as a transduc-
tive operation that is inseparable from ontogenesis itself, any methodology 
of individuation then is nothing to select abstractly and to apply as if it was 
an unconstrained choice, but becomes operational itself: a constraint con-
strains itself as it is constituted in the very act. Lury refers accordingly to a 
‘compositional methodology’ to signify this procedural character and to ad-
dress the individuation of a problematic of the contemporary. Contemporary 
here is a term described by Paul Rabinow: ‘The contemporary is a moving ra-
tio of modernity, moving through the recent past and near future in a (non-
linear) space that gauges modernity as an ethos already becoming historical’ 
(2009: 2). A problematic of the contemporary is situated in that ratio which 
lets modernity emerge as it produces its history, and this ratio is the sole site 
of its actuality. Lury calls the environment of this individuation ‘epistemic 
infrastructures’, supporting becomings with materials of any kind, without 
being self-contained themselves, in an epistemic process that develops rela-
tions of knowledge to truth in the first place. As an example, Lury explores 
the implications of infrastructuring in urban spaces as real-time instrumen-
tation in the form of sensed digital data that adds to such potentialities of 
individuation. Compositional methodology is thus concerned with uneven, 
nonlinear temporalities spurred by a plethora of epistemic infrastructura-
tions and invests in the transitivity of methods, their transductivity for the 
grounding of new structurations. The aim is to test interdisciplinary meth-
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ods for their compositional capacities towards problems, as a composite and 
compositional at once. Lury provides compositional examples from research 
concerning this auto-spatialisation instigated with methods that at the 
same time enter into the relation as they form it. For Lury, the contemporary 
concept of rendition, with its broad meanings, contributes to affective, mor-
al and political outcomes as it negotiates the tension between an auto-as-au-
tonomy and an auto-as-automatism in the auto-spatialisation instigated. 
Various styles of reasoning (induction, transduction, deduction) commit 
to various aspects of rendition, as do the multiplications of contexts. Her 
contribution in many ways complicates the polemics against ‘the moderns’, 
which have become rather fashionable in recent years, as it provides a prob-
lematisation of the relation between knowledge and truth that establishes an 
indetermination and thus retains potentials.
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The Problems of Modern Societies —  
Epistemic Design around 1970
Isabell Schrickel
Historians characterise the years around 1970 as a period of multiple con-
tradictions in modern societies, as the beginning of an era of fundamental 
transformations and sea-change – with long-term effects on societal, polit-
ical and cultural developments in many parts of the world (Brick 2000; Judt 
2005; Agar 2008; Suri 2009; Wirsching et al. 2011). The post-World War II 
economic expansion, the ‘long boom’, the ‘trente glorieuses’ or ‘Wirtschafts-
wunder’, which was based on cheap energy, enormous investments in sci-
ence, technology and infrastructure, and productivity gains in many sectors, 
had reached critical limits – physical, ecological and ethical. High-modern-
ist confidence, faith and optimism seemed exhausted and clashed – and 
sometimes coalesced – with waves of late- or postmodernist scepticism 
and doubts, but also with the activism and counterculture that had swol-
len throughout the 1960s. Some have identified the period as the beginning 
of our era due to emerging leitmotifs still relevant today, but also as an age 
of fracture, the seedbed of future crisis, and a landslide into uncertainty 
and ambiguity (Hobsbawm 1994; Jarausch 2008; Rodgers 2011; Ferguson et 
al. 2011). Deeply embedded convictions and beliefs of the preceding heyday 
of the Cold War became fragile, political conduct was questioned, and the 
meaning of distinctly modern key concepts such as progress and growth be-
came less evident (Philp 2007: 169-213; Seefried 2015b; Andersson 2018: 122-
150). Long-standing thought patterns of historical development – such as 
Marxism or modernisation theory – were challenged both on an ideological 
level and on the level of theoretical structure, as they were perceived as static, 
retrogressive, teleological and dichotomous. The idea that future develop-
ments and innovations in modern societies proceeded in progressive stages 
that were predicated on earlier ones and could thus be predicted seemed in-
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creasingly outdated. In the case of modernisation theory, such epistemolog-
ical doubts matched with the growing qualms about the normativity of the 
West as a model for a completed and stable modernity (Gilman 2003: 203-
276). And in the East the ‘actually existing’ state socialism entered a state 
of crisis as it missed launching the next phase of societal development. As 
an alternative to these competing models of political system development 
a new wave of interdisciplinary systems thinking gained momentum, im-
bued with motifs of complexity and interdependence, and focusing on the 
historical dependencies of societies, on new constellations of increasingly 
numerous actors in politics, the future as a potentially open-ended horizon 
of change, and global environmental interconnectedness and boundedness 
(Taylor 2001; Leendertz/Meteling 2016). In this context, the idea of the en-
vironment became a central discursive category at the time – particularly 
on an abstract system-theoretical level – as open systems are conceived as 
being reciprocally situated in a dynamic environment, but also on a practical 
level with regard to specific environmental problems receiving widespread 
public attention (Warde et al. 2018; Sprenger 2019). Intellectuals engaged 
with the complex dynamics of political change and the temporality of history 
as such in new ways. On the one hand, the long-term view of global change 
came into focus and increasingly sophisticated future projections, scenarios 
and imaginations gained new forms of agency on the present (Andersson/
Rindzevičiūtė 2015). On the other hand, it was not only the nature and tem-
porality of the future, but also the idea of history that changed, as the plu-
ral historicities of societies, knowledges and times as such were discovered 
and theorised in the humanities and the social sciences (Lorenz/Bevernage 
2013; Esposito 2017). Consequently, these intellectual debates, conceptual in-
novations and semantic shifts indicate that the years around 1970 also need 
to be understood as an epistemic turning point (Leendertz/Meteling 2016; 
Rohde 2017; Heymann 2017). Following up from these observations, this 
paper seeks to bring together several mutually enforcing political, cultural 
and intellectual trends of the period and trace some characteristics of this 
broader epistemic shift, which fostered new modes of knowledge produc-
tion, established various new fields of research and promoted new contexts 
for scientific collaboration: first, the political context of an abating Cold War 
and the development of more complex international relations; second, the 
rise of social movements that mobilised novel forms of expertise and cri-
tique; and third, an epistemological revolution that opened up new topics 
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for inquiry, introduced new methodologies, forms of ref lexivity and frames 
of analysis, and that made provisions for new roles of science. The notion of 
the ‘problem’ – from the problematique to the wicked problem – which occurs 
strikingly often in the period in public debates as well as in endeavours in the 
fields of systems science, future studies and theories of planning and design, 
will be analysed in its capacity to provide an ‘epistemic design’ for situations 
that call for a change, a transformation, specific interventions in a present 
state to actively envision a potential future.1 This paper seeks to discuss the 
years around 1970 as a moment of transition in the history of modern so-
cieties by looking at how the notion of the problem became an operational 
term around which new modes of knowledge production, fields of research 
and interdisciplinary collaborations have emerged, and to trace aspects of 
the inventive epistemology of the ‘problematic’ as thematised in this volume 
in these contexts.
The historical context: an abating Cold War, 
the rise of social movements and new roles for science
During the 1960s, the key features of the Cold War – the arms race, the bina-
ry logic of the US-Soviet geostrategic rivalry and the ideological battle over 
whether authoritarian communism or liberal capitalism represented the 
preferable form of modern political economy – began to abate in intensity. 
Nuclear weapons appeared more and more as an ‘ideology killer’ because the 
physical stakes they produced seemed higher than the ideological ones, and 
resourceful, military-based conf lict theories and the doctrine of deterrence 
didn’t seem to make the world a predictably safer place any more (Gilman 
2016). The 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, when there 
‘was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than 
ever before in history’ (Allison 1969: 689) reverberated for a long time and 
gave rise to strategic reconsideration. One lesson that came out of it was the 
extent to which the adversaries had failed to think similarly going into it. 
What had appeared to be ‘rational’ behaviour in Moscow had come across as 
1  While Scopus tracks a constant increase in the occurrence of the term ‘problem’ in article 
titles between the years 1950 and 2000, the increase between 1970 (5,381 article titles) and 
1974 (8,338 article titles) is at 55 per cent by far the largest over the whole period. 
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dangerously ‘irrational’ behaviour in Washington, and vice versa. Hence, in 
practice there were sharp limits to the unilateral rationalisation and solution 
of critical situations through game-theoretical exercises or rational choice 
frameworks promoted by the so-called defence intellectuals. The 1960s held 
a number of developments – the Sino-Soviet split, Ostpolitik, decolonisation 
and the political rise of the ‘Third World’2 – that further complicated the du-
alistic framing and opened up opportunities for – or perhaps exerted pres-
sure on – other forms and layers of international relations and diplomacies, 
multipolarity and the forging of complex interdependence that would mark 
the next period of international history.
Those were also the years in which social movements made themselves 
heard globally and became highly visible features of politics and culture be-
yond the turn of the decade. In many ways they ref lected the larger implica-
tions of the aforementioned political shifts. Discord in the communist world 
prompted ideological crisis, while Western civil societies began to question 
their own values, integrity and righteousness. New social movements – pac-
ifism, feminism, environmentalism – drew attention towards various issues 
previously neglected or suppressed, from democratic participation to civil 
rights and problems of the environment. Most emblematically, the turmoil 
culminated in the events of 1968 – the worldwide protests against the war in 
Vietnam, the student movements in France, West Germany, Poland, Japan, 
the USA, Mexico, Tunisia and other places, the Prague spring liberalisation 
in Czechoslovakia, and the civil rights and environmental movements (Suri 
2009). An essential characteristic of these movements was the appropriation 
of new forms of public expression and communication, educational practices 
and global solidarity. In the light of détente, looming environmental crisis, 
the computer and communication revolution, global protest movements and 
educational revolts, heretofore unquestioned modes of governance, ideas of 
order and control, patterns of thought, policy cultures and epistemologies 
were challenged in various ways. Calls for greater political participation and 
the developments of fields of political engagement at communal and na-
tional levels – but also within the United Nations – indicate that the shifts 
of the years around 1970 opened up paths into less hierarchical societal de-
velopments and polycentric orders (Cox 1981; Christiansen/Scarlett 2013). It 
2  During each year from 1960 through 1970 an average of three states gained their sovereign-
ty, most of the new states being in Africa.
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became apparent that the sources of power in society and international rela-
tions had begun to diversify at an unprecedented scale. Various supranation-
al organisations emerged as inf luential political actors, introducing a greater 
diversity of goals pursued internationally and producing greater complexity 
in the modes of interaction and the institutions within which action takes 
place (Cox/Jacobson 1973). The future of modern, industrialised societies be-
came a major concern, and knowledge was increasingly conceptualised as an 
important resource in these cultural and political transformations. 
Accordingly, these political shifts had a distinctive impact on science, 
both as a model of inquiry and as a modern tool for progress as the rela-
tionships between science and the questions it sought to answer were fun-
damentally transformed. We can understand the intense debates on epis-
temology and inter- and transdisciplinarity at the time as manifestations 
of these transformations. The contemporary struggles over epistemology 
in France, for example, are evaluated today as instances of an important 
mutual exchange between the sciences, philosophy and society, providing 
novel techniques and tools for argumentation, thought and action and a spe-
cific mode to ref lect on the role of science in society (Erdur 2018). Scholars 
from different fields were also increasingly concerned about how to bring 
science closer to real-world problems and find solutions to pressing social, 
political and environmental issues, as well as with the future of universities 
and education as such. These issues were often thematised as problems of 
disciplinary boundaries and how to transgress them.3 Varieties of (post-)
structuralism, systems theory and cybernetics, with their transdisciplinary 
conceptualisations, provided important frames of reference for engagement 
with a less universalist and more situated understanding of science as a so-
cial process and vital resource for problematisation and cultural change.4 
3  The notion of ‘transdisciplinarity’ was introduced at a meeting on interdisciplinarity in uni-
versities held at the University of Nice and jointly sponsored by the Organisation of Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the French Ministry of Education. The 
Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, the French mathematician André Lichnerowicz, the Austri-
an astrophysicist Erich Jantsch and the British media historian Asa Briggs were among the 
participants. See Apostel et al. 1972; and for historical and analytical accounts on inter- and 
transdisciplinarity see Barry/Born 2013; Schaf fer 2013; Klein 2014.
4  Osborne (2015: 14-15) claims that ‘the disciplinarily disruptive and transformative forces’ of 
the great books from the European humanities – many of which this volume discusses – 
provided the ground for inter- and transdisciplinarity movements.  
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The promotion of new constellations between scientific communities and 
increasingly transnational publics, and of unprecedented forms of scien-
tific collaboration within newly formed international institutions, can be 
understood in this context. Another manifestation of the transformation of 
the intellectual landscape at the time was the diversification of the scientific 
persona: action intellectuals, technocrats, institutional entrepreneurs, the 
radical science movement, scientific activists, engaged intellectuals, science 
policy experts – all began to interact with one another, and many emerged 
from hidden committees into the public eye (Agar 2008; Shapin 2009; see 
also White 1967; Nelkin 1979). 
The epistemological revolution
To a large extent accounts of the history of science during the Cold War have 
focused on instances that reveal how the Cold War drove scientists and sci-
ence policy ideologically and ‘distorted’ the evolution of science. The ques-
tion of how emerging ideas about the global environment and an intercon-
nected and interdependent world system, eroding epistemic certainties and 
shifting values, might have challenged binary world-views, the self-evidence 
of particular ideologies, models of society or the possibility of an objective 
science at all, is only recently being posed. The same applies to the overall 
plausibility of national security imperatives or the competition and rivalry 
between the systems as comprehensive frames of reference for develop-
ments in science policy during the Cold War. There is a growing demand and 
interest in contextualising emerging fields of research within longer-term 
intellectual trends, changing research infrastructures and innovative insti-
tutional environments (Engerman 2010).5 Additionally, the developments 
outlined so far indicate that the years around 1970 marked a transition in 
the post-World War II history of science. Besides the aforementioned great-
er diversity among the scientific personnel, emerging inter- and transdisci-
5  Histories of interdisciplinary fields such as cybernetics, futures studies, policy sciences, sci-
ence studies, peace studies or environmental sciences have provided instructive examples 
that complicated overly simplistic and exploitative ideas of the relationship between pow-
er and knowledge (Gestwa/Rohdewald 2009; Thomas 2015; Seefried 2015a; Rindzevičiūtė 
2016; Gilman 2016; Graf 2017; Rohde 2017; Andersson 2018).
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plinary perspectives and movements, new forms of international collabora-
tion, and the processes of renewal many existing disciplines and institutions 
went through, we should acknowledge the fact that scientists and intellectu-
als often played an active role in imagining a global, non-apocalyptic post-
Cold War world. They posted different sets of objectives for human develop-
ment and thematised issues in ways that challenged some of the operating 
conditions of modern societies and the status quo of international relations. 
They sought to inf luence future developments by creating new institutional 
set-ups or through specific problematisations around which new fields of re-
search emerged. A distinctive characteristic of the social and human scienc-
es around 1970 was an orientation towards greater ref lexivity, autonomy and 
new forms of intellectual engagement, which opened up the ‘closed world’ 
of Cold War science (Edwards 1996). Many fields went through what histo-
rian Peter Novick described in 1988 as an ‘epistemological revolution’, that 
is, a break with the prevalent post-World War II model of social and human 
sciences inquiry. Up to the 1960s the philosophy of the social and human sci-
ences rested on the belief that they were, in the main, value-free disciplines 
and ‘an extension of the dominant positivist and empiricist philosophy of 
the natural sciences’ (Novick 1988: 546). One of the common visions between 
such diverse enterprises as rational choice theory, structural-functional so-
ciology, information theory or operations research, among others, was the 
study of ‘systems’ behaviours, the causal chains within systems of variables 
whose interrelations could be formally stated and studied in technical terms 
(Isaac 2012a: 9; Heyck 2015). Joel Isaac has discussed the problem of ‘epis-
temic design’ in this context, that is, how in post-World War II American so-
cial science empirical knowledge was constituted within the framework of a 
scientific theory through particular arrangements of data and techniques of 
representation (models, diagrams, tables) ‘so as to make them undergird the 
theoretical claims about the social world they wished to make’ (Isaac 2012b: 
80). And for various reasons that are obviously connected to the early Cold 
war setting this world was rendered knowable, predictable and controllable. 
Such arrangements served the purpose to claim an ‘objectivism’ and ‘sci-
entism’ for the social sciences in the post-World War II context. In the years 
around 1970 however, some of these objectivist claims and assumptions 
came to be undermined. According to Novick, ‘in one field after another dis-
tinctions between fact and value and between theory and observation were 
called into question’ as the ‘notion of a determinate and unitary truth about 
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the physical or social world’ came to be seen by a growing number of scholars 
as a ‘chimaera’. For him the ‘meaning of progress in science and scholarship 
became problematic’. While Novick suggested that it was ‘for the most part 
“strictly academic” considerations which initiated debates, and contributed 
the categories in which heterodox views were advanced’, so far this paper has 
delivered some reasons to rethink the ‘epistemological revolution’ as a pri-
marily ‘academic’ endeavour (Novick 1988: 523, 546). It should rather be un-
derstood as a complex and co-evolutionary process in which the procedures 
of science interacted more intensely with the social, political, technological 
and intellectual environment than before and that challenged the prevailing 
positivist problem-solving mentality in many disciplines. Novick’s monu-
mental effort to examine the ‘objectivity question’ in the historical profes-
sion is in itself a result of these broader transformations. 
In order to support his argument on the epistemological revolution as a 
mostly academic endeavour, Novick draws largely on the cross-disciplinary 
circulation and adoption of Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 The Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions. Recent accounts of Kuhn’s work, however, have positioned him in 
an elitist and prestigious Harvard context during the Cold War, where he 
was challenged to formulate a theory of science that represented a ‘distinc-
tive response to the pressing problems of epistemology and society’ at the 
time (Isaac 2012a: 193).6 Kuhn’s Structure was indeed an important point of 
reference and provided a conceptual framework within which to discuss 
the practical and evolving nature of scientific inquiry for a wide range of ac-
tors at the time – including the sociologists, philosophers, systems think-
ers, natural scientists, international relations scholars, policy advisors and 
institutional entrepreneurs mentioned in this paper.7 The book introduced 
the broader academic world to a non-teleological, evolutionary, historical 
view of scientific development as a sequence of incommensurable but nev-
ertheless internally consistent periods of ‘normal science’, operating within 
6  For a comprehensive historical contextualisation of Kuhn’s Structure see Fuller 2000; 
Reisch 2016.
7  Novick, just like many other American intellectual historians, largely draws on Kuhn for 
an early historical and situated conceptualisation of scientific development. But there is 
a much richer French historical-epistemological tradition, which Novick mentioned only 
briefly. Authors like Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault or Gilles 
Deleuze have much to say about inventiveness and the sources of the new in scientific in-
quiry (cf. Rheinberger 2010).
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the conceptual framework of a ‘paradigm’. From time to time ‘puzzle-sol-
ving’ normal science is turned upside down, ‘gestalt switches’ occur, and a 
choice has to be made ‘between incompatible modes of community life’ – a 
paradigm shift takes place (Kuhn 1962: 94, 117). This view of normal science 
inverted the image of the scientist in an interesting way: in its suggestion 
that ‘dogma was the precondition, not the antithesis, of scientific advance, 
and in its corollary – the “normal” scientist as tradition-bound puzzle-solver, 
rather than bold adventurer – it fundamentally contradicted the orthodox 
Promethean image’ of the scientist (Novick 1988: 529). While Kuhn himself 
was probably more concerned with the question of how paradigms are ac-
tually stabilised and ultimately embraced a pedagogical theory of science8, 
the epistemological adventurers of the late 1960s – systems thinkers, policy 
experts, futurologists, engaged intellectuals, institutional innovators – em-
braced the revolutionary moment and strove for the establishment of new 
paradigmatic frameworks, perspectives that would help to open up the world 
for malleability and active intervention. These dynamics became visible in 
the processes of renewal many existing disciplines went through, but also in 
emerging fields of research that resonated with the social, political and envi-
ronmental situation at the time. The notion of the problem – ubiquitously ap-
plied and famously pored over at the time from debates at students’ kitchen 
tables over the Club of Rome’s talk on the ‘world problematique’ (Özbekhan 
1970) to the discovery of ‘wicked problems’ (Churchman 1967; Rittel/Webber 
1973) – is understood here as a marker of this revolutionary atmosphere.
Branches of contemporary social science started to question their com-
mitment to objectivity and related ideals as well as the preference for quanti-
tative analysis as opposed to historical or other ‘soft’ forms of social research 
at the time. The idea of value-neutrality was rejected and a reorientation of 
the social sciences toward normative analysis was discussed (Solovey 2001). 
The crucial importance of values as dynamic factors in societal processes was 
re-discovered during the 1970s, and studies on value shifts – for instance the 
orientation towards post-materialism in Western societies – became a central 
field of research (Galtung 1970; Schumacher 1973; Inglehart 1977). Furthermore, 
8  According to Kuhn paradigms are stabilised through exemplary scientific achievements or 
model experiments, theoretical and ontological assumptions (amounting to a disciplinary 
Weltanschauung), professional training, methodology, instrumentation and research agen-
da; (Kuhn 1962: 35-42).
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the rise of new media, the rapid spread of computers and the unprecedented 
technological possibilities of communicating across the globe gave reason to 
study the structural transformation of the public sphere and cultural dynam-
ics in relation to communication and media (Habermas 1962; McLuhan 1964). 
Inf luential media theories such as the agenda-setting theory, the knowledge 
gap hypothesis and framing theories were developed in the years around 1970 
(Tichenor et al. 1970; McCombs/Shaw 1972; Goffman 1974). In addition to these 
new or strengthened fields of social science several historians marked that at 
the peak time of the space age the unprecedented and iconic global environ-
mental images of the blue marble shaped a newly global environmental con-
sciousness, resulting in an ‘ecological revolution’ (Radkau 2014; Seefried 2015b). 
Consequently, the ‘vast machine’ of the environmental sciences emerged as a 
global knowledge infrastructure, a large-scale sociotechnical system collect-
ing environmental data and modelling and projecting planetary processes 
(Jasanoff 2001; Edwards 2010; Cosgrove 2001). In particular, climate science 
changed at the time, from a mostly descriptive and heuristic research pro-
gramme into an interdisciplinary programme in which interactions between 
humans and the Earth system were studied and predicted via computer simu-
lations (Heymann 2009). Research on planet Earth and its systemic properties 
and interactions gave rise also to new ideas on the politics and economics of 
the planet, its limited resources, boundaries and how to legislate its use (Boul-
ding 1966; Hardin 1968; Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Daly 1974). 
The years between 1964 and 1973 were also the high point of futures re-
search. Distinct from the 1950s and early 1960s futurology that studied fore-
seeable laws of social development with a positivist mindset, futures studies’ 
point of departure was the ‘historically specific understanding that the pres-
ent was a far from stable structure’ that cannot be predicted in a positivist 
sense. It was in several ways a form of ‘counter-expertise to the project of 
Cold War prediction’, with strong links to international activist movements, 
as Jenny Andersson has recently argued (Andersson 2018: 3, 47; see also 
Seefried 2015a). Predicting the future based on a status quo was considered 
to primarily serve the elites, as it perpetuated this status. Thus, new forms 
of futures techniques were developed that allowed people to actively shape 
and develop alternative futures. Approaches such as the Argentinian phi-
losopher Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy aimed to help Latin America’s poor 
people reach self-consciousness and inspired a whole generation of Europe-
an social workers from the late 1960s on (Freire 1970; Andersson 2018: 151-183). 
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At the same time in Europe, Robert Jungk developed the future workshop 
technique (Zukunf tswerkstatt) in the context of specific controversial pub-
lic policy issues, which was conceived as a process lasting several days that 
aimed to unleash the social imagination of the (non-expert) participants by 
using the tools of radical and dialectical deconstruction and psychotherapy 
(Jungk 1987; Andersson 2018, 151-183). Compared with methods of govern-
mental future planning, such as systems analysis and operations research, 
these alternative and activist futures techniques held utopian and emanci-
patory aspirations, as they aimed at an open process in which problems were 
to be constructed and a set of objectives for social and personal development 
was to be established. At the same time, however, it was a period in which 
the application of systems analysis and operations research was widely ex-
panded: initially developed in military contexts to improve defence efficien-
cy and to underscore the rationality of decision-making (Hughes/Hughes 
2000), systems thinking became more important in engineering and in the 
hard sciences, as they provided powerful tools for the control, optimisation 
and prediction of complex systems. During the 1960s, systems analysis was 
increasingly expanded to public policy, social issues, and urban and envi-
ronmental planning (Jardini 1996; Light 2004). The design and results of 
such policy processes were widely criticised at the time, for example by the 
sociologist Ida Hoos from Berkeley and Robert Boguslaw from the RAND 
Corporation. Hoos emphasised that the current practice of systems analysis 
techniques such as cost/benefit ratios or programme budgeting led to tech-
nocratic forms of governance, because policies were often crafted by outside 
consultants and experts ‘armed with solutions and in search of problems’, 
specialised in managerial efficiency, but not political problem consideration. 
Hoos saw growing incidences of ‘government-by-contract’ situations that 
removed responsibility for the decisions made from public officials (Hoos 
1972: 86, 243). Boguslaw argued in a similar manner that systems analysts 
built models that, as a result of the experts’ attempts to be value neutral 
and objective, reified the values of the ruling elite and implicitly support-
ed the status quo (Boguslaw 1965). Towards the end of the 1960s, Boguslaw 
left RAND and took a position at the progressive sociology department of 
Washington University in St. Louis, where he developed – in the eyes of his 
former colleagues – a rather obscure interest for French existentialist phi-
losophy, referring to authors such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser and 
Jacques Ellul in his evaluations of solutions to the problems of modern soci-
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ety proposed by contemporary social science and other expert panels (Rohde 
2013: 53-59). However, such profound criticism and debates led to a more re-
f lexive understanding, experimental opening up and further modification 
of systems methods. Boguslaw, Hoos and others certainly placed high ex-
pectations on the potential of systems analysis as a ‘social technology’ (c.f. 
Helmer et al. 1966) and as a ‘phenomenon fraught with social significance, 
perhaps all the more because it is characterized by contradictions, internal 
and external’ (Hoos 1972: 241). Thus, more situated frameworks for systems 
approaches have been developed in the context of specific problem areas 
such as environmental assessment, urban planning, public policy and oth-
er design challenges where systems techniques have been further developed 
into a rich and interdisciplinary field of increasingly ref lexive, more situated 
and post-positivist policy, decision and management sciences (see for in-
stance Anderson 1968; Rittel/Webber 1973; Holling 1978). A new generation of 
scholars and practitioners in different fields questioned previous hyperbolic 
notions of controllability, knowability and rationality. Instead, they were in-
creasingly interested in the ‘epistemology mediating between organizations 
and the welter of experience surrounding them’ (Dery 1984: 118), in more 
adaptive and participatory processes of planning, in shaping more careful-
ly the processes of constructing a problem and more generally the role of 
knowledge production in public policy in the light of debates about increased 
social ‘complexity’ (Leendertz 2019). Many scholars began to understand sys-
tems approaches as a means to construct and invent problems in the first 
place – not to solve prescribed ones. A contemporary observer commented 
on the conjuncture of systems science as an ongoing ‘social experiment’ with 
an open outcome (Churchman 1978). The problem of epistemic design thus 
shifted at the time – or rather, it was regularly complemented by the idea 
that systems approaches can be applied to pose and construct problems so as 
to make them create images of change or suggest particular policy options.
Finally, the years around 1970 were also a foundational period for what 
was to become probably one of the most innovative and growing fields of re-
f lexive and critical social and human science inquiry of the last third of the 
20th century, that is, the various versions of studies of science – the philos-
ophy, history and sociology of science and technology. The establishment of 
science studies at the time can be understood both as an effect of the afore-
mentioned developments and debates and a symptom of an epistemic turn-
ing point. These studies conceptualised science and technology as essential 
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drivers of social, political and environmental change and as constitutive for 
the future of modern societies. Early versions of meta-studies of science 
emerged from different contexts, for instance from debates on the ethical 
implications of advances in particular fields such as molecular biology or 
on the risks and side effects of new technology such as nuclear energy, but 
also from transnational debates about the impacts, governance and role of 
science and technology both in history and for the future of industrialised 
societies, as new global challenges began to emerge. These debates were, as 
Elena Aronova has shown, thoroughly embedded in the ‘political economy, 
cultural anxieties, and ideological dimensions of the post-World War II so-
cial and political order’.9 But at the same time many debates reveal that in 
those years an intellectual space opened up in which science as a complex 
cultural phenomenon was conceptualised and advanced in new ways. Based 
on experiences with the numerous roles international scientific cooperation 
had played in the normalisation of relations after World War II, science poli-
cy practitioners envisioned new areas of science diplomacy and internation-
al knowledge co-production. While historians have shown how early Cold 
War US-American science policy was embedded in the projection of Amer-
ican political and ideological interests in postwar continental Europe, and 
how cooperation served as a means of fostering a consensual or co-produced 
hegemony in order to consolidate a liberal, democratic, capitalist regime in 
Europe (Krige 2006; Doel/Wang 2001), the role and prospects of science in 
international relations began to change towards the end of the 1960s. Even 
though the world was divided, it was also perceived as being increasingly in-
terdependent, meaning that the autonomy of nations was becoming limited 
by transnational f lows of energy and goods, of money and ideas, and even 
of pollution and diseases – and scientific and technological collaboration 
were discussed not only in US foreign policy as ways of shaping a mutual 
understanding of the problems and concerns that modern societies had in 
common (Rosenau 1969). We find numerous examples for these changing re-
lationships between science and power in an interdependent world, emerg-
ing collaborative organisations and also the debates concerning the political, 
9  These studies had dif ferent names in dif ferent places: ‘science studies’ in the USA and UK, 
‘naukovedenie’ in the Soviet Union, ‘naukoznawstwo’ in Poland, ‘naukoznanie’ in Bulga- 
ria, ‘natural dialectics’ in China, ‘Wissenschaf tswissenschaf t’ in East Germany and in West 
Germany the ‘Finalisierungsdebatte’ has to be mentioned (Aronova 2012a; Leendertz 2013).
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ethical and social implications of science and technology more generally. 
The perceived urgency to navigate the interdependencies and future paths 
of these relationships fostered novel forms of expertise, advanced scientif-
ic internationalism and promoted closer relationships between science and 
policy. 
The future of modern societies
In these shifting political, cultural and epistemological terrains of the late 
1960s, transnational debates began to emerge, in which deeper concerns 
about the future development of modern, industrialised societies in the con-
text of rapidly changing techno-scientific environments, ecological limits, 
interdependent economies and shifting values came to the fore. At the core of 
these debates was the observation that as a result of the rise of technical and 
scientific expertise in modern societies, and its growing importance in the 
realm of public affairs, ideology was losing its revolutionary potential and 
organisational power. Neither Marxian theory of historical development nor 
the Western counterparts such as Rostow’s modernisation theory seemed 
to provide convincing theoretical devices to confront the profound changes 
looming ahead. Both offered teleological ideas of societal progress as an es-
sentially predictable process of social change (Gilman 2003; Andersson 2018: 
49). These frameworks have been replaced by theories of ‘convergence’ and 
the ‘post-industrial society’, developed independently with different foci 
and nuances by diverse authors such as Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Alain 
Touraine, Peter Drucker, Pitirim Sorokin, Jan Tinbergen, Kenneth Galbraith, 
Samuel Huntington and Jacques Ellul. These authors envisioned that indus-
trial economies around the world would be converging in terms of social, 
economic and political structure. Additionally, social and political thought 
would be converging on a remarkably widespread agreement over advanced 
societies’ fundamental aims, and the focus would shift onto the problem of 
achieving such aims.10 In light of the perceived challenges of peacekeeping 
at the time, the global population boom, sustenance, energy demand, over-
10  Drucker 1950; Ellul 1954; Sorokin 1960; Tinbergen 1961; Aron 1963; Brzezinski/Huntington 
1964; Galbraith 1968; Touraine 1971; Bell 1973; on the political contexts of these debates see 
Aronova 2012b; Andersson 2018: 49-74.
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exploitation, automation and the biological revolution, numerous authors 
began to theorise the temporality of historical dynamics, the governability of 
societal developments and the question of how to bring about desired change 
(Buchholz 1968; Huntington 1971; Luhmann 1972; c.f. Esposito 2017).
Closely related to these ideas, an emerging network of inf luential policy 
experts on both sides of the Atlantic was concerned with the impact of the 
‘scientific-technological revolution’ (in the East), the ‘technetronic era’ or the 
‘post-industrial society’ (in the West) as a revolutionary challenge to both para-
digms of historical development. The Czech philosopher Radovan Richta, one 
of the minds behind the ‘socialism with a human face’ reform movement, for 
example, published Civilization at the Crossroads in 1966, in which he suggested 
that the revolution was not a matter of a future endpoint, but a continuous 
process in the present with an open horizon of change in a highly technolog-
ical and science-based society that would require new forms of participation 
(Richta 1969; Sommer 2017; Andersson 2018: 128-129). In 1969 the Italian in-
dustrial consultant and founder of the Club of Rome, Aurelio Peccei, analysed 
in The Chasm Ahead the ‘menacing technological gap that now separates the 
United States and Europe’. He described a ‘world in convulsion’ due to ‘the un-
precedented complex of explosive problems’, ‘technological acceleration’ and 
‘exponential growths’ in population, pollution, automation etc. Similarly to 
Richta, he perceived the present as a ‘period of revolutionary and even met-
amorphic change’ that required collaborative and interdisciplinary efforts in 
order to master the future (Peccei 1969: 104). In a similar vein, Zbigniew Brzez-
inski, éminence grise of US-American foreign policy, in his 1970 Between Two 
Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, cautioned against a cognitive crisis 
between and within modern societies. He saw a ‘threat of intellectual frag-
mentation, posed by the gap between the pace in the expansion of knowledge 
and the rate of its assimilation’, which would ‘raise a perplexing question con-
cerning the prospects for mankind’s intellectual unity. It has generally been 
assumed that the modern world, shaped increasingly by the industrial and ur-
ban revolutions, will become more homogeneous in its outlook. This may be so, 
but it could be the homogeneity of insecurity, of uncertainty, and of intellec-
tual anarchy. The result, therefore, would not necessarily be a more stable en-
vironment.’ (Brzezinski 1970: 23) On the other hand, Brzezinski also observed 
that an emerging ‘planetary consciousness’ and the ‘availability of the means 
to cooperate globally’ intensified the ‘sense of proximity’ and the ‘sense of obli-
gation to act’ (Brzezinski 1970: 60).
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These rhetorics of fractures, chasms and crossroads paved the way for 
greater international interest in similar systemic characteristics and outlooks 
of the future of  modern societies, and they became a point of departure for 
critical debates on the common problems, direction and governability of these 
developments (Leendertz/Meteling 2016). Even though these engagements 
had been developed in quite different political contexts, they shared a sense 
of urgency and being present at a turning point in the history of modern soci-
eties – demanding new theoretical devices, interdisciplinary perspectives and 
methodologies. The novelty of the problems associated with the political and 
cultural shifts, the advances in science and technology making these problems 
discernible, global interdependence and the environmental crisis looming 
ahead were widely perceived as challenges for high modernist self-perceptions, 
approaches and expectations. 
A post-positivist conception of problems
In the following I argue that the intellectual impact of this epistemological 
revolution and the transition towards post-positivism can be understood 
through the conjuncture and the changing status of the notion of the prob-
lem in intellectual endeavours at the time. Before I turn to exemplary cases, 
let me brief ly recall the etymology. The word problem stems from the Greek 
verb probállo (to put forward, to propose, to outperform somebody) and the 
noun próblema (clif f, obstacle, question, exercise). From the meaning it be-
comes clear that problems can be spontaneously emergent in a situation or 
they can be purposefully posed to a counterpart. They can be concrete and 
tangible but also conceptual and abstract. The prefix pro- can be understood 
temporally as something that lies ahead and demands a reaction or a strate-
gy. On the other hand, it points towards a strategy of empowerment or au-
thorisation through which someone can pose a problem for someone else. It 
is both a prefix of priority in space or time, having a meaning of advancing or 
projecting forward or outward, and/or it indicates substitution. In a positiv-
ist understanding of science11 the concept of the problem functions as some 
11  Positivist conceptions of science are usually bound to a combination of the following ac-
counts: realism: truths about the world are true regardless of what people think and there 
is a unique best description of any chosen aspect of the world; demarcation: there is a dis-
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kind of placeholder for the time span needed to find the solution. Problems 
are obstacles to be removed, means to implement specific solutions, negative 
states of uncertainty, ignorance and methodological imperfection bound to 
dissipate with the solutions that scientific and technological progress yield. 
Consequently, traditions like logical positivism rejected the ‘great questions’: 
philosophical, metaphysical, vital and singular problems ‘are in fact pseudo-
problems, which are incapable of solution not because of their profundity but 
because they pose nothing to be solved’ (Kaplan 1968). In a positivist under-
standing problems are conceptualised negatively in the sense that they are 
meant to disappear. They are chosen precisely because nothing will be left 
from them – just like a puzzle. In a post-positivist understanding, it is par-
ticularly this aspect that is different. Problems are actively constructed as 
matters of concern in order to intervene in the present and to create agency 
and images of change. They are devices to open up and assure us of some cre-
ative leeway and measure of control over an uncertain future. The particular 
ways problems are constructed imply how they function as political or social 
technologies.12 
In the light of the aforementioned developments and transnational de-
bates on the challenges of modern societies, many institutional entrepre-
neurs, policy advisors and systems thinkers engaged with this particular 
understanding of the problem – both on an institutional level and as an in-
tellectual agenda but also in methodological and theoretical writings. They 
tinction between scientific theories and other kinds of beliefs or knowledges; axiomatisa-
tion: the content of a theory is analysed as a given set of axioms from which the remaining 
content of the theory can be derived deductively as theorems; reductionism: phenomena 
can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena; the unity 
and universality of science: both hypothesis and working programme, this claim states 
that all scientific disciplines are part of the same endeavour and that less profound sci-
ences are reducible to more profound ones; and the cumulative character of science, the 
Whiggish narrative of continuous scientific progress through an elimination of false-
hoods by the discovery, verification and systematisation of empirical truths or facts (c.f. 
Mittelstraß et al. 2005-2016).
12  The concepts of ‘social technology’ and ‘political technology’ describe how forms of 
applied knowledge can be used in pragmatic and intentional ways to transform states 
or societies have been used by dif ferent authors with varied nuances throughout the 
20th century, among them Thorstein Veblen, Karl Polanyi, Karl Popper, Olaf Helmer 
and Michel Foucault. For a critical review see Leibetseder 2011; for the Soviet debate see 
Rindzevičiūtė 2015.
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deployed the notion in the sense of a post-positivist ‘epistemic design’13 in 
order to address the procedural criticality, complexity, uncertainty and 
openness of recent societal developments in modern societies and their in-
creasingly critical relationships to a globalised environment as a continuous 
epistemic and political challenge that requires innovative institutions, and 
novel frameworks and approaches, but also to suggest particular policy op-
tions over others. The notion of the problem became a politically operational 
and performative concept, not a mere placeholder within a clearly defined 
scientific task. In many cases the ambition to construct problems in order 
to leverage systems into a different state became apparent. In that sense, 
problematisations provided an epistemic design that could be used to en-
gage with the question of the future development of modern societies, a pro-
cedure that allowed the gathering and arranging of data, modelling issues, 
defining their aspects and boundaries, and deriving options for action. The 
particular ways in which problems became thematic in programmatic writ-
ings and institutional agendas can be understood as a conceptual turning 
point and an epistemological effort in this transitional period in the history 
of modernity. 
In the French epistemological tradition, a similar understanding of the 
notion of the problem has been substantially theorised. Based on the philos-
ophy of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, for instance, has provided a useful 
evaluation of the truth or falsity of problems. A true problem is one that is in-
trinsically productive, a kind of ongoing, groping and experimental process 
that forces the transformation of the subject’s thought (During 2014). A false 
problem, by contrast, is one whose determination depends on something ex-
ternal, an extrinsic conditioning as opposed to an intrinsic genesis. Here the 
substituting, instrumental meaning of the word is addressed, which gives 
reason to carefully distinguish between problematisations that are chosen 
because they allow the implementation of extrinsic pre-defined measures 
and solutions and those that allow an intrinsic differential evolution of a 
problematic situation (Deleuze 1968; Bowden 2018). For an epistemological 
13  On ‘epistemic design’ see Isaac (2012b, 80, 88), who defines epistemic design as the con-
cern with the problem of ‘how to arrange [the social scientist’s] data so as to make them 
represent and undergird the theoretical claims about the social world they wished to 
make’ and the challenge of how ‘to arrange the data so that they could serve as instru-
ments for investigating and perhaps even manipulating value systems in actually existing 
social systems’.
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assessment of post-positivist scientific approaches in specific historical con-
texts, and for analysing how problematisations provide an epistemic design 
of specific matters of concern, this might be a helpful distinction to make. It 
helps to recognise critical approaches that are truly productive and trans-
formative in character but also to identify cases where problems are used 
in rather instrumental terms, which also resembles the criticism voiced by 
Hoos and Boguslaw.
Researching through the problematique: 
institutions, issues and designs
Among the more radical adopters of the notion was the Armenian, Tur-
key-born, systems scientist Hasan Özbekhan, who had studied at the London 
School of Economics, then worked for RAND and the Systems Development 
Corporation in Santa Monica. He was the author of a number of inf luential 
writings in which he outlined theoretical approaches around the notion of 
the ‘problematique’ that circulated between the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), RAND, the Club of Rome and the 
network of futurists from the late 1960s. Özbekhan argued that ‘the all-per-
vasive analytic or positivistic methodologies’ modern planning processes 
rely on ‘failed to provide us with an ethos, a morality, ideals, institutions, a 
vision of man and of mankind and a politics which are in consonance with 
the way of life that has evolved as the expression of our success’. At the OECD 
Working Symposium in Bellagio on long-range forecasting and planning in 
1968, with an illustrious group of participants such as Jay Forrester, Erich 
Jantsch, René Dubos, Stafford Beer, Aurelio Peccei and others, Özbekhan 
outlined a ‘General Theory of Planning’ in which he rejected the idea of val-
ue-free approaches. Recognising the current ‘problematical situation’ means 
that ‘there exists a dissonance between the situation and the value system: 
[…] If planning is viewed as a problem-solving device, then the emphasis of 
action is to bring changes in the environment while leaving the value system 
untouched and thus to achieve consonance between the two. If planning is 
viewed as a continuous organisation of progress throughout the environ-
ment, then it becomes necessary to effect changes in the value system as well 
as in the environment to achieve consonance between the two.’ (Özbekhan 
1969: 152) Consequently, his first technical and methodological proposal for 
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the Club of Rome was designed to ‘cognize and investigate the all-pervasive 
problematique which is built into our situation, through some new leap of 
inventiveness’. Özbekhan’s generalised problematique was a ‘system-wide, 
interdependent, interactive and intersensitive [complex], immune to linear 
or sequential resolution, [and] ecosystemic in character’ – it posed nothing 
solvable, but something ‘that inheres in our situation’. In order to understand 
and intervene in the dynamics and to reach ‘ecological balance’ he suggest-
ed a ‘coarse graining’ of the complex problematique by identifying a set of 
‘continuous critical problems’ covering the ‘biological, physiological, physical, 
psychological, ethical, religious, technological, economic, political, national, 
international, communal, attitudinal, intellectual, institutional’ aspects of 
it. A combination of conceptual and axiomatic work and a cybernetic system 
would allow study of the behaviours of different set-ups and exploration of 
both the ‘logical, normal future (forecast)’ and a ‘normative future, imagined 
in the light of the value-base of ecological balance’. In that sense, the aim of 
Özbekhan’s proposal was ‘not research in the traditional sense but invention’ 
(Özbekhan 1970). 
The activities of the Club of Rome were organised for some time around 
Özbekhan’s idea of a highly relational or interdependent ‘world problema-
tique’ as the ‘complex of problems […that] occur to some degree in all societ-
ies; they contain technical, social, economic, and political elements’.14 The call 
for inventiveness was heard by Jay Forrester at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT), who together with his team translated the structure 
of the problematique into a computer model, which the famous Limits to 
Growth study was based on. However, many aspects of Özbekhan’s compre-
hensive, ambitious and ref lexive proposal were neglected in Forrester’s sys-
tems dynamics approach. The criticism Limits to Growth received, particularly 
14  ‘[T]he complex of problems troubling men of all nations: poverty in the midst of plenty; 
degradation of the environment; loss of faith in institutions; uncontrolled urban spread; 
insecurity of employment; alienation of youth; rejection of traditional values; and infla-
tion and other monetary and economic disruptions. […] It is the predicament of mankind 
that man can perceive the problematique, yet, despite his considerable knowledge and 
skills, he does not understand the origins, significance, and interrelationships of its many 
components and thus is unable to devise ef fective responses. This failure occurs in large 
part because we continue to examine single items in the problematique without under-
standing that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, that change in one element 
means change in the others.’ (Meadows et al. 1972: 10-11)
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because of the methodologically closed approach, the lack of data, the com-
puter fetishism and the doomsday mentality, became an iconic tale on the 
ethical and epistemological challenges of experimenting with high ambition 
in the realm of the problematique (Vieille Blanchard 2010). 
At the same time, within the OECD, initially founded to coordinate eco-
nomic policies among the Western nations and first and foremost seen as a 
technocratic institution implementing the paradigm of economic growth in 
the Cold War setting, an ecologically oriented and growth-critical discourse 
on what were called the ‘problems of modern society’ was launched. At the 
centre of the debate were some high-level OECD bureaucrats with strong 
ties to the Club of Rome, such as the Secretaries-General Thorkil Kristensen 
and Emile van Lennep, and the Director of Scientific Affairs Alexander King. 
Driven by the events of 1968 and the seemingly interrelated phenomena of 
social, political and environmental crises and the negative by-products of 
technology and industrialisation, they questioned the potential of exist-
ing political institutions to catalyse a global debate on the detrimental so-
cial and ecological effects of uncontrolled growth, the spread of technology, 
and individual and social alienation, which they deemed necessary. They 
regarded many of the existing institutions as ‘guardians of the status quo 
and hence the enemies of change’, simply because they had only ‘post-facto 
mechanisms’ available, a statement that underlines the perceived necessity 
of interdisciplinary systems perspectives and futures research as political 
technology. They were not only sceptical about the readiness of political in-
stitutions but also criticised disciplinary attitudes, ‘the extraordinary arro-
gance of the economist, the naïvety of the natural scientist, the ignorance of 
the politician, and the bloody-mindedness of the bureaucrat’, all unable to 
tackle the ensemble of problems they had identified (Alexander King 1970, 
c.f. Schmelzer 2017, 248). While the Club of Rome would choose global mod-
elling as a tool for public intervention and discussion of the problematique, 
the OECD set up a directorate for environmental policies, at a time when no 
member country had an environmental ministry, and started an ambitious 
programme to develop alternative indicators intended to measure progress 
towards increasing the ‘quality of life’ (Schmelzer 2017, 308). Yet, while the 
latter failed and the OECD would – during the backlash of the 1970s – launch 
environmental policies that were ultimately compatible with the growth 
paradigm, these heterodox debates within the OECD provide an instructive 
case about the possibilities of autonomous supranational bureaucracies and 
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their ability to form a platform for critical intellectual and political inter-
vention through problematisations that challenge existing orders and para-
digms (Cox 1981). Historical research can reveal the unexpected contexts of 
some of these proposed alternative and heterodox views and contribute an 
analysis of how critical interventions have been made and the reasons for if 
they could, or could not, prevail. 
Another initiative that deserves to be mentioned here as an example of a 
specifically new ‘détente mode’ of scientific internationalism was the estab-
lishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
The non-governmental, international think tank opened its doors in 1973 in 
Laxenburg, Vienna and was funded initially by 12 national member organi-
sations (mostly the science academies) from both sides of the Iron Curtain.15 
The initiative dated back to the mid 1960s, when President Lyndon B. Johnson 
launched the policies of bridge-building towards the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, designed to resolve international tensions and to develop transna-
tional relations throughout the (post-)industrialised world. Among the ini-
tiatives pursued was the establishment of a joint research centre as a site for 
practical, scientific collaboration between scientists and policy experts with 
the goal of developing mutually compatible policy expertise. As mentioned 
above, transnational scientific and intellectual networks have been charac-
teristic features in the intellectual landscape at a time when various pro-
tagonists shared deeper concerns about the future development of modern, 
industrialised societies in rapidly changing techno-scientific environments, 
interdependent economies and shifting values. The establishment of IIASA 
is perhaps one of the most obvious examples of these emergent discussions 
and the development of international approaches to the co-production of 
knowledge and expertise. The initiative was launched at a press conference 
at the White House in December 1966, when the idea of a joint institute with 
the Soviet Union and other ‘industrialised nations in East and West Europe 
and elsewhere’ was presented to a wider public by the president of the Ford 
Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, who was commissioned by President Johnson 
15  These 12 included the USA, the Soviet Union, the UK, France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Bulgaria, West Germany, East Germany, Canada and Japan. During the 1970s five 
more countries were to join: Austria in 1973, Hungary in 1974, and Sweden, Finland and the 
Netherlands in 1976. On the history of IIASA see Riska-Campbell 2011 and Rindzevičiūtė 
2016; on détente science see Graf 2017.
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to pursue the project. He told the press: ‘The kind of problem we are dealing 
with here is that all advanced economies share the problems of efficiently 
managing large and complicated enterprises […] We do think that […] if we 
could quietly make progress in this kind of exchange of knowledge and know-
how and have exploration in these fields of peaceful activity in advanced 
societies, it would be a contribution […] to the wider cause of international 
understanding and of peace. […] The problem is to take this clear fact of great 
common concern in matters that have to do with the business of living in an 
advanced society, or an advancing society, and see whether there aren’t ways 
of setting up a new framework or a new institution or a new focus in which 
more progress can be made for the benefit of all.’16 What we can understand 
from the wording is that the joint research centre was to be designed as an 
institutional response to the emerging new worldview of multifaceted power 
and interdependency. Collaborative research would help to develop common 
understandings through the study of problems arising from increasingly in-
terdependent societies in a globalising environment. And while some of the 
protagonists certainly envisioned IIASA to become some kind of Cold War 
tool that would allow the exertion of a rather unilateral inf luence and trans-
fer of systems expertise and management knowledge in order to maintain 
the prerogative of interpretation – or even to erode and dissolve communist 
ideology – the actual coproduction of ‘common problems of advanced societ-
ies’ unfolding at IIASA through collaborative, interdisciplinary work allowed 
scientific internationalism to evolve into something new. 
It took six years for IIASA to open its doors, during which the initiative 
had been developed further in politically delicate negotiations. The notion of 
the ‘common problems of advanced societies’ provided a sustainable if ab-
stract rationale, but the focus on problems and applied research would lat-
er also structure the institute’s research matrix. Research projects at IIASA 
conducted by multidisciplinary teams of social and natural scientists, sys-
tems analysts, mathematicians and policy experts from both sides of the Iron 
Curtain would focus on complex long-term problems that similarly occurred 
in all advanced societies, such as problems of transboundary environmental 
pollution, sustainable energy supply, and urban and infrastructure plan-
16  Bundy, McGeorge, George Christian, and Francis M. Bator. ‘News Conference at the White 
House 673-A’, December 15, 1966. NSF Subject File: East-West Institute. Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library, Austin, TX; Johnson 1966.
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ning, but also on the interdisciplinary co-production of frameworks to shape 
knowledge and expertise on newly emerging global issues such as climate 
change and world population. The institute became a central spot where the 
systems approach was developed further into an innovative and increasingly 
ref lexive, performative and post-positivist policy science. It was combined 
with more profound research from various disciplines as a large number of 
internationally renowned scientists – ecologists, physicists, economists, so-
ciologists, etc. – worked at IIASA. At the institute systems analysis met a 
complex institutional structure and the objectives were usually not defined 
by a single client. The projects often had multilateral and even global dimen-
sions and the conf lict potential was obvious. The actual conf licts, however, 
often didn’t manifest themselves along the ideological lines between East 
and West, but rather between different disciplinary perspectives, episte-
mologies, attitudes towards the future and towards the properties and sta-
tus of systems. On the project level such inconsistency could be turned into 
an asset. IIASA researchers developed, for example, methodologies such as 
multi-objective decision-making, participatory methods, integrated mod-
elling approaches and comparative case studies. In contrast to previous 
systems approaches they attempted to take the social, political and institu-
tional aspects of systems analysis more seriously into account, for instance 
the plural rationalities of the various stakeholders affected by policy-making 
and transformation processes or the importance of previously neglected is-
sues such as risk and uncertainty (Duller 2016). IIASA’s lasting impact and 
legacy lies in the provision of a sometimes contested but often innovative 
environment for the collaborative coproduction of common problems. A de-
politicised systems approach allowed for international collaboration, mutu-
al learning and varieties of boundary transgressions, in which disciplinary 
perspectives, trainings and subjectivities were made explicit and sometimes 
put aside in order to generate novel responses to the challenges of late mod-
ern societies (Rindzevičiūtė 2016). As a result of these collaborations numer-
ous novel interdisciplinary and multilateral perspectives emerged at IIASA 
– among other places – that broadened the scope of questions to be dealt with 
on a scientific basis: especially, as there was often no exchange or joint prob-
lematisation at a political level on issues such as transboundary pollution, 
the challenges of technological change and associated risks and the problem 
of sustainable development. 
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Conclusion
Egle Rindzevičiūtė has recently argued that the mobilisation of complex sys-
tems perspectives and the ‘smuggling’ of policy sciences developed at IIASA, 
entailing notions of uncertainty and limits to knowing, had a liberalising 
impact on Soviet governance in the sense that they challenged totalitarian 
notions of control (Rindzevičiūtė 2016: 206-209). In a similar vein we can de-
scribe how these joint research initiatives opened up an international space 
for the construction and governance of transboundary problems in Europe, 
or how particular problematisations and the enactment of more ambigu-
ous epistemologies and proposed frameworks to think about sustainable 
future pathways of modern societies both confirmed and challenged val-
ues, epistemic ideologies and imaginations of modernity (Schrickel 2017). In 
that sense we can evaluate problem-oriented research and interdisciplinary 
thinking at IIASA and other places in terms of the questions and futures per-
spectives generated and the interventions and differences they made (Barry/
Born 2013). In any case, they represent various ways of actively creating and 
engaging with the future outlooks of modern societies in the light of emerg-
ing global challenges.
This paper presented an integrative historical approach to the study of 
changing conceptual frameworks and epistemological developments in in-
terdisciplinary scientific fields such as systems science, futures research and 
policy sciences, which have been traced through the making of novel insti-
tutions in the years around 1970. It attempted to embed conceptual devel-
opments in the scholarly world in a broader intellectual and political envi-
ronment fostering increasingly ref lexive and constructive approaches. The 
positivist approach to progress, growth and development, which had been 
carefully constructed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was called into 
question. The same applies to teleological ideas about the future and societal 
progress. It has been suggested to study these epistemic shifts through the 
changing notion of the problem, which was brought forward in various con-
texts at the time as a post-positivist operational concept. The conjuncture of 
and ‘problem-talk’ has been discussed as a marker for a questioning situa-
tion in the international history of modern societies, and it has been argued 
that through the construction of problems broader intellectual debates on 
the perceived challenges for modern societies, in the light of social, political 
and technological developments, have been enacted. In a historical moment 
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of post-Cold War uncertainty, complexity and openness that came to the fore 
in the writings and discussions of various scholars, institutional entrepre-
neurs and policy advisors, the high-modernist problem-solving mentality of 
the previous era had lost its epistemic appeal. 
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Sustainable Development (SD) finds its discursive breakthrough in 1987 
through the final report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future 
(Vanhulst/Beling 2014; Sneddorn et al. 2006). The Brundtland report sub-
stantially conveys the regulative specification of a worldwide social and eco-
logical national economic development, justified by the possibility of equal 
opportunities also for future generations (intergenerational justice). In ad-
dition, this development should be designed in such a way that equal access 
to resources for all living people is possible (intragenerational justice) (Hauff 
1987; Dingler 2003). Reactions to the report reveal the nature of its global 
regulatory appeal, because intra- and inter-generational justice can only be 
defined according to political values (Vanhulst/Beling 2014; Grunwald 2011). 
In 2015, the United Nations set the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
differentiating and equating SD explicitly with peace and security, natu-
ral and cultural diversity, democracy, eradicating poverty, as well as equal 
rights and opportunities for women and men (SDGs 2015). SD simultaneous-
ly tends to be shaped by a hegemonic discourse of SD (Hajer 1995; Höhler/Luks 
2004; Brown 2016; Vanhulst/Zaccai 2016; Albán/Rosero 2016)1 that ultimately 
1  Discourse understandings, or the dif ferent discursive analytical orientations of the au-
thors who refer to the hegemonic discourse of SD, are not discussed here. My own, previ-
ously carried out, discourse-analytical research (Meyer 2020) is based on the understand-
ing of critical discourse analysis. According to Adele Clarke (2012) critical discourse analysis 
pays special attention to the ways in which dominant theories emerge and, through their 
discourses, (re)produce power relations.
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counteracts SD as it is envisaged by the SDGs. Around the 1990s, so-called 
sustainability sciences began to form and characterise themselves as inter- or 
transdisciplinary. Sustainability sciences are constituted by and respond 
to international sustainability politics and organisations, intertwined with 
hegemonic political interests. Transdisciplinary (td) sustainability sciences 
especially aim to generate topics and research questions in collaboration 
with representatives of diverse societal groups in order to identify pressing 
sustainability problems. Accordingly, questions arise concerning the entan-
glement with and positioning towards a superordinate hegemonic discourse 
of SD. Thus, transformative and interventionist approaches to exploring a 
sustainable cohabitation are being hampered. The questions arise, firstly, if, 
and, secondly, which theories towards societal transformation are missing 
in td sustainability sciences, and how may sustainability and td sustainabil-
ity research be re-invented in order to explore and shape a sustainable co-
habitation.
My contribution starts with my methodology, the problematisation of 
‘notions of problems’ (Bowden/Kelly 2018: 3). After the introduction of the 
methodology follows an outline of the hegemonic discourse of SD and the 
consequences it produces. That leads to the introduction to td sustainabili-
ty sciences. The objective is to analyze how problematisations in td sustain-
ability sciences relate to concepts that have emerged through the hegemonic 
discourse of sustainability. In sustainability sciences, I suggest this is the 
concept of challenge. While the first part deals with the problematic of (td) 
sustainability sciences, the second part deals with the problematic in td sus-
tainability research. The differentiated addressing of the problematic deals 
with methodological considerations and experiments for a td sustainability 
research that is aware of its entanglement of epistemological and normative 
dimensions. The aim of my research is to explicate reproducing discourses 
and constructions of handling problems in td sustainability sciences that 
suppress the subversive potential of radical transdisciplinary logics and 
comprehensions of a generative problematic in td sustainability research. 
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Methodology: problematisation of problem understandings 
Transdisciplinarity and td sustainability research can gain significance as 
a counter project to the hegemonic discourse of SD. However, td sustainability 
sciences are partly interwoven with the hegemonic discourse. Being a rela-
tively new phenomenon within the discourse, their efficacy is limited from 
the outset by existing power relations. It is here that the problematic unfolds 
itself as a possibility to work with. The problematic of td sustainability re-
search can be found in its in between position amid distinct, inconsistent, 
contradictory paradigms. Td sustainability sciences are, as Michel Foucault 
would say, ‘always inscribed in a game of power, but always also a limitation 
or rather: bound to the limits of knowledge, which emerge from it, but nev-
ertheless condition it’ (Foucault 1978: 123, in Bührmann/Schneider 2008: 53, 
my translation).
The concept of problem has a major bearing on td sustainability sciences. 
On the one hand, td sustainability sciences tend to be considered as ethical 
and intellectual revolutions or innovations in the mode of thought and, thus, 
as solutions to sustaining global social-ecological problems. On the other 
hand, these problems persist and accumulate due to another hegemonic 
economic-political level that is often overlooked in research practice. These 
problems then tend to be at the same time the condition of possibility for 
td sustainability sciences to be constituted, legitimised, and made possible. 
The meanings of problems and their function for td sustainability sciences 
therefore seem to constitute their problematic. Starting from a problematic 
constitution of problems ‘offers heuristic notions that allow the reformulation 
of the manner in which problems are conceived’ and, as Maria Kaika further 
writes concerning a radical political ecology, ‘[t]his inclusive approach does 
not place itself on “managerial” ground’ (Kaika 2003, in Blanchon/Graefe 
2012: 47), but on a philosophical movement to pose different research ques-
tions and other problems to be investigated (Bachelard 2012; Maniglier 2019). 
In which contexts of meaning are problems posed? What would be a differ-
ent theorisation of the problem? With Foucault problematisation means to 
carve out conditions of possibilities that enable different solutions to symp-
tomatic problems (Defert/Ewald 2005). By scrutinising supposed solutions 
in td sustainability sciences, I will first make the problem approachable.
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The problematic of sustainability sciences
Hegemonic discourse of sustainable development
The hegemonic discourse of SD is aligned to neoliberal forms and goals of 
organising (environmental) policies towards profit maximisation of market 
enterprises (Castree 2002). A critical discourse analysis published in 2014 by 
Carol Kambites examines discourse strands of SD in the respective strategy 
papers of British governments in the 1990s and 2000s and comes to the con-
clusion: ‘sustainable development is presented from within the paradigm of 
neoliberalism and neoclassical economics’ (Kambites 2014: 345). In Germany 
the analysis by Johannes Dingler on SD shows that a ‘decrease in the stress of 
intragenerational justice’ (Dingler 2003: 255, my translation) can be seen. ‘In-
tragenerational justice is, thus, increasingly reduced to equality of opportu-
nity and subsumed under market-based instruments’ (ibid, my translation). 
At the same time intergenerational justice is prioritised, which matches well 
with the normative goal of having the chance of private asset protection and 
its intergenerational transfer. These patterns of significations of SD neglect 
the discourses of social redistribution within one generation. 
The research project ‘NEDS – Nachhaltige Entwicklung zwischen 
Durchsatz und Symbolik’ (‘Sustainable development between throughput 
and symbolism’) analyzes the Brundtland report regarding the economic 
construction of ecological reality. The research project identifies seven co-
herent theses – thereby differentiating the thesis of the unsustainability 
of modernity. They outline how ‘economic logic, natural and technological 
scientific expectations and juridical, administrative regulations intertwine 
and have contributed significantly to a discursive version of sustainability 
as a management problem’ (Höhler/Luks 2004, my translation). The authors 
see SD shifting from an understanding of nature and ecology to an under-
standing of mere economically manageable and controllable environments 
divided into scarce resources. The hegemonic economic conception of SD is 
ref lected in the guiding principle of weak sustainability (Williams/Millington 
2004; Ziegler/Ott 2011), which assumes only a few, isolable sustainability di-
mensions, as well as their interchangeability: economic, ecological or social 
goals should be integrated into behaviour and economic activity. In Germa-
ny, the final report of the Enquete Commission, ‘Protection of Man and the 
Environment’, proposes a subdivision into three pillars: ecological, econom-
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ic, and social (Enquete Commission of the 13th German Bundestag 1997). In 
addition, multi-pillar models and one-pillar models have been developed 
(‘from one dimension to eight dimensions’, Tremmel 2003: 116, my transla-
tion). Also, the cultural, the institutional and the political are mentioned as 
important parts (Michelsen/Adomßent 2014). Moreover, in this discourse, 
not all authors speak of pillars, but instead, for example, of different dimen-
sions, like Niranji Satanarachchi and Takashi Mino (2014) or the Preamble 
of the SDGs. The concept of strong sustainability (Ott/Döring 2004; Ziegler/
Ott 2011), however, is not contained within the logic of the pillar-discourse: 
nature as an ecological basis of life is not considered substitutable. The rela-
tive approach via goals, pillars or dimensions of sustainability has different 
effects as to how social or ecological target dimensions are integrated into a 
discourse that is governed by a priori economic ratings.
What are the problems of the hegemonic discourse 
of sustainable development?
Human rights, which are valid for all current and future humans (Ott 2014; 
SDGs 2015), count as substantial minimal goals for sustainability and thus 
constitute the basis of normative sustainability ethics (Carnau 2011).2 From 
a sustainability ethical perspective, human behaviour can therefore be as-
sessed on the basis of whether it is life-sustaining (Carnau 2011; Olssen 2014). 
‘The hegemonic discourse of sustainable development is in the discursive 
tradition of […] modernity’ (Dingler 2003: 484, my translation). The social 
development indicated in the discourse, however, could have led to a crisis 
threatening the livelihoods of today’s and future people’s lives (‘thesis of the 
unsustainability of modernity’, ibid: 493).3 SD strategies, as they refer to in 
the Brundtland report, aim at achieving economic growth that is desirable 
2  This work is not concerned with the definition of a normative-prescriptive ethics of sustain-
ability. Thus, the ‘future ,̓ related to human rights and climate change, remains open. The 
work, however, is based on the premise that a normative-prescriptive ethics of sustainabil-
ity is recognised.
3  The designation of an “ecological modernization” by Hajer (1995) counts as an origin in the 
German- and English-speaking discourse. Likewise, the criticism of Eblinghaus and Stickler 
from 1996 can be mentioned. Criticism of eurocentrism and the globalisation of occiden-
tal development theories, in this respect, comes from Arturo Escobar (1995) and Wolfgang 
Sachs (1993; 2002). Other authors grasp the thesis of the ‘unsustainability of modernityʼ 
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for as many nation states as possible in order to establish both inter- and 
intra-generational justice. The unit in which national economic growth is 
measured is the quantitatively expressed gross domestic product (GDP). 
This means that the goal of SD is that all countries always achieve the highest 
possible economic parameter – sustainable growth or green growth (Höhler/
Luks 2004; Brand/Wissen 2017; Acosta/Brand 2018). In economic theory, 
higher growth figures equate to more capital being available for the state to 
finance environmental protection or social compensation. However, in or-
der to achieve these growth figures, nature, the environment, resources and 
people – life – are subordinated to economic development and consumed 
in life-destroying proportions (Moore 2016). This happens in an exponential 
way, because of the national-economic belief in higher growth numbers as a 
solution and in the complete governability of social-ecological problems at 
local and global level. Thus, national-economic theory of this kind and its 
politics are dysfunctional as they cannot meet the requirements of sustain-
ability. An analysis of the SDGs shows that sustainability-relevant norms are 
attributed to the local and global levels, which in turn can have effects at the 
national-economic meso-level, ‘as the normative core and the focus of ac-
tion and interventions’ (Schmieg et al. 2018). However, the non-sustainable 
norms of the meso-state level are not problematised in the UN documents 
(Parenti 2016). The transnational agenda of SD, emerging at the beginning 
of the 1970s from environmental and justice movements, has been incorpo-
rated into the neoliberal agenda, starting in the 1980s and 1990s with more 
and more success. Sustainability, therefore, under the roof of SD, serves to 
strengthen and spread neoliberal hegemony, leaving eco-political and hu-
man rights interests in marginalised positions. If sustainability was caught 
in a neoliberal hegemony, fractures within the latter are showing up and 
might change constellations (Brown 2016). This is also ref lected in the SDGs, 
as important documents that aim to advance sustainability (Schmieg et al. 
2018), and that differ from international sustainability documents of the 
late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. And, as Julien Vanhulst and Adrián Beling write, 
‘even if conservative understandings of SD remain dominant, they continue 
slowly to lose ascendancy over global debates in the discursive field of SD, 
as the growing emergence of alternative discourses (and their coalitions) 
(Dingler 2003) or the “economic construction of ecological reality” (Höhler/Luks 2004) as a 
dispositive (Timpf 2000).
The Problematic of Transdisciplinary Sustainability Sciences 75
proves’ (Vanhulst/Beling 2014: 61). The very question in and beyond this con-
tribution is how td sustainability sciences have reacted to neoliberal history 
and present dynamics and, thus, relate to the hegemonic discourse of SD. 
(Transdisciplinary) Sustainability sciences
Sustainability sciences themselves make up parts of complex dynamic sus-
tainability contexts within the human-nature system and behave towards 
them in an evaluative and ref lexive way (Satanarachchi/Mino 2014). In the 
constitution of sustainability sciences there are two strikingly parallel devel-
opments: on the one hand projects in the theory of science, such as transdis-
ciplinarity, and on the other hand transnational negotiations. In both cases, 
it is a question of moving boundaries, in collaborations between scientific 
and non-scientific actors (Vilsmaier 2018; Schmidt 2011), in order to pursue 
SD. The spectrum of discursive events that constitute sustainability sciences 
is wide. For the sake of systematics they can be represented on five inter-
woven levels: 1) political with the UN conferences4; 2) theory and politics of 
science with concepts such as transdisciplinarity (Klein et al. 2001; Osborne 
2015), mode-2 (Gibbons et al. 1994; Gibbons 1999; Nowotny et al. 2001), or 
post-normal science (Funtowicz/Ravetz 1993: 3) publications such as from 
Robert Kates and William Clark et al. in Science in 2001 that present sustain-
ability sciences as a programmatic scientific research field (Kates et al. 2001); 
4) non-university institutes, NGOs, civil society, companies that strongly re-
4  ‘United Nations Conference on Human Environment’ in 1972, ‘United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development’ in 1992. From these conferences emerged programmes, 
as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the final report of the World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development and the Agenda 21, the World Climate Summits, in-
ternational follow-up conferences such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg in 2002, or the SDGs document in 2015. There were also counter-reactions 
to the European and North American ‘global consensual positions on ecology and devel-
opment’ (Vanhulst/Beling 2014: 55). The Latin American Global Model (or Bariloche Model) 
(Herrera et al. 1976) replied in 1976 to the MIT report ‘The limits to growth’ (Meadows et al. 
1972), and, in 1991, the report ‘Nuestra propia agenda sobre desarrollo y medio ambiente’ 
(‘Our own agenda on development and environment’) of the Development and Environ-
ment Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean was published in response to the 
Brundtland report and in preparation for Rio 1992 (Vanhulst/Beling 2014; Vanhulst/Hevia 
2016: 178). See also Meyer/Vilsmaier 2020.
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acted to 5) global events that destroyed nature and called for environmental 
policy measures. 
Joachim Spangenberg distinguishes the understandings of sustainabil-
ity sciences as being between a ‘more traditional disciplinary-based science 
for sustainability and the transdisciplinary science of sustainability’ (Span-
genberg 2011: 275). Td sustainability sciences fall in the category of science of 
sustainability. This emergent mode of research is aiming at the plurality of 
knowledges and perspectives, as well as process orientation combined with 
a normative orientation towards sustainability or SD. It is criticising mod-
ern institutionalised demarcations and understandings of research, such 
as scientific objectivity and progress (Vilsmaier et al. 2017; Vilsmaier 2018). 
Research in td sustainability sciences may open up a platform on which the 
boundaries that constitute research are shifted (Schmidt 2011). Relation-
ships between the scientific and non-scientific emerge, for example in con-
sideration of traditional or local everyday knowledge (Klein 2014).
According to Julie Thompson Klein’s analysis of discourses on transdis-
ciplinarity, the dominant understanding of and lived research cultures in td 
sustainability sciences is attributable to the ‘discourse of problem solving’ 
(Klein 2014: 70; Schmidt 2011). The discourse is represented by the Swiss-
based ‘Network for Transdisciplinary Research’ known as ‘td-net’, that was 
founded at a congress held in Zurich in 2000. Thus it is sometimes classified 
as a ‘Swiss or German school of TD because the approach was signaled in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in Swiss and German contexts of environmental 
research’ (ibid: 74). The results of a collocation analysis focusing on the con-
cept of problem in English-speaking articles of the journal GAiA published up 
to and including the year 2017 confirm that td sustainability sciences appeal 
to problem-solving as their normative target (Meyer 2020). 
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Exemplary problem understandings in transdisciplinary 
sustainability sciences 
Controversial problem contents as justification moments 
for sustainability sciences
The first UN conference on the human environment in Stockholm in 1972, as 
a reference point for sustainability sciences, showed that what are regarded 
as sustainability-related societal problems is contested. The countries of the 
Global North in particular demanded measures to limit industrial pollution, 
while the countries of the Global South pushed for a catch-up of prosperity 
and brought forward medical and educational concerns. There were there-
fore different ideas about this conference, which resulted in a compromise 
to capture everything as environment and to conceptualise human progress 
with the label of SD in order to dissolve the contradiction or better emphasise 
the compatibility between economic growth and environmental protection 
(Hopwood et al. 2005; Sneddorn et al. 2006; Vanhulst/Beling 2014).5 
Challenge
The normative background against which problems are assessed is a func-
tioning society as a prerequisite for SD. SD itself is equated with a societal 
challenge. The use of the concept of challenge points to the following de-
velopments: problems associated with sustainability are labeled as societal 
challenge(s), replacing so-called old social problems, like hunger, illness, and 
poverty (Rockström et al. 2009; Jerneck et al. 2011). The sustainability chal-
lenges, in their unlocalised rhetoric, refer to expected welfare losses or gains, 
are uncertain, speculative, and cannot be understood by social collectives 
from experiences (Jerneck et al. 2011). At the same time, they are commu-
nicated as alarming due to the irretrievability of unique opportunities with 
advancing time (Moore 2016). Within market economy thinking challenges 
are connoted positively as they simultaneously offer an opportunity for in-
novative advancement and progress for a sustainable society, if correspond-
5  The comprehensive empirical question about how the controversial problems found their 
ways into td sustainability sciences or were not assessed as relevant, must first be put 
aside.
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ing – also positively connoted – risk-oriented performance is shown. The 
sustainability challenges thus fit without contradictions into the discourse 
of the freeing of the markets from socio-ecological policy regulations. 
Sustainability challenge is a relative concept that does not diagnose any 
spatial and temporal limits or goals in view of future uncertainties to be 
speculated. Therefore the term describes the discourse of SD as a dynam-
ic shift of boundaries or relative goal within the concept of weak sustain-
ability. This is incompatible with the discourse on strong sustainability (Ott/
Döring 2004; Ziegler/Ott 2011), which in turn identifies planetary boundaries 
(Rockström et al. 2009).6 Within these boundaries all human endeavor and 
striving, the mode of economic activity, has to happen. This discourse was 
stronger in Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) and in the environmental 
concerns at the beginning of the 1970s (Williams/Millington 2004). What is 
also striking is another development that goes along with the terms of the 
‘problem’ and ‘challenge’: ‘dilemma’ is underrepresented as a concept in sus-
tainability-related scientific publications.7 This term means that there is no 
solution that would be morally acceptable to all stakeholders – we remain 
terminologically in the discourse strand of the td sustainability sciences – to 
derive a conf lict-free action. The concept of ‘dilemma’ indicates epistemolog-
ical or ethical issues, namely, how to deal with manifold and conf licting epis-
temologies or moral norms, or which ethical legitimacy becomes accepted 
and how. These questions are not central in td sustainability sciences (Krohn 
et al. 2017). It therefore seems promising to work on the thesis of a repression 
of dilemma and conf lict in discourses on sustainability and SD in light of the 
solution of familiar social problems with market economic strategies – re-
branded as sustainability challenges. One hypothesis is that the prioritisa-
tion of intergenerational instead of intragenerational research questions and 
the marginalised theories dealing with differences and moral conf licts in td 
sustainability sciences explain each other.
After the naming of the problematic of td sustainability sciences, the 
next part of this chapter attempts to highlight theoretical-methodological 
6  The Rockström et al. paper, however, leaves a space for discussion open by using the term 
challenge. 
7  No search results (August 2018) came from the terms ‘moral dilemma AND sustainab*’ 
in the Web of Science, a relevant database of scientific publications (https://login.webof-
knowledge.com/).
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starting points, which answer to just that epistemic-ambiguous (Harrasser/
Sohldju 2016) problematic, namely being taught to think in an even, sustain-
able way ‘that created today’s turbulence [and] is unlikely to help us solve it’ 
(Moore 2016: 1). In so doing, the figure of the problematic, as it is envisaged 
in French philosophy of the 20th century, is connected to td sustainability 
research for further development.
The problematic in transdisciplinary sustainability research
In td sustainability research, moral and epistemological dimensions are in-
terwoven. Reading about the problematic in twentieth-century French phi-
losophy8 raises the question of an epistemology of the problematic that can sup-
plement the basic normative coordinates in sustainability and sustainability 
research – change and adaptation – with basic questions. Such as, how does 
td sustainability research understand, explain and perform relationships 
between and through the form of research itself, concerning individuality, 
collectivity, subjectivity, and objectivity? In the following, I take up Gilbert 
Simondon, because his thinking of the problematic can enrich conceptual 
approaches in the process- and change-oriented td sustainability research 
(Engbers 2020) that orient beyond hegemonic discourses and practices of 
SD.9 With his conceptualisation of dynamics and change through close 
studies of the modes of functioning of the living, Simondon is able to offer 
a ‘radically transdisciplinary’ (Scott 2014: 3) alternative to a mechanical con-
cept of development covered in the hegemonic discourse of SD. In contrast, 
the problematic becoming, or individuation, as he calls the dynamics as 
dimensions of the living, keeps moving in permanent relation to particular, 
multi-layered, multi-dimensional, interior and exterior (Voss 2018: 101) en-
vironments. Individuation describes the inventive finding of a partial own 
in the conditional higher social dimension, by transindividual participation 
(Simondon 1964/2007: 31; Voss 2018: 96, 104). The psychic and the collective 
8  The interdisciplinary research project ‘Complexity or Control? Paradigms for sustainable 
development’, in preparation for the workshop ‘Thinking the Problematic’, read together 
several philosophical texts.
9  I have worked with a few existing translations into German and English of his work as well 
as secondary literature.
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are constituted by individuation (Simondon 1964/2007: 36).10 Individuation, 
as a structural description of the dynamics and vectors of change, is neither 
to be understood as a sole adapting to the specific higher social dimension, 
nor to be understood in such a way as to be based solely on the change of 
the higher social dimension. Rather, individuation is explained by invent-
ing internal structures (Voss 2018: 95), in accordance with the changed ex-
terior structures, and, thus, inventing a new metastable, participative and 
symbiotic relationship state between exteriority and interiority (Simondon 
1964/2007: 35). The problematic arises through resonating the exterior in the 
interior (Voss 2018: 94). Individuation is an ever-inventing of new problemat-
ics and always necessary dynamics of living (Simondon 1964/2007: 36). For td 
sustainability research the recognition of Simondon’s structure of individu-
ation would provide the ability to interweave with an awareness of environ-
mentality, the interior, the exterior, as well as with a different awareness of 
temporality, such as of the previous, and the future. The political-normative 
of sustainability is manifested in the dynamics of change, whereby these are 
to be thought of as, in different strengths, mutually conditional interwoven 
starting points: the interior, the relations and the exterior (Harrasser/Sohldju 
2016; Voss 2018: 98). The problematic is generative and sustainable, because it 
cannot be resolved by an optimistic detachment from material conditionali-
ties for the living such as the externalisation of the global dimensions of our 
modes of production and consumption, for example. 
Sustainability sciences are based on ethics, because of their explic-
it normative orientation towards sustainability. Which policies of change, 
which collective normative movements (such as those contained in a norma-
tive-prescriptive sustainability ethics or in the SDGs), can we deduce from 
the dynamics of life described in this way? Where do I find the normative 
momentum with regard to sustainability? A normative momentum that is 
not assessing or defining the uncertainty of a problem-transformation with 
regard to fixed outcomes, nor talking of sustainability problems or chal-
lenges, but of sustainability-related events that provoke social changes to 
challenge td sustainability research with the question: Why and how may 
td sustainability researchers shape these social changes? Which normative 
movement can be invented in concepts ‘such as ecological economics, polit-
10  Just as little is said of an initial psyche confronting an initial collective, epistemologically 
an initial juxtaposition of subject and object can be used (Maniglier 2012).
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ical ecology, de-growth, ecosocialism, ecofeminism, environmental justice’ 
(Vanhulst/Beling 2014), i.e. for the preservation of life and how to work in td 
sustainability research? 
Methodological problematic
How can we think of methodologies for td sustainability research that are 
coherent with epistemologies of the problematic (Maniglier 2019)? How to shape 
conditions for transdisciplinary possibilities to unfold the problematic? How 
can we activate an ethical practice in td sustainability research that allows 
for the speculative and failure and, thus, arrive at an ecology of practices that 
create spaces of opportunities beyond a cling to computable decision nodes 
(Stengers 2010)? 
The problematic in td sustainability research may be addressed by sit-
uational, contextualised decision-making and responsiveness, ‘local values, 
traits, beliefs, and arts for action’ (Fals Borda 1995), entrepreneurial creativi-
ty, humor (Savransky 2018), attitude and ethics (Meckesheimer 2013), as well 
as an (algorithmic) learning, which recognises temporally and spatially re-
lated, multiple different sustainability contexts and continues the resulting 
decisions as limiting moments, instead of universal, methodical programs 
(Harrasser/Sohldju 2016). Methodological approaches that go in this direc-
tion are oriented along ‘a questioning perspective that does not rush for 
direct straightforward solutions to problems, […] an appeal to imaginative 
possibilities and especially subversive imagination; a hands-on approach to 
experimentation which is not limited to linear logico-deductive processes 
[…], spaces of possibilities to play and experimentally and aesthetically en-
gage with.’ (Kagan 2015: 2) In search for a ‘particular methodology in trans-
disciplinarity’ through his Deleuze reading, Patrice Maniglier calls for ‘the 
introduction of comparative methods across the disciplines’: ‘To compare 
consists in experiencing, within one’s system of categories, a variation of the 
very type that functions as the heading that makes the comparison possible’ 
(Maniglier 2019).
There are diverse and recent methodical examples and experiments that 
can be interpreted as problematic and transdisciplinary methodology, or 
that have even been designed as such: design methods (Jonas 2015; Peukert/
Vilsmaier 2019), generative picturing (Brandner 2020), transformative sce-
nario planning (Freeth/Drimie 2016), case-based mutual-learning sessions 
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(Vilsmaier et al. 2015), mutual listening (Meckesheimer 2013), story-telling 
salons (Richter/Rohnstock 2016), and remembrance work (Haug 1999). With a 
‘thinking practice of problematic designing’, Daniela Peukert and I recently 
attempted to open an epistemological perspective in and for td sustainabil-
ity research. It is designed to methodologically capture the experience of a 
problematic (Meyer/Peukert 2020) and for a multi-dimensional methodolo-
gy allowing Simondon’s approach to be interwoven with the complexity that 
sustainability and td sustainability sciences demand. In addressing ques-
tions of how we can include the conditions of our research into the research 
itself, we can work out dimensions in and for the respective research situ-
ation. The epistemological concept of problematic designing, as a thinking 
practice, together with the methodological design canon, is an invitation to 
expand the methodological canon of td sustainability research.11
Epistemologies of the problematic start at the relation to uncertainties, 
be they the past, the other or the future (Vilsmaier et al. 2017) and regard ‘the 
effects themselves (as) the cause of the world’s development’ (Aicher 1991: 186, 
my translation; Harrasser/Sohldju 2016; Moore 2016). The (future as) play-
ful-speculative remains tied back to its conditions, namely (preservation of) 
life itself and its ‘pre-individual nature’ (Voss 2018: 96). 
That calls for an ethical research practice, protected against neoliberal 
re-enclosure (Meckesheimer 2013; Strong et al. 2016) to enable td research-
ers to make decisions without competitive pressure and not to set numerical 
optimal solutions but an ‘ecology of practices’ as a standard (Stengers 2005; 
2010). The speculative is therefore no challenge to climb the highest moun-
tain but to invent other mountain worlds. Td sustainability research must 
distinguish itself from a concept of science that evaluates the progress of 
knowledge, as well as researchers on the basis of an impact factor (Schmidt 
2011) and that always excludes other forms of research (Meckesheimer 2013), 
as well as unpredictable insights – which, however, are relevant to sustain-
ability research and, thus, to sustainability. As Andreas Kläy et al. ask in the 
journal Futures: ‘Science for sustainable development is, thus, confronted 
with a fundamental contradiction arising from this double normative fram-
ing of science policy: can scientists really live up to their role of contributing 
to sustainable development, while at the same time helping societies achieve 
11  Daniela Peukert is currently working on this topic as part of her PhD, see https://www.
danielapeukert.de/.
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only greater economic growth, at the expense of equity and the environ-
ment?’ (Kläy et al. 2015: 73)
Conclusions
The idea of sustainability allows us to ref lexively refer to different ways of 
life on planet Earth with regard to our own behaviour and at the same time 
renegotiates the material conditionality for these ways of life. Being norma-
tively oriented towards sustainability, td sustainability sciences appeal to 
problem-solving as their sole target. At the same time, they are character-
ised by a critical stance towards modern institutionalised demarcations and 
understandings of research, such as scientific objectivity and progress.
This contribution highlights epistemologies of the problematic for td sus-
tainability research against the background of the problematic constitution 
of the hegemonic discourse of SD as a critical, problematising discourse-an-
alytical approach towards problems in td sustainability sciences. The hege-
monic discourse of SD is aligned to a neoliberal economic-political interpre-
tation of organising a modern way of life (Castree 2002). Sustainability, thus, 
under the roof of SD, might serve to strengthen and spread neoliberal hege-
mony and is the product of a culture, based on a ‘Eurocentric Cartesian worl-
dview’ (Vanhulst/Beling 2014: 59; Meyer/Vilsmaier 2020), that has a specific 
relationship, namely a separating, between the individual and the collective, 
humanity and nature (Moore 2016). Ecological interests, as well as the con-
cern that ‘no one will be left behind’ (SDGs 2015: Preamble) are then left in 
marginalised positions. The hegemonic discourse on SD likewise requires 
the unsustainability of modern ways of life and economy (Dingler 2003) and 
does not deal with the unsustainable state of the national economy in trans-
national markets (Parenti 2016). 
Thus, the project of td sustainability research offers a problematic op-
portunity for its own restructuring. A sustainability (research) ethics of the 
problematic will on the one hand react to (historically conditioned) depen-
dencies and asymmetries (such as hegemony) (Harrasser/Sohldju 2016; Acos-
ta/Brand 2018), thus recognising a true materialistic core of sustainability. 
But on the other hand be dynamic – as a backwardness to the dynamics of life 
itself – and open. Then, td sustainability research engages with its problem-
atic of hegemonic structures in science, characterised by a ‘double normative 
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framing’ (Kläy et al. 2015), founded in liberalism itself. But the problematic is 
just as well a force to initiate a transdisciplinary and ethical way of relations 
between entities, which can unfold according to the hegemonic conditions. 
Reviewing Judith Shklar’s ‘Liberalism of Fear’, Seyla Benhabib and Hannes 
Bajohr write that we will have to ultimately draw ‘a clear line between liberal 
market capitalism and the political essence of liberalism’ (Benhabib 2013: 67, 
my translation), namely the ‘ability to place oneself in the position of the vic-
tims’ (Bajohr 2013: 145, my translation). In terms of td sustainability research, 
this means engaging ‘not in the back but in the face’ (Harrasser/Sohldju 2016: 
86, my translation) of social change (Meckesheimer 2013), and ‘studying with, 
and not only about social groups, or at least studying the hegemonic artic-
ulations of power’ (Mato 2000), namely of ourselves (Freire 2007 [1968]; Fals 
Borda 1995). 
Problems in the context of SD are conceptualised and essentialised dif-
ferently, as the UN conferences, based on the need to decide between pov-
erty reduction and environmental protection, show. This, in turn, testifies 
to their relative momentariness. Sustainability thus demands a problem 
definition of a case-based singularity (Maniglier 2019), in which the internal 
and external references in the way of individually becoming are recognised, 
shaped and assessed. Td sustainability research can therefore be under-
stood as complex insofar as we see ourselves as part of the problem (van der 
Leeuw/Zhang 2014) and do not confront a research topic as a problem. If we 
reinforce this research paradigm, td sustainability research can process the 
interweaving of epistemological and normative dimensions. Further work 
towards epistemologies of the problematic, and a sustainable future, ways 
of life and cosmologies, beyond the European, should be explored against 
the background of European perspectives and theories on the concept of the 
problematic (Vanhulst/Beling 2014; Maniglier 2019).
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A Genealogical Perspective on the Problematic: 
From Jacques Martin to Louis Althusser
Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod
The current importance of the notion of the problematic invites us to think 
about its relevance and its conceptual content, but also to explore its gene-
alogy in the works that explicitly refer to the problematic as a philosophi-
cal concept. Thus, it is often considered that the word ‘problématique’ ap-
pears for the first time in 1949 in Gaston Bachelard’s Le rationalisme appliqué 
(Bachelard 2004: 51). Even the statistical studies cannot find an occurrence 
of this word before 1949 and its apparition in Bachelard’s and Paul Ricoeur’s 
works (Benoit 2005). Its conceptual signification goes back further in France, 
however. Indeed, the introduction of a manuscript dating from 1947 and en-
titled ‘Some remarks on the notion of the individual in Hegel’s philosophy’ 
was entirely devoted to the thought of the problematic. Nowadays located in 
Louis Althusser’s archives, this manuscript is nothing but the master thesis 
that Jacques Martin, a nearly unknown student, wrote about Hegel under 
the direction – that is to be noticed – of Bachelard. 
We know very little about Martin, except that Althusser owes him the 
notion of the problematic. Thanks to Yann Moulier Boutang’s work, we 
know that he was born May 18, 1922 in Paris and joined the École Normale 
Supérieure in 1941 (Moulier Boutang 2002: 376-393). There he became one of 
Althusser and Michel Foucault’s closest friends. Martin was a very brilliant 
student, passionate about German philosophy and notably Hegel and Marx. 
But he also suffered from depression and mental illness, which led him to 
inactivity and finally suicide. This is the reason why, as Nikki Moore insist-
ed (Moore 2005), he is the ‘man without work’ that Foucault references in 
History of Madness and in Madness, the Absence of Work (Foucault 1995; 2006). 
His masterʼs thesis was never published during his lifetime and Martin just 
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translated some of Hegel’s, Wiechert’s and Hesse’s work (Hegel 1948; Wiech-
ert 1953; Hesse 1955).
The name of Jacques Martin was therefore apparently destined to fall 
into oblivion. Fortunately, Althusser preserved the masterʼs thesis and rec-
ognized his debt towards him in For Marx, mentioning Martin as the real 
inventor of the concept of the problematic: ‘I thought it possible to borrow 
for this purpose the concept of a “problematic” from Jacques Martin to desig-
nate the particular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the location to 
be assigned to this specific difference […]’ (Althusser 1969: 32). After Martin 
committed suicide in 1963, Althusser was profoundly shocked and this is the 
reason why he dedicated For Marx to him, the person that led him to the read-
ing of Marx: ‘These pages are dedicated to the memory of Jacques Martin, the 
friend who, in the most terrible ordeal, alone discovered the road to Marx’s 
philosophy – and guided me onto it.’
Nowadays Jacques Martin’s text is published at last (Martin 2020) and we 
can evaluate the real significance of his ref lexion. The early development of 
the notion of a problematic in Martin’s work and its importance for Althusser, 
one of the most famous and strongest proponents of the concept, calls into 
question the traditional genealogy of the notion and means that a new ge-
nealogical perspective on the problematic has to be pursued. Our objective 
here is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the intellectual context in 
which Martin used the word as a philosophical concept, then in presenting 
the signification of the problematic in Martin’s view, and finally in confront-
ing Althusser’s and Martin’s comprehensions of this notion to set out the 
philosophical issues of this genealogical perspective.
From Germany to France
When Martin wrote his master’s thesis in 1947, the problematic was not yet 
designated as a philosophical concept in France and was not considered as a 
powerful and relevant tool for analysis. But the word existed in the French 
intellectual area, especially in the philosophy of science. It is likely that the 
word had been imported from Germany, where Heidegger made a specific 
use of it and tried to provide a rigorous concept of the problematic in dis-
cussing Hartmann’s and Windelband’s works. Thus Martin picked up the 
problematic at the crossroads of those different inf luences and made it his 
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own to turn it into a very specific concept destined to have a great posterity 
in French philosophy. Let us sum up brief ly here those steps that preceded 
Martin’s appropriation of the notion.
In the 1923-1934 lessons that he gives in Marburg – now published and 
entitled Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung (Heidegger 1994) – 
Heidegger proposes an intense ref lection about the notion of problem and 
its implications for the history of philosophy. In section 10, he notably deals 
with the ‘clarification of problems (Klärung der Probleme)’ and distinguishes 
between problems and questions. A question refers to an implicit care of 
the Dasein: ‘Suchen als eine bestimmte Sorge des Daseins’ (Heidegger 1994: 73). In 
Husserl’s philosophy, discussed by Heidegger, it is the question of knowledge 
that is crucial, conceived as a care of an absolute clarity, a sake of clearness 
(Heidegger 1994: 79). But a question is not exactly a problem, in the sense that 
a problem is the question that is explicitly stated and raised in an explicit 
way (Heidegger 1994: 73). The question appears as the opening of the Dasein 
into the beings and the care that founds such an opening. But the problem is 
the explicitation of this ontological state of the Dasein as a necessary attitude 
towards the worlds (Heidegger 1994: 77). In 1923-24, the word ‘problematic’ 
does not appear yet, but Heidegger insists on the importance of the Fragestel-
lung – the question stating – as part of the process of making the question 
explicit.
In Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung, Heidegger refers to 
the School of Marburg, to Wilhelm Windelband and to Nicolaï Hartmann’s 
philosophies as important ref lections about the notion of the problem and 
its application to the history of philosophy. In Zur Methode der Philosophie- 
geschichte, written in 1909, Hartmann tried to understand the history of phi-
losophy through the notion of problem (Hartmann 1958). According to him, 
problems would be the only way to overtake the idiosyncrasy of thinkers and 
to restore continuity in the history of thought. The problems are transmitted 
through the ages and thinkers progress in their resolutions. Thus Hartmann 
criticized Windelband, who had already conceived the history of philosophy 
as a history of problems, but who considered that those problems were not 
independent from the living and cultural conditions of the authors (Windel-
band 1912). On the contrary, in Hartmann’s view, there is no link between the 
history of problems and the history of thinkers. It does not matter if some-
times the philosophers do not resolve the problems or change their preoccu-
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pations or ignore them, because the next ones will take care of them and will 
pursue the task of resolving them.
Heidegger indicates that those comprehensions of the history of philos-
ophy through the notion of a problem were a ‘starting point (Standpunkt)’ for 
his own research (Heidegger 1994: 78), but that they had to be overcome by an 
ontological perspective, stepping forward to the source of the question (Quel-
len und Motive des Fragens): the Dasein itself. Indeed, for him, the problem has 
to reveal the question that is at the root of its existence. In 1927, with the pub-
lication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger gives a conceptual name to the Fragestel-
lung: calling it the Problematik. The book opens on the oblivion of the question 
about being as ‘a thematised question of a real research (als thematische Frage 
wirklicher Untersuchung)’ (Heidegger 1977: 3). In this context, Heidegger uses 
the word problematic to point out the renewal of the question of being and 
the possibility of an explicit ref lection about it. He speaks about ‘the possi-
bility of reaching an ontological founded problematic (die Möglichkeit der In-
angrif fnahme einer zureichend fundierten ontologischen Problematik)’ (Heidegger 
1977: 18). Therefore the problematic appears as the new philosophical term for 
the stating of the question.
Although the importance of the notion of the problematic in ‘Sein und 
Zeit’ is obvious, it seems that it was not this book that introduced the word 
in France, but another text that was translated long before and popular-
ized Heidegger’s thought on a large scale (Janicaud 2001: 40): Vom Wesen des 
Grundes, written in 1929 (Heidegger 1976) and published in France as early 
as 1938 thanks to Henry Corbin’s translation (Heidegger 1968). In this text, 
Heidegger wants to bring to light what he calls ‘the ontological problematic’ 
(Heidegger 1968: 100), the ‘problem of Being’, which was ‘repressed’ by the 
tradition, but nevertheless was always present implicitly (Heidegger 1968: 
156). The task Heidegger assigns to his own philosophy is to put forward a 
‘problematic explicitly worded of the concept of Being’ (Heidegger 1968: 98). 
As in Hartmann and Windelband, the problematic is here connected to the 
history of philosophy, but conversely, Heidegger conceives the problematic 
as the unique question that underlies all the history of thought. Such a ques-
tion is thought of as the ontological difference and, according to Heidegger, 
it is the task of philosophy to make the ontological difference explicit in a 
clear problematic.
This formulation of a precise concept of the problematic in Germany, par-
ticularly in Heidegger’s work, is important to understanding the discussion 
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around the concept in France during the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, we have 
reason to believe that the text Vom Wesen des Grundes was central in the dis-
cussion between Jean Cavaillès and Albert Lautman in the Société française de 
philosophie in February 1939.1 In his conference presentation, Lautman refers 
twice to Heidegger (Cavaillès 1994: 608, 630) and the notions of problem and 
problematic are at the center of the discussion. It is in light of the dialectical 
concept that the problematic is understood by Lautman and Cavaillès. In-
deed, Cavaillès calls the ‘fundamental dialectic of mathematics’ the dynamic 
process of problem solving: ‘It could be called the fundamental dialectic of 
mathematics: if the new notions appear as required by the given problems’ 
(Cavaillès 1994: 601). In a Hegelian perspective, he understands the problem-
atical dialectic as a historical process that goes forwards from problems to 
solutions. For his part, Lautman uses the term ‘problematic’ and claims that 
‘dialectics in itself is pure problematic’ (Cavaillès 1994: 607). According to him, 
dialectics is the science of philosophical and abstract problems that are not 
mathematical (for example, the problem of essence and existence, of matter 
and form, of finite and infinite, and so on), and mathematical notions are 
answers to those metaphysical problems. Like Cavaillès, Lautman identifies 
the problematic with dialectics. But like Heidegger, in a Platonic tradition, 
he removes the dialectical problematic from a concrete history and considers 
that they cross through all the history of philosophy as transversal transcen-
dent ideas. In the discussion, Jean Hyppolite stresses the difference between 
Cavaillès and Lautman in their discussions of dialectics and takes the side of 
a Hegelian concept of dialectic in which problems change at the same time as 
history moves forward (Cavaillès 1994: 619-620). But both make extensive use 
of the notions of problem and introduce the term of the problematic taken 
from Heidegger in France.
When Jacques Martin developed his own conception of the problematic 
in a historical and Hegelian way, he was probably aware of this discussion 
and he picked up the term from this epistemological appropriation coming 
from Heidegger’s notion. We can now move on to the very specific meaning 
that Martin gives to the problematic.
1  Concerning Lautman, Emmanuel Barot explains that he had read Vom Wesen des Grundes 
and that he had appropriated the notions of this essay (Barot 2009: 138-144).
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Martin’s problematic
The meaning of the problematic in Martin’s text and the importance of this 
notion for him can only be understood by analyzing the particular goal that 
he sets for himself in his masterʼs thesis: reading Hegel through the lens of 
Marx and, more precisely, finding in Hegel a precursor of the Marxist crit-
icism of the bourgeois individual. Martin explicitly considers that the two 
authors enlighten each other in the way of thinking about the relationship 
between the individual and her social and historical determination: ‘Think-
ing history as something effective (dire que l’histoire est ef fective) means that, 
on the philosophical level, Hegel’s philosophy was an object of critical ref lec-
tion for Marx; it is only in reference to this one that the indications of Hegel 
about the individual can be appreciated […].’ (Martin 2020: 41)
It is in this context that Martin uses the notion of the problematic. If the 
problematic is required by the Marxist reading of Hegel that Martin propos-
es in 1947, it is because he has to justify why he may raise the problem of the 
individual in Hegel’s philosophy even though Hegel did not thematize it ex-
plicitly and, consequently, did not address it in a direct way. Indeed Martin 
needs a notion that could indicate the possibility of reading the history of 
philosophy in revealing some implicit questions in Hegel’s thought. As Mar-
tin recognizes, ‘the problem of the individual was not addressed in Hegel’s 
philosophy (Martin 2020: 39). But this is precisely the reason why he has to 
think about a new way of reading Hegel and, therefore, why he has ‘to insti-
tute a problematic to contribute to locate the importance of those themes’. 
The institution of the problematic means the elaboration of a particular per-
spective of reading, in light of a problem raised by the history of philosophy, 
but that remains implicit in a text. The notion of the problematic can thus 
resolve the issue of finding a Marxist question in a theory that came before 
Marx in the history of thought.
Through his original and very specific approach, Martin shifts the notion 
of the problematic from Heidegger’s ontological perspective and from the 
epistemological debate between Lautman and Cavaillès to the political Marx-
ist field of thought. In doing so, he transforms profoundly the meaning of the 
concept. The problematic, as developed by Heidegger, but also by Lautman, 
entailed exactly the means of asking a question to thinkers, even though this 
question was not explicitly raised in their philosophy. But Martin does not 
consider that an ontological question might be the unique cross-cutting of 
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all the history of philosophy, and he does not think that some eternal and 
ideal problems are present in particular mathematical problems. On the con-
trary, like Cavaillès, he thinks that problems are totally historical and that 
only history can explain the implicit problematic of a thinker. According to 
him, a problematic does not transcend history and it is history itself that cre-
ates new problematics when it allows us to read the authors of the past in the 
light of some more recent authors – in this case Hegel in the light of Marx.
Nevertheless, Martin’s objective should not be understood as the will of 
an ideologue plotting to incorporate Hegel in his political and strategic enter-
prises. Martin does not even join the French Communist Party, even though 
he shares a lot of their views (Moulier Boutang 2002). If he returns to Hegel 
from Marx, it is because he thinks that Hegelian concepts can help us to bet-
ter understand Marx’s philosophy itself. Like a lot of Marxists at that time, 
Martin thinks that Marx had developed a very precious science of history 
and of the economic conditions of the capitalist world, but had not explicitly 
exposed the philosophy that supported its explanations, making it difficult 
to actualize Marxist thought in the new capitalist context of the aftermath 
of World War II. It is therefore a very pressing task to explain the philosophy 
of Marx in the light of Hegel. This idea is notably claimed by Althusser in the 
masterʼs thesis he writes in the same year, in 1947: ‘Hegel is Marx’s silent rigor, 
the living truth of a body of thought which is too pressed by circumstances to 
apprehend itself in self-consciousness, but which betrays itself in the least of 
its movements’ (Althusser 2014: 142). Martin seems to share the same opinion 
as his friend. Both think that Hegel can provide the philosophy required by 
Marxism. We can notice that such a project, even after Martin’s death, will 
be the aim of Althusser’s life until his last ref lections (Althusser 1994).
In terms of content, the problematic enables Martin to inscribe the indi-
vidual in its social and historical conditions and in this way to criticize the 
solipsism of the bourgeois conception of the individual. It connects Hegel to 
Marx’s criticism of the bourgeois individual and thus makes him appear as 
a critical transition between the individualistic thought of the 18th century 
and its criticism by Marxism: ‘Hegel’s propositions are nothing if separated 
from the individualistic conception of the person in Rousseau or Kant – and 
they are not determined for those who do not read them through Marx’s 
claims, which make possible the meaning of Hegelianism that simultane-
ously makes Marx possible’ (Martin 2020: 44). Thus, for Martin, the problem-
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atic is a way to plunge Hegel into the history of thought and to read him as 
the first critical philosopher of the bourgeois individual.
As Marx, and Hegel before him, would object to the idea of the subject’s 
self-sufficiency, he integrated the individual in society and history and set 
out all the mediations that contribute to create personality and subjectivity. 
According to Martin, Hegel had ‘an intuition of the individual as integrated 
in a reality from which he cannot be separated (une intuition de l’individu com-
me intégré dans une réalité dont il n’est pas separable)’ (Martin 2020: 70). Hegel 
wrote about all the historical and social mediations that determine the in-
dividual at one particular time: ‘Hegel always conceived the concrete in the 
form of totality: not a totality of qualities or gifts, whose realization could 
be enough to define individuality, but the totality of the relationships be-
tween the individual and the world that defines her and constitutes her, and 
conversely those that the individual contributes to constitute and to define.’ 
(Martin 2020: 87) Hegel was the first to propose such a conception of a medi-
ated subjectivity opened to the world and defined essentially by its relations 
and not by itself. This is exactly why his philosophy is important for Marxism. 
Thinking the mediations as constitutive of subjectivity, it offers a clear ar-
ticulation between individuals and collectivity that wipes out the solipsistic 
and individualist approach of man that characterizes the bourgeois point of 
view. 
In such a view, and in the horizon of a comparison between Martin’s and 
Althusser’s problematics, we could sum up the comprehension that Martin 
had of the problematic in three points: the problematic is a question, it is 
essentially diachronic and it is a way to read together Hegel and Marx.
1. In Martin’s view, a problematic is a specific problem, a particular ques-
tion, a thematic. Martin speaks of ‘the theme of the individual (le thème 
de l’individu)’ (Martin 2020: 43) and of ‘a theme that offers itself as a prob-
lem (un thème qui se propose comme un problème)’ (Martin 2020: 44). It is not 
a global structure of thought or a way to raise particular problems, but 
a single particular problem itself. Martin looks forward to Hegel’s crit-
icism of individualism in the Age of Enlightenment and considers the 
problematic as the designation of such a singular question. 
2. Martin’s problematic is essentially connected to history and is conse-
quently understood from a diachronic point of view. It is a means to es-
cape from the subjectivity of a thinker and from the explicit questions 
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that are raised by a philosopher in order to reintegrate a philosophical 
system in the whole process of the history of thought. This is the reason 
why, according to Martin, the problematic carries out a ‘dispossession by 
history (dépossession par l’histoire)’ (Martin 2020: 45). By that means, Hegel 
is deprived of his own intentional work and is questioned with a prob-
lematic that belongs to the later history of Marxism.
3. Martin’s objective is to promote a reading of Hegel that would be com-
patible with Marx. His goal is to read Hegel and Marx together thanks 
to the common problematic of the criticism of the bourgeois individual. 
In some ways, it is the idea that Marx had not completely developed his 
philosophy and that Marxism needs a philosophical theory that meets its 
practical aspirations.
It is only by keeping in mind these elements that we will understand the dif-
ferences that Althusser introduces to the notion of the problematic in the 
1960s. In spite of those differences, Althusser recognizes his debt towards 
his friend Jacques Martin, who had accomplished the decisive action of 
shifting the problematic from Heidegger’s philosophy and from the French 
epistemological debates between Lautman and Cavaillès to the Marxist 
space of thought, and thus had given the impulsion of a new Marxist theory 
that could be improved thanks to the use of this notion; henceforth it was 
truly ref lected and worked as a legitimate concept.
From Martin to Althusser
My objective here is to analyze the way Althusser inherits the notion of the 
problematic from his friend Jacques Martin and how by doing this he trans-
forms the notion at the same time in a decisive way. It is only this double 
movement of inheritance and transformation that can explain how Althuss-
er is able to recognize his debt towards his friend while creating one of the 
most representative and powerful concepts of French philosophy during the 
1960s.
In For Marx, Althusser uses the notion of the problematic to ref lect on 
the ‘epistemological break (coupure épistémologique)’ (Althusser 1969: 32) that 
occurred between Marx and the philosophers that came before him, espe-
cially Hegel and Feuerbach (Gillot 2009: 31). Against Hegel’s teleological dia-
Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod102
lectic, focused on the unity of spirit and on the end of history, Marx opposed 
a complex dialectic that could contain the ‘overdetermination’ (Althusser 
1969: 87) of a singular event by the diversity of all the elements of the soci-
ety, understood as a ‘complex structured whole’ (Althusser 1969: 193). And 
against Feuerbach’s humanism, which had referred to an ahistorical human 
nature, Marx dispensed with the unscientific and ideological concept of Man 
and replaced it with a scientific view of society and its history, based on so-
cial structures in which men were limited to occupying functions (Althusser 
1969: 219-241). The date of the break would have been 1845, when Marx wrote 
with Engels ‘The German Ideology’ and thus reached a real science of history. 
Althusser’s intentions were perfectly clear: through Hegel, he targeted the 
simplistic and rigid Stalinist dialectic, and through Feuerbach, he wanted to 
criticize the humanist Marxism in France and the Soviet Union that followed 
Stalin’s death. Marx’s epistemological break was also Althusser’s break with 
the ideological Marxism of his time.2
Althusser’s objective is to provide an adequate explanation of the social 
organization and of the revolutionary process. To this end, he has to take 
into account the extra-economic causalities that traditional Marxism did not 
consider since it limited the social contradictions to the conf licts between 
the productive forces and the relations of production, and thereby restricted 
the revolution to a transformation of the economic basis. Althusser estimates 
that such a program is clearly unsatisfactory and needs to be completed by 
the importance of the political, juridical and ideological factors of the rev-
olution. In particular, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Mao’s criticism 
of Stalinism proved that a society could change in its economic basis and, 
despite of this transformation, could remain the same from the point of view 
of its political and ideological domination. 
The complex causality that Althusser proposed by reading Marx in a new 
perspective is precisely dedicated to thinking these pluralistic phenomenon. 
But he was convinced that this purpose cannot be achieved if we continue 
to read Marx in the light of the Hegelian legacy. Hegel’s philosophy devel-
oped a simple, or even a simplistic concept of causality, where each society is 
structured by a fundamental contradiction and by a unique principle – for 
example the juridical principle in the Ancient Rome. Regarding this point, 
Feuerbach did not differ from Hegel, when he considered each social state 
2  On the context of Althusser’s thought, see Elliott 1987 and Lewis 2005.
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and the whole history of humanity as constituted by the self-alienation of 
humankind. In each case, it is the philosophical desire for a first and unique 
principle that is at stake. It is exactly this Hegelian simplicity, extended by 
Feuerbach, that can be found in the traditional Marxism, that focuses only 
on the economic contradiction and ignores other social contradictions. This 
is the reason why Althusser decides to insist on the epistemological break 
between Marx and his predecessors and when he reads Martin’s text to find 
a concept that could help him to express this theoretical and historical shift.
The problematic is therefore required to think this epistemological break 
of Marxism. Althusser gives some dispersed definitional elements that char-
acterize it. According to him, the problematic is ‘the constitutive unity of the 
effective thoughts’ (Althusser 1969: 66) of an author; ‘the typical systematic 
structure unifying all the elements of the thought’ (Althusser 1969: 67); a way 
by which a philosophy or an ideology ref lects its objects, ‘the way it ref lects that 
object (and not in the object itself)’ (Althusser 1969: 66); ‘the system of questions 
commanding the answers given by the ideology’ (Althusser 1969: 67); more 
generally the ‘theoretical presuppositions’ (Althusser 1969: 68) of thought; 
and an unconscious element of thought supposing that ‘a philosopher thinks 
in it rather than thinking of it ’ (Althusser 1969: 69). We can thus say that Althuss-
er considers the problematic as a way of questioning and ref lecting objects 
that provide unity to thought and of which the philosopher is never absolute-
ly conscious. 
Hence the problematic describes the organisational mode of a system of 
thought, the way of thinking it entails, and the particular ways of raising 
and solving particular questions. In Marx’ theory, according to Althusser, it 
means that the questions are never raised by presupposing a simplistic cau-
sality, even if this causality would be the economic contradictions and not 
the spiritual principle of a society (Hegel) or the alienation of humankind 
(Feuerbach). The resolutions that he proposes are also not instructed by a 
single phenomenon. Marx always takes into account the diverse factors that 
constitute each society and he underlines the multiplicity of causes – the 
overdetermination – that are at stake in the revolutionary movement. His 
manner of formulating problems is not the Hegelian way of thinking, and in 
this sense we can say that he thinks in a different problematic.
On this basis we can understand the difference that has arisen in the con-
cept of problematic between Jacques Martin and Louis Althusser. Althusser’s 
polemical perspective against Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s philosophies brings 
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him to transform the notion. In his view, it is necessary for the problematic 
to be understood as a means to separate all the mature thought of Marx from 
other philosophies. From there stems the differences with Martin and the 
fact that Althusser considers the problematic not as a single question raised 
from a diachronic point of view in order to reconcile Hegel and Marx, but 
as a systematic and synchronic structure of thought absolutely original and 
revolutionary, without any link to any prior philosophy.
1. In Althusser’s discourse, the problematic does not concern a thematic or a 
unique question, but a whole organization of thought from which the partic-
ular questions can be raised. Althusser deals with ‘the active but unavowed 
problematic which fixes for it the meaning and movement of its problems 
and thereby of their solutions’ (Althusser 1969: 69). This means that the sin-
gular elements of thought should be considered from the problematic and 
not the opposite: ‘So anyone who still wants to pose the problem of elements 
in this perspective must recognize that everything depends on a question 
which must have priority over them: the question of the nature of the prob-
lematic which is the starting-point for actually thinking them, in a given 
text.’ (Althusser 1969: 68) Or, as he also writes: ‘Every ideology must be re-
garded as a real whole, internally unified by its own problematic, so that it is 
impossible to extract one element without altering its meaning.’ (Althusser 
1969: 62) Thus the problematic is not a problem, but a way or a perspective 
to raise problems. It is not a particular question – Martin’s question of the 
individual – but a principle of coherence between all the questions that a 
philosophy can ask. Feuerbach’s problematic, for example, was anthropology, 
a way of questioning from the presupposition of human nature and from the 
point of view of human relationships. On the contrary, Marx discovered a 
problematic where social structures and structural relations, not men, were 
at the center. 
2. Being a structure of thought and not a particular question, the problem-
atic is set out by Althusser from a spatial figure and not from a temporal per-
spective. It is therefore not understood as diachronic, as it was in Martin, but 
as synchronic. According to Althusser, the problematic is a ‘field’ (Althusser 
1969: 66) and it is not constituted by the succession of thoughts in history, 
but by the combination of different elements inherent to a philosophy. From 
this principle, reading Hegel in light of the individualistic thought of the 18th 
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century and of Marx is not relevant; much more so is searching in Marx’s 
work for the moment – after 1845 – when his thought found a new systematic 
way of raising problems and hence became absolutely original.
3. The consequence is that Althusser does not want to read Hegel and Marx 
together but, on the contrary, strives to distinguish Marx from all the philos-
ophies that preceded his, especially from Hegel’s dialectic and Feuerbach’s 
humanism. He searches for what is called, in an Aristotelian language, the 
‘specific difference’ that separates Marx from others, and then defines the 
problematic as ‘the particular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the 
location to be assigned to this specific difference’ (Althusser 1969: 32). The ob-
jective cannot be, as it was in Martin, to reconcile Marx and his predecessors, 
but to inscribe the very originality of Marx in the history of philosophy: ‘The 
truly Marxist critique of Hegel depends precisely on this change of elements, 
that is, on the abandonment of the philosophical problematic whose recalci-
trant prisoner Feuerbach remained.’ (Althusser 1969: 48)
Conclusion
When Bachelard used the word ‘problematic’ in Le rationalisme appliqué, he 
may have borrowed it from the epistemological debate between Cavaillès 
and Lautman, but he also could have found it in the work of his young stu-
dent Jacques Martin, whose master thesis he supervised. In any event, the 
role of Martin in the development of French philosophy after World War II 
should surely be revalorized. His importance in the thought of the problem-
atic is enough to reconsider his name in the great tradition of Gilles Deleuze, 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard and others. But 
his thought of social mediations is not unconnected with the idea of a his-
torical transcendental that is thematized at the end of Althusser’s work in 
1947 – ‘Marx understood that transcendental was history’ (Althusser 2014: 
170) – and that is exposed for itself in Michel Foucault’s ‘La constitution d’un 
transcendental dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel’3, his masterʼs the-
sis written in 1949. One can also notice that Martin mentions already the 
psychoanalytic concept of ‘overdetermination (surdétermination)’ (Martin 
3  Manuscript not yet published. 
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1947: 31)4 to explain the complex causality that results from interfering social 
mediations. And as we said earlier, Foucault’s ‘absence of work’ is a reference 
to Martin’s madness. 
My objective here is not to claim that all the French philosophy in the 
1960s was contained in Martin’s first work. I just would like to sketch the 
possibility of considering him as an essential moment of its development 
from the 1940s to the 1960s and even afterwards. The transformation of the 
notion of the problematic by Althusser is remarkable on this point, because 
he uses Martin’s work but he turns it into something else and in a different 
context of thought. Martin developed some decisive intuitions and some im-
portant concepts that have not been developed further in their original form, 
but that have been changed to serve a different goal and to signify different 
meanings. He is one of the links in this philosophical chain that runs to us 
and we probably would not ref lect today on the problematic without his con-
tribution.
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‘The problem itself persists’:   
Problems as Missing Links between Concepts and 
Theories in Canguilhem’s Historical Epistemology
Thomas Ebke
If one was to register the specific terminological use of the concept of the 
‘problem’ in 20th century philosophy of the sciences and of scientific prac-
tice, it is not without a soupçon of irony that one would have to compile such 
an inventory. Without a doubt, or so Warren Weaver claimed in 1948, a for-
malised mathematics of the kind that had propelled the regime of stochas-
tics and statistical mechanics about half a century earlier would hold the 
key to unlock so-called ‘problems of disorganized complexity’ (Weaver 1948: 
538), that is to say logical situations involving a vast amount of variables, all 
of which display ‘individually erratic’ (ibid) characteristics. Conundrums 
of that type, Weaver argued, will turn out to be more complex to manage 
than ‘two-variable’ (ibid: 537) problems – which conveniently correspond to 
the binary system of the mathematics of mechanics – but it is through the 
recurrence of ‘certain orderly and analyzable average properties’ (ibid: 538) 
that, despite the numeric range and largely random interplay of the variables, 
predictions as to their standard distribution will hold true ‘with increasing 
precision’ (ibid). The reason for the relative controllability of such a system of 
randomly interconnected, yet homogeneous, elements is the ‘disorganized 
complexity’ of the ensemble, that is the absence of an internal order – an 
organised configuration of the components that would be irreducible to a 
recurring pattern of averages. As opposed to these two classes of problem 
constellations, ‘problems of simplicity’ (which can be addressed by the math-
ematics of mechanics) and ‘problems of disorganized complexity’ (mastered 
by stochastics), then, Weaver identifies a third type of problem that displays 
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a strict quality of intrinsic organisation, an ‘organic’ (ibid: 539) immanence of 
the ensemble that obliterates any random conduct of its elements.1 
Indeed, the hiatus between the logic of ‘disorganized complexity’ and the 
quality of what Weaver dubs problems of ‘organized complexity’ constitutes 
the most interesting moment within Weaver’s argument: after all, the dis-
tinction between these two classes of difficulties is not based on the sheer 
numeric excess of the variables (which, in turn, is precisely the distinguish-
ing mark between ‘simplicity’ and ‘disorganized complexity’). The leap from 
‘disorganized’ to ‘organized’ complexity is not tied up with an increase in the 
amount of empirically contingent factors that would, at one point, become 
impossible to prognosticate. On the contrary, the very fact that an excessive 
number of variables interact in empirically random constellations makes it 
all the more possible to single out regularities within that state of contingen-
cy and to numeralise the likelihood of recurrent events (such as, in Weaver’s 
example of telephone communication, ‘the average frequency of calls, the 
probability of overlapping calls of the same number, etc.’, ibid). Paradoxi-
cally, it is rather the blanket extinction of empirical randomness in a sys-
tem of ‘organized complexity’ that prevents the forecast of the conduct of its 
parts (and of itself, in its integrity) by means of statistical calculation. Thus, 
Weaver can raise the following questions that, in his account, deserve to be 
tackled under the label of organised complexity: ‘What makes an evening 
primrose open when it does? [...] Why can one particular genetic strain of mi-
croorganism synthesise within its minute body certain organic compounds 
that another strain of the same organism cannot manufacture? Why is one 
chemical substance a poison when another, whose molecules have just the 
same atoms but assembled into a mirror-image pattern, is completely harm-
less? [...]’ (ibid: 539). It is, of course, not insignificant at all that these text-
book examples of organised complexity, which exhibit the irreducibility of 
‘the whole’ towards the sum and the qualities of its components, stem from 
the world of vital phenomena – from the horizon of ‘life’. In 1948, Weaver re-
sumed Kant’s hint at the peculiar teleological constitution of organisms – or 
1  Weaver marks of f this set of problems from the situation of ‘disorganized complexity’ 
with recourse to the stochastics of the billiard game: ‘For example, the statistical methods 
would not apply if someone were to arrange the balls in a row parallel to one side rail of the 
table, and then start them all moving in precisely parallel paths perpendicular to the row 
in which they stand. Then the balls would never collide with each other nor with two of the 
rails, and one would not have a situation of disorganized complexity’ (Weaver 1948: 538). 
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rather, which is, in fact, a decidedly different claim, at the way in which ‘our’ 
finite intellect inevitably judges ‘organized nature’ (Kant) as if it is the abode 
of an intrinsically teleological organisation. This specification is crucial as 
Weaver, abandoning the Kantian axis of reasoning, expresses his optimism 
that the ongoing ‘advance’ (ibid: 541 and passim) of the natural and techni-
cal sciences will in the end bring about empirical techniques to determine 
and regulate states of organised complexity. Whereas Kant had categorically 
severed the teleological access to the self-sufficiency of organic living beings 
from the mechanistic approach – which, inadequately, refers to the purpose-
ful entirety of the organism as a totality of partes extra partes – Weaver clearly 
opts for an investment into the future progress of the natural sciences and 
the regime of their techniques of regulation until they will one day be able to 
respond to the specific intricacy of organic, that is to say emergent, forms of 
organisation. However, this positivistic reduction of the singular epistemic 
status of living phenomena (as elaborated by Kant) will not garner any sys-
tematic attention in the following analysis: this reduction is classical in its 
own right, and its critique can scarcely dispense with the worn-out dualisms 
of philosophical (or, for that matter, phenomenological) description versus 
empirical objectification, ‘philosophical’ versus ‘scientific’ discourse, heuris-
tic ‘openness’ versus methodical ‘closures’ etc. 
Rather, it is pertinent to take note of and to ref lect on the way in which 
the terminology of ‘problems’ is tied up, at this particular juncture, with the 
notion of, or at least with an allusion to, the irreducible dimension of life. If 
one traces the history of the term ‘problem’ back to its conjuncture in 19th 
century philosophy and sciences, it is intriguing to learn that this particular 
term – as opposed, for instance, to the semantics of ‘concepts’ – was meant 
to address a delicate entanglement between the order of objective contents 
(problems as ‘matters of fact’) and the pole of the subject of scientific inquiry. 
To ‘throw up’ (see the origin of the word προβάλλειν: ‘to throw something up 
in front of yourself’) a problem amounts to irreplaceably ‘having’ a problem, 
to be, as it were, embroiled in and practically affected by the particular diffi-
culty that poses itself. In the German tradition, Nietzsche and Simmel stand 
out in their emphatic pronunciation of this involvement of the subject that 
raises the problem in the problem, in defiance of the Neo-Kantian current 
that, during their time, identified ‘problems’, on the contrary, as technically 
specified tasks within an already established context of scientific discourse 
(see, for instance, the position of Richard Hönigswald, cf. Hönigswald 1931). 
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The summary of this specific panorama – in which problems appear on the 
threshold of an epistemic process that includes them in the immanence of 
a scientific discourse, while at the same time they remain expressive of the 
living subject who pursues problems, the subject to whom problems matter 
– sets the stage for the argument that I wish to carry out in this article. It will 
be my goal to show that the philosopher and historian of science Georges 
Canguilhem (1904-1995) elaborated a conceptualisation of what problems are 
that demarcates their role in the research process from two other elements 
that are also at stake in the very same process: namely, on the one hand, con-
cepts, and, on the other hand, theories. Problems emerge and remain, as it 
were, on the threshold of a series of operations that bring about the specif-
ic discourse of a science, including the set of epistemic objects with which 
that discourse correlates. Both complementary terms, concepts and theories, 
need to be located within this immanence of science: it is here that they fulfill 
their specific functions. Yet, to the extent that concepts never fully coincide 
with and never entirely cover the scope of what problems are, the latter re-
tain a quality of resistance to the conceptually restrained fabric of a science. 
Indeed, they point back to the enjeu of a vital subjectivity that initiates re-
search processes in the first place and, in so doing, undergoes a shift of po-
sition that transforms it, the living entity, itself into an object of the sciences. 
In a nutshell, the thesis around which my observations will revolve is the 
following: if one wishes to understand the concise status of what features 
as a ‘problem’ within Canguilhem’s version of historical epistemology, one 
needs to explicate a triad of terms, namely the way that problems are inter-
twined both with ‘concepts’ and with ‘theories’ – more precisely, with scien-
tific theories. It is only in establishing links and distinctions between these 
three elements and in insisting on their non-coincidence that the following 
argument can be upheld: according to Canguilhem, the epistemological per-
tinence of the problem and its fecundity within the process of the constitu-
tion of a scientific discourse harks back to the way in which a problem outlives 
or outlasts its conceptualisation, that is to say, the way in which it outlives 
the concept. In that sense, problems act as missing links between concepts and 
theories within the process of the formation of a science. However, Canguil-
hem does not at all argue that the epistemological effect of the problem is to 
provide the inaugural piece in the genesis of a scientific discourse that could 
in the end be considered as self-sufficing, immanent and complete. Rather, 
it is Canguilhem’s very distinction of problems as opposed to concepts within 
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the dynamism of conceptualisation proper that enables and motivates him 
to mount a critique of scientism precisely by insisting on the historicity of 
the generation of scientific discourses. It is against the background of these 
distinctions that Pierre Macherey echoed Canguilhem’s famous definition of 
philosophy as the ‘science of solved problems’, la science des problèmes résolus, 
as Canguilhem phrased it in his study on the formation of the concept of 
the ref lex in the 17th and 18th centuries (Canguilhem 1955). On Macherey’s 
reading, the ‘philosophie du concept’ pursued by Canguilhem constitutes 
‘la science des problèmes indépendamment de leur solution’ (Macherey 2008: 
56). This expression, after all, hits an insight that seems to be deeply char-
acteristic of Canguilhem’s historical epistemology in its entirety, that is the 
insight that philosophy addresses an element – namely problems – which is 
elaborated, as it were, from the inside and within the boundaries of a science, 
yet without reproducing and sharing the very means that science summons 
up in coming to grips with that certain problem: those means being the con-
cepts of science. It seems helpful to reiterate the gist of these observations: 
although Canguilhem locates philosophy immanently, at a point that finds it-
self in the midst of the very operations of scientific rationalisation, he does 
so only to explicate a sharp split between philosophy and science. Philoso-
phy, for Canguilhem, presents itself as ‘a science of problems’ in such a way 
that the problems (re-) appear in their independence from the solutions that 
scientific discourses have endowed them with. Indeed, it is crucial to under-
score the verb reappear at this juncture and to draw attention to its temporal-
ity: to return to the problems that had been at stake at the outset of a process 
of scientific conceptualisation is in itself a historical procedure whose effect 
it is to reinstate what has (already) been ‘framed’, that is to say operated on 
and thus rationalised by means of scientific concepts. One would not be en-
tirely misled if one concluded that Canguilhem restores on the part of the 
objects of science what, in an inevitable reduction, had been taken (that is: 
abstracted) from them in the very process that turned them into epistemic 
objects in the first place – namely their problematic status, their quality as 
problems according to which they remain specifically external to the con-
cepts that relate to them and express them under the conditions of science. 
What Canguilhem dubs a ‘historical epistemology’ is thus a decidedly philo-
sophical undertaking while, at the same time, his conception of philosophy 
takes on the irreducible form of an epistemology that cannot but proceed 
historically.
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In what follows, I will attempt to elaborate the point that historical epis-
temology, in Canguilhem’s definition, is a type of ref lection that situates 
itself at the crossroads of the history of science and a philosophy of values: 
in a certain discord with the wording used by Macherey, I will suggest think-
ing of this epistemology not as the science of ‘problems independent of their 
solutions’, but as a reciprocally historical and philosophical gesture that sep-
arates the problems of scientific rationalisation from their conceptual and the-
oretical solutions, which is precisely what the sciences engender. In an inau-
gural step, however, it will be crucial to expound the specific genealogy and 
meaning the term ‘problem’ takes on in the writings of Canguilhem. 
The epistemological dispositive of Canguilhem’s 
problematology: the fissure between protasis and problem
In his biography on Michel Foucault, Didier Eribon portrayed Georges Can-
guilhem as a clandestine intellectual who, although constantly looming but 
in the background of a scenery that boasted more f lamboyant protagonists 
(such as Foucault himself), obliquely shaped the entire agenda of philosophi-
cal discussions in France in the 1950s and 1960s (Eribon 1989: 232). According 
to Eribon, the key antagonism that remained at work underneath the major 
controversies of these decades was the split between, on the one hand, Can-
guilhem, and on the other, Jean-Paul Sartre. Thirty years after Eribon evoked 
that picture, at a time when Canguilhem was still alive, it is fair to say that 
this philosopher has been elicited from the relative obscurity that surround-
ed him à l’époque. The systematic reception of Canguilhem’s thought can be 
rather neatly traced back to 1996, which witnessed the publication of Gilles 
Renard’s monograph on Canguilhem’s rendition of historical epistemology 
(Renard 1996). In the aftermath of this rediscovery, one axis of reception that 
has been particularly prominent is a line of research that inscribes the proj-
ect of Canguilhem into a ‘Bergsonian’ heritage (see Osborne 2003, During 
2004, Worms 2009, Schmidgen 2014, Delitz 2015). According to this recep-
tion, Canguilhem’s notions of the normativity of life and of the primacy of 
practice within scientific inquiry are strongly tied to the modern vitalism 
of Henri Bergson, who stands aloof in the landscape of 20th century French 
philosophy due to his singular insistence on a philosophy of life. 
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The emphasis on Canguilhem’s ‘Bergsonian’ filiation has exerted an in-
teresting impact on contemporary readings of Canguilhem. By and large, 
Canguilhem’s specific tackling of the question of what problems actually are 
has been reduced to the Bergsonian claim that ‘genuine problems demand 
the creation of the concepts that will be used to posit them’ (Bowden 2018: 
48). On that reading – which certainly has its merits – the decisive point is 
the practical quality and efficacy of problems, which, rather than being the 
mere correlates of scientific practice, essentially engender the techniques, 
including the conceptualisations, that science requires in order to (literally) 
come to terms with ‘its’ problems (ibid). But it would be a cliché to associate 
Canguilhem’s understanding of problems too tightly with this ‘Bergsonian’ 
trajectory, which cannot but amount to the idea of a radical primacy of life 
over and against its objectifications via science. Instead, it can be helpful to 
note that what seems to linger in Canguilhem’s vocabulary of ‘the problem’ 
is a decidedly Aristotelian echo: in view of the logical issue of problems in his 
Topics, one can identify at the centre of this tract the motion of dialectical 
reasoning (see Margel 1997: 160-162). Aristotle, in fact, makes a distinction 
between πρόβλημα and πρότασις: the first term, the problem, represents 
that upon which (τά περι ων) a dialectical train of arguments is grounded: that 
which is thrown up in the logical form of disjunction. The second term, by 
contrast, refers to that element out of which (τά έξ ών) he who draws the logi-
cal conclusion can base the dialectics (see ibid for this entire reconstruction): 
that is, in the sense of the classical syllogism, the premises. In other words: 
the protasis is the active heuristic operation that takes root in what, in log-
ical priority, had been thrown up before the one who constructs the dialectical 
argument. That is to say, technically speaking, the premises of a dialectical 
construction take on the form of the premise only by means of a (protatic) re-
ply to a (problematic) question, that has, in logical antecedence, been raised 
and posed, thereby eliciting the dialectical motion of arguments. 
At first glance, it might be difficult to discern the point of interest that 
is at stake here: if a fissure constantly remains between the problem that is 
brought up – or rather, ‘projected’ (ibid: 170) – in a proposition and the pro-
tasis which takes up that very problem under the form of syllogistic premis-
es, then this transition crucially implies a discursive ‘space of controversy’ 
(ibid: 169: ‘espace d’une controverse’) in which interlocutors confront each 
other as adversaries. In a first step, this internally polemical or controversial 
structure explicates itself to the extent that a problem does not simply coin-
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cide with any enunciation whatsoever; rather, it is precisely an enunciation 
constituted in a form that is open to discussion: ‘Ought one rather to obey 
one’s parents or the laws, if they disagree?’ (Aristoteles 1984: 176). In other 
words, the problem suspends any reference to facticity by turning a pre-
sumed fact into a moot subject, a question that elicits logical reasoning on 
behalf of the interlocutors. On a second level, this enunciation that has shift-
ed into the status of a problem invites a multiplicity of heterogeneous (ratio-
nal, conceptual) solutions, including the acknowledgment (or the denial) of 
the problematic status of that which has been thrown/brought up – that is to say, 
of the πρόβλημα itself. The fissure between and the passage from problems 
to premises, then, is intrinsically polemical, it is permanently open to dis-
cussion. Yet, it would be justified to speak of a genuine Aristotelian ‘dialec-
tics of problems’ (cf. Marge 1997), because what unites the problem with the 
premise(s) and what in fact transforms the problem into the premise through 
the operation of πρότασις is the logical form of interrogation. By posing the 
problem in the form of a question to the interlocutor binds the one who asks 
and the one that is called upon to answer to the discursive standard of the 
judgment. It is the interpellative function of interrogation that guarantees 
the formal connection of the problem and the premise, the projection and the 
proposition (see ibid: 173-174).
This recourse to Aristotle’s Topics might in fact be conducive to an ade-
quate reading of the systematic role played by the term ‘problem’ within 
Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology. At least one impact that I 
hope my observations in this paper may induce rests in the claim that, in 
opposition, or rather as an amendment to, the Bergsonian interpretation of 
Canguilhem’s ‘philosophy of the problem’, one should elaborate on the in-
trinsically epistemological dimension, that is to say, on the Aristotelian vein 
of Canguilhem’s interest in problems. According to Aristotle, the eminent log-
ical function of problems hinges upon the ‘dialectical’ quality of their logical 
solution, which transposes the discussion of the problem into the twofold 
form of interrogation and, as its correlate, judgment. In the secondary litera-
ture on Canguilhem, which, in some sort of pragmatist ref lex, too frequently 
focuses on the vital(-ist) foundation of the semantics of problems, anchoring 
it in Bergson and/or Bachelard as Canguilhem’s major sources, this episte-
mological dispositive tends to be underestimated (see During 2003, Osborne 
2003, Schmidgen 2014, Feldman 2016, Bowden 2018). Yet, to overlook this 
dispositive would mean to fall short of the argument over why Canguilhem’s 
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project of historical epistemology is an intrinsically political and in itself a 
normative intervention. Before this position can be spelt out in more detail, 
however, it is indispensable to go back to at least two of the most prominent 
quotations from the writings of Georges Canguilhem that foreground the 
notion of the ‘problem.’
Theories, concepts, problems
In one of the most famous wordings from his magisterial study The Normal 
and the Pathological (1943), a passage that stems from the original introduction 
to the book, Canguilhem underscores that the reason why he studied medi-
cine in the first place and later earned a doctorate in that discipline was his 
expectation that medicine might ‘provide precisely an introduction to con-
crete human problems’ (Canguilhem 1978: 6). This quotation, as well as the 
one that follows, lends credence, all in all, to what one might apostrophise 
as the vitalist key to reading Canguilhem: on this view, problems designate 
an objectivity that is dealt with by a scientific discourse, yet in that grasp 
outlasts the very rationality of such a discourse, which cannot but be based 
upon an interplay of concepts and a theory that guarantees their coherence. 
A problem seems to represent a difficulty of an intrinsically technical register 
– an underlying issue that propels the immanent ‘solutions’ generated by a 
science, while at the same time outwearing any such termination. It is, of 
course, not by accident that this distinction is evoked by Canguilhem in the 
direct context of a ref lection on the normativity of the living organism as a 
factor that thwarts its full objective explication within a scientific physiology. 
More concretely, at one moment in his book Canguilhem tackles the question 
of whether Claude Bernard expressly intended, in the formulation of his own 
physiology, to blur the strong, qualitative idea that the pathological states of 
the organism are in themselves genuinely normative states that are irreduc-
ible to the states and conditions of the ‘healthy’ organism. Tending to credit 
Bernard with exactly such a strategy, but at the same time with a certain hes-
itation as to the legitimacy of such a suspension, Canguilhem continues with 
the following interesting remark: ‘This ambiguity is certainly instructive 
in that it reveals that the problem itself persists at the heart of the solution 
presumably given to it. And the problem is the following: Is the concept of 
disease a concept of an objective reality accessible to quantitative scientific 
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knowledge? Is the difference in value, which the living being establishes be-
tween his normal life and his pathological life, an illusory appearance which 
the scientist has the legitimate obligation to deny?’ (ibid: 36).
Problems, Canguilhem contends here, ‘persist at the heart of the solution’ 
they have been endued with; that is to say, a problem outlasts the conceptual 
operation which does not only raise the problem but, in so doing, renders it 
intelligible. However, it would be mistaken to envisage this deferral of con-
cepts vis-à-vis the problem as a purely derivative relationship (as if the con-
cepts of a science cannot but fall short of their underlying problem): instead, 
it is equally important to recognise that problems, rather than existing aloof 
from scientific rationality, always appear on the threshold of a science, per-
manently on their way to a science’s immanent nexus of a theory and its con-
cepts. Now, a close examination of the secondary literature on Canguilhem’s 
problematology (see sources above) demonstrates that most readings of his 
disjunction between problems and concepts stop at the ‘vitalist’ conclusion 
and its twofold logic. At any rate, the vitalist reading of the way Canguil-
hem winnows problems from concepts does not only accentuate the role of 
the problem as a technical obstacle within the discourse of science, but also 
identifies life as the epitome of any productive (viz. normative) force that de-
fies all positivisation. Thus, by definition, life features par excellence as the in-
trinsically generative process of the ‘formation of forms’ (Canguilhem 2008: 
XIX): Whereas the analytic determinations brought about by the discourse 
of science cannot hold good but for the terminal forms of vital processes, life 
comes into view as the formative process itself from which all those forms 
originate. Therefore, the primary mode in which the specificity of life as an 
intrinsically normative phenomenon becomes expressive is the mode of tech-
niques (ibid).
It will be my core observation in this paper, however, that in terms of 
a corrective or, as it were, an amendment to this vitalist stance, one ought 
to reevaluate the Aristotelian legacy in Canguilhem’s appropriation of the 
semantics of the ‘problem’. This legacy provides Canguilhem’s approach to 
the sciences with a fully f ledged political epistemology that revolves precise-
ly around the fissure between πρόβλημα and πρότασις: the latter term rep-
resenting an active reply to an antecedent problematic question that can or 
cannot subsequently be carried out in the logical form of the premise. Xavier 
Roth (Roth 2013) has recently drawn attention to the lineage in Canguilhem’s 
thinking that connects his approach with the (French) ‘style de pensée ré-
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f lexif’ (ibid: 129). Among the most renowned protagonists of this intellec-
tual current, Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), Léon Brunschvicg (1869-1944) and 
Émile-Auguste Chartier aka ‘Alain’ (1868-1951) stand out, and Roth gives a 
helpfully concise idea of what is central to the philosophical tradition of the 
analyse réf lexive: this tradition essentially represents an epistemology which 
insists on the irreducibility of values to facts and on the perpetual challenge 
to the human spirit to elude the reign of facts by the very acts of judging their 
genesis and validity (ibid: 130-131). ‘Ref lexive analysis’ thus designates the 
bending back (re-f lexio) of the fact to its intrinsic axiology, to the judgmental, 
that is to say evaluative operations that are sedimented in ‘matters of fact’. 
Nowhere has Canguilhem spelt out the methodology of his ‘ref lexive analy-
sis’ of the sciences more clearly than in his early Traité de Logique et de Morale, 
co-written with his colleague Camille Planet in 1939, when both authors were 
employed as teachers of philosophy at a lycée in Toulouse. It is in this treatise 
that Canguilhem gives the following portrait of science as a rationale of sub-
stituting practical obstacles with (temporary) inconsistencies on the level of 
discursive conceptualisation: ‘Toute science est analyse des obstacles que l’ex-
istence supposée d’une Nature dresse dans l’expérience devant nos désirs; 
pour le jugement théorique qui a ainsi décidé de se constituer, l’échec prend 
la form examinée plus haut, celle de l’erreur, en se considérant uniquement 
comme affirmation de réalité reniée par l’objet même.’ (Canguilhem/Planet 
2011: 653)
The quintessence of this wording is sufficiently explicit: the discourse 
of science hinges upon an epistemological decision to confront practical im-
pediments as immanent issues within a process of conceptual rationalisa-
tion. What is more, it is not by accident that Canguilhem takes up the role 
of judgments in this context: on a first level, judgments are located within 
and effectuated by the scientific discourses themselves. It is in the interest 
of the consummation of the scientific practice to treat technical obstacles, 
bluntly speaking, as immanent moments of the working of the concept. Yet, 
on a second level, there is also a historical judgment at work here, that is 
to say the evaluation of the historian of science who judges the judgments 
of the scientists themselves. It is this twofold gesture which, as far as I can 
see, structures Canguilhem’s idea of ‘ref lexive analysis.’ Another quotation 
from the Traité corroborates Canguilhem’s ‘pre-vitalistic’, ref lective starting 
point of a genuine philosophy of the problem: ‘[Q]uand nous commençons 
de dissocier le chaos perceptif en y cherchant des “genres” de choses, nous 
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sommes amenés, pour comprendre les choses les unes par les autres, à multi-
plier non seulement ces genres, mais les “points de vue” sous lesquels ils nous 
apparaissent et nous constituons ainsi des concepts. [...] Les concepts pris tels 
quels ne sauraient être des vérités; au même titre que les sensations, et bien 
que formés d’autre manière, ils proposent des problèmes à qui essaie des les 
comprendre et pour cela des les ordonner.’ (ibid: 721)
This is a particularly rich quotation that needs to be unpacked with 
some caution, not least because it eventually helps to elucidate the division 
between problems, concepts and theories. To begin with, on inspection of this 
quote, it seems that two different ways to understand what a ‘concept’ does 
or is can be ruled out on its basis (viz. Schmidgen 2014). On the one hand, 
concepts do not represent reality; they have no semantic and no referential 
function. But on the other hand, neither can they be adequately interpreted 
as ‘constructions’ (ibid: 238), not even in Kant’s gentler, decidedly non-con-
structivist sense of a priori determinations of thought that are, in the last 
instance, anchored in the transcendental apperception of consciousness. 
Rather, as both Canguilhem’s and Planet’s choice of words and their reading 
by Henning Schmidgen suggest, concepts normatively make something vis-
ible, they ‘produce realities and perceptions, and stimulate activity’ (ibid). A 
concept seems to inscribe into the phenomenon it addresses a distinct ‘point 
of view’, a distinctive operation that imposes a normative decision on the one 
who approaches the phenomenon via this concept, such as a researcher in an 
empirical situation of a scientific practice. As a textbook example, one might 
think of the concept of the ref lex and the way that it necessarily involves an 
elementary opposition, namely the opposition between voluntary and in-
voluntary movements. After all, the productive performance of the concept 
consists of the way it raises or proposes a problem – to take up Canguilhem’s 
and Planet’s expression here. Importantly, the two young authors continue 
to argue, on the following page of their treatise, that concepts, in this light, 
indeed already imply ‘connaissance’ (Canguilhem/Planet 2015: 722) – which I 
hesitate to translate here with ‘knowledge’ – but precisely not ‘connaissance 
vraie ou scientifique’ (ibid). After all, then, one seems to be justified in point-
ing out that concepts are on the road to more precise knowledge. Yet, what 
keeps a concept aloof from ‘connaissance’ in the strict sense is that it does 
not, in and by itself, generate an internally coherent system of judgments 
that explicitly order and classify the phenomena under the perspective that 
this particular concept is able to open up. In other words concepts supply a 
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sketch of the solution which they tend to give to the specific problem that 
correlates with them. But here comes what Canguilhem and Planet add to 
their portrait of what, in their book from 1939, a concept is: ‘C’est que, de la 
subjectivité impliquée dans l’expérience originelle, les concepts gardent une 
sorte de contingence, et même une instabilité: tel pense inoffensif ce que tel 
autre juge dangereux, durable ce qui celui-ci croit précaire, etc.’ (Canguil-
hem/Planet 2015: 794) 
This is indeed a salient point in Canguilhem’s entire conception of episte-
mology: on a level that is not already included in the immanence of the theo-
rematic operations of a science, concepts continue to implicate a contingency, 
or, as the quotation has it, a precarious openness – and this contingency is 
precisely the share of the problem. No ultimate determination of the prob-
lem that is at stake in connection with a specific concept can ever be reached, 
and while concepts seem to invite and elicit research that is conducted un-
der the genuine conditions of science – that is, within a discourse that aims 
at producing or speaking ‘the truth’ – they are never fully reducible to the 
realm of science. At this juncture, it is no longer complicated to discern the 
disjunctive operation that culminates in the slip between problems and con-
cepts. The reason for this fissure is the internal tension between πρόβλημα 
and πρότασις: the transition from problems to premises always rests upon 
a normative act (the πρότασις), an implicit act of judgement that decides to 
accommodate the problem inside a conceptual regime. And it is precisely the 
f lip side of this operation that Canguilhem (alongside Planet) calls to mind 
with his usage of the term ‘problem’: to remit the discourse of science to its 
problems as opposed to its concepts amounts to unveiling the normative judg-
ments, and the historicity of these judgments, that structure the discourse 
of science itself. In other words, the recourse to the problem is the key to that 
‘ref lexive analysis’ which explicates the epistemic decisions of a science and, 
in so doing, itself judges those decisions as historical enjeux. 
In his paper on the topic, Henning Schmidgen contends that whenever 
Canguilhem speaks of a ‘concept’ in the technical sense, there is always an 
interplay between a phenomenon, a denomination and a definition at work 
(Schmidgen 2014: 246). For example, while we encounter the word ‘ref lex’ in 
the sense of a denomination in the writings of Descartes, it is not the case that 
this word carries with it a fully f ledged definition of the object it addresses. In 
fact, as Canguilhem shows in his study about the formation of the concept 
of the ref lex in the 17th and 18th centuries (Canguilhem 1955), Descartes did 
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not conceive of a homogeneity between sensory stimulation and motor reac-
tions, whereas in the latter half of the 17th century, notably in the writings of 
the British physician Thomas Willis, it is exactly the functional symmetry of 
these two cycles that is conceptualised, that is to say determined as a ref lec-
tion, a ref lux, or an echo, by means of the word ‘ref lex’. Only then does the 
word ‘ref lex’ take on the terminological function of a ‘concept’: it begins to 
address the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary motions under a qual-
itative distinction between these two groups of phenomena. In other words, 
it classifies and stabilises experience through the lens of this distinction.
Pierre Macherey has drawn rich conclusions from this methodology in 
Canguilhem’s writings. The following quotation from his above-mentioned 
piece on Canguilhem’s philosophy of science speaks for itself: ‘Un concept, 
c’est un mot plus sa définition; le concept a une histoire; à un moment de 
cette histoire, on dit qu’il est formé: quand il permet d’instituer un protocole 
d’observation’ (Macherey 2009: 59). One can retain the idea that concepts 
have a history only to the extent that one speaks of something that might 
have been, and can always be, conceptualised in ways and terms different 
from the path that a science historically took as a matter of fact. This factor 
is precisely what Canguilhem has termed, on more than one occasion, a prob-
lem. However, one needs to be concise on this point: the notion of the prob-
lem is not part of a position that one might describe as an epistemic realism. 
Problems are no realities that would exist outside of and preceding the work 
of conceptualisation. In this regard, Canguilhem is very outspoken and he 
sides with Duhem, Rey and Bachelard in saying: ‘Le fait n’est pas ce dont la 
science est faite, mais ce que fait la science en se faisant’ (Canguilhem 2015: 
371). Thus, the difficulty in coming to terms with the role of problems as op-
posed to concepts in Canguilhem’s epistemology resides in the fact that Can-
guilhem does indeed separate these two poles, but that does not mean that 
he grants the problem an ontological status anterior to the process of concep-
tualisation. Strictly speaking, then, problems are not phenomena. Rather, a 
problem is a specific task that a conceptual operation tosses up in front of 
itself as something which requires a solution – which is supposed to need a 
solution that is not yet, or may be no longer, in place. All of this is particularly 
relevant under the aspect of time, in the perspective of temporality: although 
Canguilhem aims at explicating that dimension which presents itself, after 
all, as exterior and irreducible to science, he does not at all pursue the di-
rection of a phenomenology of lived experience, and to some extent he does 
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not even (strictly) associate this dimension with his philosophical vitalism. 
What one needs to understand, then, is the immanent critique of scientific 
rationalities, a project that, by the way, does not exclude, but rather implies 
the affirmation of the peculiar normativity of the sciences. In the last step 
of my argument, I will brief ly try to betoken the fabric of Canguilhem’s his-
torical epistemology in its ‘pre-vitalist’ configuration that is not yet, at least 
not explicitly, pervaded by the argument of biological normativity, but rather 
oriented towards the ‘ref lexive analysis’ of the problems of science. 
The upshot of the reflexive analysis: 
moments of stability, moments of crisis
Pierre Macherey has reminded us of something pertinent, namely of Can-
guilhem’s claim that concepts are actually born (Macherey 2009: 58). There-
fore, what needs to be reconstructed are the constellations and the normative 
choices, the enjeux which have a hand in the birth of a concept. The temporal-
ity of the concept does not coincide with the history of a scientific discourse 
or of any scientific discourse which operationalises that concept. In order 
to fully account for this non-coincidence, one would have to earmark three 
breakages which a historical epistemology in the lines of Canguilhem deals 
with and draws our attention to. The first breakage is the irreducibility of 
problems to concepts: concepts tackle problems through an act of πρότασις, 
thus transforming them from technical obstacles into the immanent sub-
ject matter of scientific rationalisation. It is on this level that Macherey can 
introduce the idea of philosophy as a questioning of problems in their inde-
pendence from their solutions. The second breakage concerns the way that 
scientific discourses implicate problems in a theorematic regime. In this 
perspective, Canguilhem insists, as Macherey has justly shown, not only that 
a theory has its moments of crisis, but actually even a birth, the birth of the 
theory being the decision of science to tackle problems conceptually, driven, 
as it were, by something that one might call a volonté de la vérité, a will to pro-
duce and to speak truth. Thirdly, however, there is another breakage, which, 
too, has to be reconstructed historically, and that is the point where science 
spills over to arenas that are outside of science per se, for instance, to the 
field of techniques as opposed to science. The example of the rise of positivist 
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physiology, which has eclipsed the genuinely technical and practical dimen-
sion of medicine, is particularly telling in this respect.
And one finally begins to understand, too, that this philosophy is intrin-
sically tied to and can only constitute itself as a history of science. Philosophy 
raises and highlights problems in a gesture that is not driven by the will to 
solve them, by the volonté de la vérité that is immanently constitutive of sci-
ence. On the contrary, philosophy solicits a precise historical reconstruction 
of the distinct ruptures and normative stakes in the process of formation 
of scientific knowledge. To understand what is at stake here, a glimpse at 
the philosophical articulations of ‘Canguilhem avant Canguilhem’ (J.-F. 
Braunstein) can be particularly precious: it is here that the epistemology of 
ref lexive analysis is foregrounded, an operation that lingers on the thresh-
old between problems and concepts. Simultaneously, this analysis exposes 
and normatively questions the judgments, that is the valuations, that drive 
a science to pursue problems within the regime of concepts: if it is true that 
‘the problem itself persists’ at the heart of its scientific solutions, the task of 
historical epistemology can only reside in the constant liquefaction of facts 
with a view to the values that remain sedimented inside them. This dynamic 
operation, in turn, is rendered possible by the immanent split of the process 
of problematisation, the split that separates the πρόβλημα from its πρότασις. 
Only four years after the Traité, co-written with Camille Planet, Canguilhem 
will move to an integration of his ref lexive analysis into a philosophical vo-
cabulary of life and of biological normativity. But the oblique model of and 
complement to this vitalism, it seems to me, needs to be identified in his 
epistemology of ‘ref lexive analysis’. It is only along the lines of such an anal-
ysis that the genuinely vital dialectics of the sciences, their interplay between 
‘moments of crisis’ and ‘moments of stability’, can garner their full credit.2
2  ‘Du moment que nous parlons de science, c’est-à-dire de connaissance vraie, nous sommes 
dans l’ordre de cette opération mentale qui seule peut être dite vraie ou fausse, c’est-à-dire 
l’établissement dans le jugement d’un rapport entre concepts. [...] Le fait n’est pas ce dont 
la science est faite, mais ce que fait la science en se faisant. [...] Donc s’il est vrai qu’il n’y a 
de science que sous forme de théorie, c’est-à-dire de démonstration, et qu’il n’y a pas de 
démonstration sans principes, nous dirons que la science expérimentale est celle qui va à la 
recherche de ses principes. Le concept de science expérimentale est un concept mixte qui 
retient à la fois la relation de la science à l’expérience comme au problème à résoudre et la 
relation de l’expérience à la science comme au théoreme, c’est-à-dire au problème réso-
lu. [...] Mais si toute science est théorie, composition rationnelle, c’est-à-dire déductive de 
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Compositional Methodology:    




The primary focus of Gilbert Simondon’s writings is the problematic of in-
dividuation (1992; 2017); a subsidiary but integral dimension of this focus is 
a concern with the individuation of a problematic. In this essay, I explore some 
of the methodological aspects of this process. At a fundamental level, ap-
proaching the construction of a problematic as a process of individuation, 
Simondon provides an alternative to theories of knowledge in which the pos-
sibility of knowledge is grounded in the constituting activity of the knowing 
subject. As he puts it, ‘We cannot know individuation in the common sense of 
the phrase; we can only individuate, individuate ourselves and in ourselves’ 
(1992: 317). 
In Simondon’s approach to the individuation of a problematic, metaphys-
ics and logic are merged in what is called transduction, that is, a recursive 
analogical operation in which the process of individuation ‘between the real 
exterior and the subject is grasped by the subject due to the analogical indi-
viduation of knowledge in the subject’ (Simondon quoted in Combes, 2012: 9; 
my italics). Transduction is the analogical and self-grounding dimension of 
the procedure of thought. As Adrian Mackenzie explains,
Every transduction is an individuation in process. It is a way something comes 
to be. Importantly, transduction refers not only to a process that occurs in 
physical, biological or technical ensembles as they individuate. It also occurs 
in and as thought. Thinking can be understood as an individuation of a think-
ing subject; not just something that someone who thinks does. (2002: 18)
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The individuation of a problematic is always double, both ontogenetic and 
epistemological. As Combes put it in her inf luential account, for Simondon, 
‘thought is nothing more than one of the phases of being-becoming, because 
the operation of individuation does not admit of an already constituted ob-
server.’ (2012: 7)
In what follows my concern is to explore the implications of the on-
to-epistemological doubling by focusing on issues of methodology. Given 
this concern, I risk falling into a kind of technocratic conception of the prob-
lematic, of inhabiting the position of a functionary (Flusser 2014), but I hope 
to avoid doing so by following Simondon in refusing to understand meth-
odology as a principle or a set of principles that can simply be applied or put 
into effect. Instead, the aim is to see methodology as a principle – or perhaps 
better – and, to adopt Simondon’s terminology, an operation, that is itself con-
stituted as it happens: ‘the transposition of the scheme is in turn accompanied 
by a composition of it’ (Simondon, quoted in Combes 2012: 13). I put forward 
the term ‘compositional methodology’ to describe the dynamic and meth-
odologically constitutive dimensions of the individuation of a problematic 
(Lury, forthcoming), the twisting of process into practice.
The use of the term ‘compositional’ is intended to draw attention to Si-
mondon’s distinctive notion of form. His criticism of hylomorphism – in 
which a pre-existing form is imposed on matter from outside – is well 
known. In Simondon’s view, such an understanding is inadequate in that 
it does not recognise the potentials that are always emerging in a process of 
individuation. To acknowledge this potential, he proposes a concept of form 
related to the activity of in-formation. In this understanding, information 
designates ‘the very operation of taking on form, the irreversible direction in 
which individuation operates’ (Combes 2012: 5). This understanding of form 
as an operation – a continuous, variable process – is also present in other 
process thinkers, including A.N. Whitehead, who says that the comprehen-
sion of process requires ‘an analysis of the interweaving of data, form, tran-
sition, and issue’ (Whitehead 1968: 34).
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A problematic of the contemporary
My aim here is to consider the methodological aspects of the individuation 
of a problematic by addressing the individuation of a problematic of the con-
temporary. Peter Osborne (1995) provides a note of caution for such a project 
when he suggests that the space of the contemporary is constituted as an 
illusory present in much social and cultural theory. He gives as an example 
those analyses that make use of the term ‘new media’ as if ‘new-ness’ provid-
ed its own context. This present-ism, he suggests, is a consequence of theo-
ry’s modernism and its negation of the past. Acknowledging the pitfalls of 
such an approach, I propose instead to elaborate what might be involved in 
the individuation of a problematic of the contemporary by drawing on Paul 
Rabinow’s anthropology of reason, which explicitly aims to move beyond 
modernity as a metric of inquiry.1 Rabinow presents the contemporary as an 
assemblage of old and new elements and their interactions and interfaces: 
‘The contemporary is a moving ratio of modernity, moving through the re-
cent past and near future in a (nonlinear) space that gauges modernity as an 
ethos already becoming historical.’ (2009: 2)
In this way of thinking, the individuation of a problematic of the con-
temporary is emergent, where emergence refers to ‘a state in which multiple 
elements combine to produce an assemblage, whose significance cannot be 
reduced to prior elements and relations’ (2009: 2). Simondon himself uses 
the term contemporary to describe the individuation of living individuals, in 
contradistinction to that of physical individuals: he says that the living indi-
vidual is contemporary with itself whereas a physical individual contains a 
past that is ‘radically “past”’ (1992). The restriction of this understanding of 
the contemporary to living entities is not adopted here since, methodolog-
ically, it is important to recognise the heterogeneity of milieu in which the 
individuation of a problematic takes place and acknowledge the significance 
of modes of conscious and non-conscious cognition that cut across the dis-
tinction between the living and the non-living (Hayles 2017). Although some 
scholars (Back and Puwar 2012) have proposed the term ‘live methods’ to gal-
vanise methods across the social sciences, what is proposed here is a little 
different (though not incompatible): that is, a compositional methodology is 
1  Relatedly, Rabinow says, ‘it is only through discovering and giving form to elements that 
are already present that the inquiry can proceed’ (2009: 9).
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proposed in which the individuation of a problematic is a processual ensem-
ble of living and non-living entities. 
Having laid out some general methodological characteristics of the indi-
viduation of a problematic of the contemporary, let me now brief ly introduce 
the notion of epistemic infrastructures to orient the discussion of the envi-
ronment in which the individuation of problematics takes place. The term 
‘infrastructure’ highlights the ways in which individuation requires and in-
stalls ‘material supports’ in the world, including ‘buildings, bureaucracies, 
standards, forms, technologies, funding f lows, affective orientations, and 
power relations’ (Murphy 2017: 6). The term epistemic is used to signal that 
what is at issue is the nature of knowledge, justification and belief rather 
than (pre-formed) knowledge as such. Indeed, the relation of knowledge to 
truth, and the complex relations between knowledge, faith, feeling and be-
lief are central to discussions of the individuation of the problematic of the 
contemporary (for different perspectives on these issues see Simone 1994; 
Connelly 1999; Esposito 2013; Blencowe 2015). 
Crucially, infrastructures are never self-contained or discrete: they 
themselves leave legacies that impinge on environments, atmospheres and 
other material sites through complex interrelationships of energy trans-
ference, waste disposal and economics (for example, data centers globally 
currently account for 2% of global greenhouse emissions equivalent to avi-
ation)’ (Corby 2017: 368). And of course they are always changing. Consider, 
for example, the changes described by Alberto Corsín Jiménez (2014) in his 
discussion of beta or open source urbanism. By this he means the ways in 
which citizens are ‘wiring the landscape of their communities with the de-
vices, networks, or architectures that they deem worthy of local attention or 
concern’ (2014: 342). He situates these developments in relation to the ‘new 
economy of open knowledge’ emerging from organisational forms, such as 
peer‐to‐peer networks of collaboration, and in doing so identifies the possi-
bility of a right to infrastructure. 
Corsín Jiménez identifies three dimensions to this right. One, concep-
tual: projects in open source urbanism populate urban ecologies with digi-
tal and material entities whose emergence destabilises classical regulatory 
distinctions between public, private or commercial property forms, tech-
nologies and spaces. Two, technical: open source urban projects are built on 
networks of expertise and skills that traverse localised boundaries. Three, 
political: open source projects transform the stakes in modes of urban gover-
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nance. In an open source project, a community may assume political and ex-
pert management of its infrastructure. By bringing these three dimensions 
together, he suggests, it becomes possible to read the right to infrastructure 
as a verb, not a noun: 
The process of infrastructuring makes visible and legible the languages, me-
dia, inscriptions, artefacts, devices, and relations – the betagrams – through 
which political and social agencies are endowed with […] expressive capacity. 
(2014: 357)
But, as Corsín Jiménez also acknowledges, both the right to and the capacity 
for infrastructure are unevenly distributed. There is a precarious politics as-
sociated with the articulation of this right and the associated redistribution 
of expertise. For example, in the UK and more widely in Europe, academ-
ics in all disciplines are now routinely encouraged to extend collaboration 
outside the academy, not simply to engage representatives of business, gov-
ernment and the third sector, social movements and the public, but to invite 
them to participate in research activity as co-producers of knowledge. On 
the one hand, it is part of a shift in emphasis from the experimental as a 
knowledge-site to the experimental as a social process. On the other hand, 
it is also an unequal playing field, in which the nature and characteristics 
of the social are being redefined (Marres, Guggenheim and Wilkie 2018). At 
the same time, ‘users’ (that is, most of us who engage with digital media as 
part of our everyday lives) are increasingly required to take part in/be part 
of a variety of genres of participation, including tests, trials, games, com-
petitions, experiments, quizzes and so on, also including various forms of 
tracking and tracing, where we are not so much participating as being par-
ticipated. In these practices, knowledge-making is implicitly and explicitly 
tied to the creation of epistemic cultures of increasingly diverse, distributed 
heterogeneous kinds (Knorr Cetina 1999), including (multi-sided) markets. 
As the traditional entry and exit points of knowledge-creation become less 
clear ‘information’ asymmetries proliferate. 
The politics of infrastructuralism is also at issue in the emergence of 
what are called global challenges or global problems. In these uses, the glob-
al is sometimes understood as size or magnitude, that is, some problems – 
such as climate change or disease – are understood to be so ‘big’ as to be 
global. In addition, the term is sometimes extended to a concern with the 
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heterogeneity of the actors said to be required to address such problems, 
and the necessity of including both human and non-human participants. On 
other occasions, much of the data and processes associated with what are 
called global problems are now held to operate below and before thresholds 
of human awareness. These kinds of formulations are increasingly hard to 
avoid. But the concept of the global and the related term globalisation are 
also contested, at least in some disciplines: it is argued that they cannot cap-
ture the intensities and unevenness of the variety of mobilities that cross-
cut the world (Sheller and Urry 2006). For this reason, some scholars prefer 
to explore the unevenness that might be introduced into an understanding 
of such mobilities by focusing on ‘inter’-relations. This approach has more 
resonance with a consideration of the individuation of a problematic of the 
contemporary, and with an emphasis on the making or composing – rather 
than the finding – of problems.
Consider, for example, those scholars who have drawn on the idea of 
‘Asia as a method’ (Chen 2010) to develop both an intellectual movement – 
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (IACS) – and a methodology, Inter-Asia method-
ology. Inter-Asia as methodology involves visibilizing the normative frame 
that often has the ‘West’ as its key reference point, comparative work, and 
the identification of terms to become part of a broader conceptual frame-
work. For Niranjana this includes what she calls the ‘pressing’ of concepts, 
that is a mutual or lateral interrogation of concepts with each other to reveal 
their interconnections and how they unevenly implicate simultaneously dif-
ferent Asian locations, the production of genealogies of the Asian ‘present’ 
(2013).
Infrastructural changes such as the increase in computational capac-
ity, the growing availability of ‘real-time’ data and transformations in the 
ecosystem of data retrieval, have also contributed to a preoccupation with 
the relation of research to the future. In particular, these changes have 
stimulated discussion as to whether the future can somehow be brought 
into the present, that is whether the future can be not just predicted but in 
some sense anticipated. That is, for example, one way of understanding the 
changes in the calculation of risk associated with new techniques of statis-
tical analysis (Amoore 2013). It is also linked to a resurgence of interest in 
design as a methodology and a concern with the performativity of method. 
The appropriation of design methodology is also associated with the making 
of artefacts of all kinds, including epistemic artefacts, synthetic materials or 
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even smart cities. In research linked to smart materials, smart cars or smart 
cities, design methodology contributes to the creation of cognitive and epis-
temic artifacts that are held to have the capacity to modulate the present in 
what is described as real time, bypassing more human forms of governance. 
As epistemic infrastructures come to be equipped with real-time instrumen-
tation, including actuators (Hayles 2017), and a growing number of storage 
and memory artefacts able to mobilise and articulate the potential-izing ca-
pacities of individuation, Simondon’s claim that time itself is ‘the expression 
of the dimensionality of the being as it is becoming individualised’ (1992: 314) 
is being activated methodologically. 
-ing
By focusing on form as in-formation, the proposal of the term compositional 
methodology is designed to draw attention to the uneven, non-linear tem-
poralities of this methodological activation. The thinking behind the term 
was developed in the perhaps unlikely context of working on an International 
Handbook of Interdisciplinary Methods (2018; with co-editors Rachel Fensham, 
Alexandra Heller-McCrea, Angela Last, Mike Michael, and Emma Uprich-
ard), the working shorthand for which was -ing! Contributors were asked to 
describe the do-ing of their chosen methods. 
An inspiration for this approach was the artist Richard Serra’s claim that 
‘Drawing is a verb’. His artwork Verb List  (1967-68) serves as a kind of mani-
festo for this pronouncement. In pencil, on two sheets of paper, in four col-
umns of scripts, the artist lists the infinitives of 84 verbs – to roll, to crease, to 
fold, to store, for example – and 24 possible states or conditions – of gravity, of 
entropy, of photosynthesis, of nature among others. In an interview, Serra says, 
‘[t]he problem I was trying to resolve … was: How do you apply an activity or a 
process to a material and arrive at a form that refers back to its own making?’ 
(Garrels 2011). The art critic Rosalind Krauss suggests that the list describes 
Serra’s own practice in terms of action that ‘simply acts, and acts, and acts’ 
(1985: 101). Serra himself draws attention to the relations in which the action 
that ‘simply acts’ takes place: he describes the list as a series of ‘actions to 
relate to oneself, material, place, and process’ (Buchloh 2000: 7; my emphasis). 
The verbs in the list are transitive, that is, in linguistic terms, they can 
imply or express an object – to roll pastry, to crease paper, to fold metal, to 
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store data, for example. This formulation – of implication or expression – is 
important; the verbs are not ‘applied’ to materials – they imply or implicate an 
object in a process, ‘something/happening’ as one of the contributors, Thomas 
Jellis, says in a discussion of experimenting (Jellis 2018: 53). This, perhaps, is 
why 24 examples ‘of’ a variety of objects, conditions or states are also included 
in the list by Serra: verbs are expressions of objects, conditions or states, and 
objects, states and conditions are the implication or expression of verbs. 
Perhaps most significantly for a compositional methodology, how the 
verbs in Serra’s list imply or express an object is a problem – indeed, it is 
‘the’ problem. As he puts it, the problem is how to accomplish a form by or in 
doing. Drawing on this insight, and the contributions to the Handbook, the 
proposal I want to advance here is that the individuation of a problematic of 
the contemporary is an accomplishment of the do-ing of a method or meth-
ods, that is, it is an accomplishment of a practice in which there is a referral 
back to person, place, matter and process. For Serra, as for Simondon, that 
this accomplishment emerges as a form cannot be assumed: the operation 
of methods may or may not arrive at a form, have purchase on a question, or 
individuate a problem.
‘[n]ot having turns of phrase and modes of conjugation indicating processu-
ality (like the English form -ing that indicates an action in the process of hap-
pening) available to him in his language, Simondon is to some extent con-
strained, in order to introduce dynamism into his thought, to invent a style.’ 
(2013: 109). 
In contrast to Serra’s use of the infinitive form of verbs in Verb List, the ap-
proach introduced in the Handbook places emphasis on what are, in the 
English language, known as gerunds, that is, active present tense forms that 
may also function as nouns (a doubling that is made explicit in Serra’s phrase, 
‘Drawing is a verb’).2 Put rather grandly, the Handbook’s concern with meth-
ods as gerunds or -ings is intended to identify the potential of methods to 
2  In English, this verb form typically ends in -ing, which is why our informal name for the 
Handbook was –ings! As Rachel Fensham, one of the co-editors of the Handbook, pointed 
out in discussion, other languages do not necessarily have the same verb forms. Indeed, as 
Combes points out in her influential explication of Simondon’s conception of individua-
tion, ‘[n]ot having turns of phrase and modes of conjugation indicating processuality (like 
the English form -ing that indicates an action in the process of happening) available to him 
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compose problems as interruptions of the (historical) present. That is, the 
aim of a compositional methodology is to emphasise the role of methods in 
the making of problems as an activation of the present: they are of interest in-
sofar as they contribute to the determination of a situation as a problem, that 
is, ‘a state of things in which something that will perhaps matter is unfolding 
amidst the usual activity of life’ (Berlant 2008: 4). Just as Simondon says of a 
concept that it ‘is neither a priori or a posteriori but a praesentia, because it is 
an informative and interactive communication between that which is larger 
than the individual and that which is smaller’ (1992: 310), so we sought to de-
scribe interdisciplinary methods. Put rather more prosaically, the aim was 
to consider how methods might constitute some aspect of what is given, the 
present – in all its geo-political complexity – as a situation that has poten-
tials that can be methodologically activated in specific, precise ways.3 
How to realise this aspiration is described in a variety of ways in the 
Handbook. Matthew Reason says in his discussion of the method of drawing, 
‘[d]rawing is at once immediate, and yet takes time’: 
When I ask a participant to draw me a picture I am inviting a dif ferent dy-
namic than if I had simply asked them to talk. I do not expect them to re-
spond instantly. Instead drawing imposes a slowing down, a pause for reflec-
tion in the returning to memories. (Reason 2018: 48)
Gail Davies and Helen Scalway say of the diagram, 
[…] it hasn’t got a beginning, it hasn’t got an end but nonetheless the incom-
mensurable meanings are there, written in, but it hasn’t got to have that lin-
ear structure of time. (Davies and Scalway 2018: 226)
in his language, Simondon is to some extent constrained, in order to introduce dynamism 
into his thought, to invent a style.’ (2013: 109)
She continues: ‘For all its subtlety, this style is nonetheless tangible, relying in large part on 
a specific usage of punctuation: it is thus not rare to see deployed, in a phrase composed 
of brief compositions connected with semicolons, all the phases of a movement of being 
or an emotion.’ (ibid) 
3  LaMarre, in his translation of Combes, uses the word ‘givenness’ in place of ‘il y a’ (which he 
also describes as a gloss on ‘es gibt’), all phrases used to refer to ‘being as such’, in contra-
distinction to individuated being.
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Alex Wilkie observes of speculating:
Speculation, however, requires a shif t in approach from analysing how 
probabilistic futures are manifested, managed and contested in the present 
– how actors imagine, model, predict, coordinate and in turn configure the 
future to the present – to the construction of adequate concepts and devices 
for exploring possible latent futures that matter. A word of caution is in order 
here, however: speculation is both prospective and retrospective. It applies 
as much to the politics of explaining past events (what might have been) as 
it does to the capturing of future possibilities (what might be). (Wilkie 2018: 
347)
Catherine Ayres and David Bissel use the term suspending to describe the 
analytical potential of acknowledging the multiple durations present in an 
interview. They say,
Dif ferent durations resonate at dif ferent times, sometimes immediately, 
and sometimes years af ter the initial encounter. Following Ingold’s (1993) 
observations about the multiple co-existent temporalities of landscapes, we 
want to show how the interview “landscape” is steeped in the pasts and pos-
sible futures of researcher and researched alike, a site in which trajectories 
converge and transform. We want to revisit the interview event between 
Catherine and John to draw out “suspending” as a methodological interven-
tion filled with theoretical, practical and ethical possibilities for thinking em-
pirical encounters. (Ayres and Bissell 2018: 76)
Jussi Parikka says:
As a method, digging opens up historically constructed material reality. It 
does not merely expose “ruins” but the multiple historical realities where 
material infrastructures have been layered, revealing dif ferent “distinctive 
temporalities and evolutionary paths” (Mattern 2015: 14). In this sense, dig-
ging opens the dif ferent temporalities that are all the time layered in infra-
structures of cities, in media technological objects and in everyday situations. 
(Parikka 2018: 164-5)
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Importantly, this activation of the present in the individuation of a prob-
lematic is not something that is a one-off, a discrete procedure, but rather, 
something that itself is typically conducted as part of a distributed and col-
laborative process in which a problematic individuates and is individuated. 
In other words, just as LaMarre notes in his discussion of technical individ-
uation, ‘because machines also exist in series and in ensembles, we also need 
to look at their phylogeny, at the relation between reproduction and trans-
formation’ (1999: 104), so also do we need to look at the distributed or differ-
entiated reproduction of problems. To use a different, although related, set 
of terms, problems are always the methodologically induced property of dis-
tributed practical fields, themselves comprising researchers, methods, ma-
terials and media, connected to each other in time and space in diverse ways 
as part of the constantly changing epistemic infrastructure. Or, as Combes 
puts it, transductive unity is accomplished through ‘a relative store of the 
“spacing out of being”, its capacity for dephasing’ (2013: 6). 
To explore what all this might mean in relation to an individuation of a 
problematic of the contemporary let me return to the notion of process de-
scribed by Simondon as transduction, and described by Whitehead as con-
formation–the interweaving of data, form, transition, and issue. Simondon 
says: 
By transduction, we mean a physical, biological, mental or social opera-
tion, through which an activity [of relation] propagates from point to point 
within a domain, grounding this propagation in the structuration of the do-
main, which is operated from place to place: each region of the constituted 
structure serves as a principle of constitution for the next region. (Simondon, 
quoted in Combes 2013: 6)
In this process, the operations of in-formation link the problematic and the 
associated milieu and ground the links between internal and external milieu. 
This is a difficult process to grasp but it is one way to acknowledge that a 
problem does not simply take place or individuate in an unchanging context, 
nor only to recognise that it is simply the context that is changing, but to 
acknowledge that the changing context is (also) changed by each action. One 
way of understanding this is through the notion of recursion, where recur-
sion is understood as a repetition that sums as it sequences. In other words, 
the action that simply acts in the individuation of a problematic of the con-
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temporary is not so simple at all, but, rather, compounds the problem. A par-
adigmatic example is free software, where the infrastructure (code) is self‐
grounded by the very collaborative effort that sets it in motion (Kelty 2008). 
In earlier work (Adkins/Lury 2011; Lury/Wakeford 2012) I used the term 
auto-spatialisation – adopted from the philosopher Gilles Châtelet (1999) – 
to describe this process of individuating a problem. From a compositional 
methodology point of view, the operation of individuation as auto-spatial-
isation can be taken to mean that a problem is always both a composite and 
compositional, that is, a form that is of the process of being in-formed. And 
this composition continually actualises potential as it makes relations be-
tween a problem and (the changing) context anew: a problem individuating 
is never fully solved but always in suspension. 
Auto-spatialisation
Let me give some examples from a variety of disciplinary and interdisciplin-
ary practices. 
First, sampling. Zeilinger (2014) proposes that we recognise sampling as 
a methodological intervention, not simply as borrowing or stealing, but as a 
purposeful replacement of a recognizable original. He gives two cases. The 
first concerns a record of the Bobby Darin 1959 hit song Dream Lover, which 
as a result of the repeated playing of selected passages is scratched so that 
the needle gets stuck, repeating certain grooves: ‘the jumping needle trans-
forms the line “Dream lover, where are you – with a love oh so true?” into a 
loop that sounds like: “Dreamlo-lo-lo-lover where are yo-u-u-u-u […]?”’ (2014: 
163-164). The effect of this stuttering, he says, subtly changes the line’s conno-
tation: ‘The scratched record takes on the quality of a new utterance […], and, 
from its inscribed involuntary repetitions and stammering, the listener may 
discern the longing for love, the insecurities, and the unfulfilled desires of a 
whole generation of listeners.’ (2014: 164) The second case concerns the film 
Alone. Zeilinger says,
[b]y my estimation, Arnold’s Alone appropriates a total of around two minutes 
from several source films and, by inserting countless repetitions of sampled 
snippets, stretches the source material to roughly eight times its original du-
ration. This intervention allows the filmmaker to focus on a number of arche-
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typical character constellations (such as Father-Son, Father-Mother-Son, and 
Mother-Son-Love Interest) and to foreground in these constellations psycho-
logical issues that the cultural mainstream tends to gloss over. (2014: 164)
Through these two cases, Zeilinger argues that sampling can uncover, fore-
ground, and repurpose the meanings of original materials. He shows how 
sampling can return the past to the present and the future. In making this 
argument he is very much concerned with the ways in which repetition is 
sequenced, that is, in the terms being developed here, how the organisation 
of auto-spatialisation can individuate a problematic in very particular ways: 
When we sample, we do not necessarily produce anti-authoritative ruptures 
(that would be the legal action of the sampling artist as pirate); rather, sam-
pling allows us to become part of circuits of meaningful repetition that can 
create new intimacies, new rapports between us, the original work, and the 
sampling piece itself. Sampling simultaneously dismantles and reinstates a 
work, an idea, or a unit. (2014: 169)
A second example comes from a study of Fluidity, the name of an open source 
computational code that is the key methodological resource of a large group 
of scientists at the Applied Modelling and Computation Group at Imperial 
College in London. In his ethnography of this group, Matthew Spencer de-
scribes the complex temporalities that are involved in the transformation 
in use of this code by scientists in different disciplines, working both inde-
pendently and collaboratively, in syncopated rhythms with each other. He 
writes,
[r]esearch projects carry with them the whole weight of their past. While the 
trajectory of construction may move from a mathematical model of an ana-
lytical solution to a model of a well-studied experiment, the results of these 
previous stages become concretised in the apparatus as part of a testing 
system. When a scientist moves on to model something new, it is import-
ant to be assured that changes made in doing this have not undone earlier 
successes that built the foundation for the project. So as a test incorporated 
into the automated build and test suite, the earlier result will be run every 
time modifications are made to the code, ensuring that confidence from past 
success can still hold. […] When a model is under active development, it is 
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never enough to cite validations and verifications that have been made in the 
past, because these have been made with respect to a dif ferent code. All past 
verification and validation accreted in the present system of research is thus 
carried forwards with current research projects, applied over and over again 
to every new iteration of the code. (Spencer 2013: 107)
This characteristic – the operationalisation of repetition in ways that actively 
engage and exploit a context that is itself changing – is an aspect of all indi-
viduation (including the individuation of a problematic), so Simondon would 
suggest. As Spencer acknowledges, scientific practice has always been repet-
itively distributed in space and time, but his study shows the newly enhanced 
methodological importance of the changing organisation of that repetition 
in a shared computational infrastructure that is itself being deliberately changed 
in a process of auto-spatialisation.
A third example relates to the use of computer-generated images (CGIs) 
in urban planning. Rose, Degen and Melhuish (2014) argue that rather than 
seeing them as still images, as static representations of urban space, they 
should be understood as interfaces circulating through a dynamic soft-
ware-supported network space:
[…] the action done on and with CGIs as they are created takes place at a series 
of interfaces. These interfaces – between and among humans, sof tware, and 
hardware – are where work is done both to create the CGI and to create the 
conditions for their circulation. (2014: 386)
Crucially, understood as interfaces, the circulation of a CGI is not secondary 
to its creation, but both a condition and a consequence of its methodological 
value in a process of auto-spatialisation. 
A fourth example – perhaps the paradigmatic one – concerns the in-
creasing importance attached to search in the conduct of re-search. David 
Stark observes a shift in the ways in which networks are transforming the 
processes of classification that are fundamental to many kinds of research 
(2011: 169). Things changed, he says, when the founders of Google reorgan-
ised search from a classificatory to a network logic: 
[…] new social technologies exploit, radically in recombination, the three ba-
sic activities of life on the Web: search, link, interact. [… S]earch based on the 
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structure of the links […]. Interact based on the structure of searches […] [L]ink 
based on the structure of the interactions. (2011: 171)
Stark emphasises the capacity of this new logic of search to correct a defi-
ciency of methods that conceive databases as ‘passive’ and model search as 
information retrieval, that is, assume that the existing, often static, struc-
ture of an information resource contains all the relevant knowledge to be 
discovered. In contrast, Stark says, ‘[o]nce the vast databases are seen as 
an associative knowledge structure, the goal is to make them accessible as 
evolving knowledge repositories’ (2011: 171). New categories emerge by treat-
ing users themselves as information resources with their own specific con-
texts. While the concept of category is not abandoned it is reconceived in re-
lation to contexts produced in relation to circulation or movement: 
[…] short-term categories bring together a number of possibly highly unrelat-
ed contexts, which in turn create new associations in the individual informa-
tion resources that would never occur with their own limited context. (Stark 
2011: 173)
Each of these examples demonstrates the methodologically constitutive op-
eration of auto-spatialisation, including, perhaps most significantly, prac-
tices of contexting that provide (unevenly) shared resource for the individu-
ation of a problematic in terms of movement within and through changing 
milieu.
Rendition
To consider what is at stake in these practices for the individuation of a prob-
lematic of the contemporary let me introduce the artist Hito Steyerl’s de-
scription of how the practice of film editing is currently being transformed. 
It is, she says, 
[…] being expanded by techniques of encryption – techniques of selection – 
and ways to keep material safe and to distribute information. Not only mak-
ing it public, divulging or disclosing, but really finding new formats and cir-
cuits for it. I think this is an art that has not yet been defined as such, but it is, 
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well, aesthetic. It’s a form. […] Now it’s not only about narration but also about 
navigation, translation, braving serious personal risk, and evading a whole 
bunch of military spooks. It’s about handling transparency as well as opacity, 
in a new way, in a new, vastly extended kind of filmmaking that requires vast-
ly extended skills. (Steyerl/Poitras 2015: 311)
Steyerl proposes that the question of how information is ‘stored, secured, 
circulated, redacted, checked, and so on [… the] entire art of withholding 
and disseminating information and carefully determining the circumstanc-
es’ is a ‘formal decision’. She emphasises that this decision has an unstable 
temporality:
When I’m working with Af ter Ef fects,4 there is hardly any real-time play back. 
So much information is being processed, it might take two hours or longer 
before you see the result. So editing is replaced by rendering. Rendering, ren-
dering, staring at the render bar. It feels like I’m being rendered all the time.
What do you do if you don’t really see what you edit while you’re doing it? 
You speculate. It’s speculative editing. You try to guess what it’s going to look 
like if you put key frames here and here and here. Then there are the many 
algorithms that do this kind of speculation for you. (Steyerl /Poitras 2015: 312)
In dialogue with Steyerl, the filmmaker Laura Poitras discusses the pro-
gramme TREASUREMAP used by the US National Security Agency (NSA) to 
provide analysts with ‘a near-real-time map of the internet and every device 
connected to it’. She suggests that at the core of the NSA’s approach to data 
collection is a ‘retrospective querying – how to see narrative after the fact’ 
(Steyerl and Poitras 2015: 312).5 
In the terms being developed here Steyerl provides a description of a 
specific form of auto-spatialisation – one which I suggest is increasingly 
dominant: rendition (see also Day and Lury 2017). Rendering or rendition is 
a term with many everyday as well as technical definitions, including: a per-
4  Adobe Af ter Ef fects is a sof tware tool for video compositing, motion graphics design and 
animation.
5  Following this line of thought, phenomena such as ‘fake news’ can be understood as epis-
temic artefacts of practices of rendition.
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formance, a translation, an artistic depiction, a representation of a building 
executed in perspective, as well as meaning to return, to make a payment 
in money, kind or service, to pay in due (a tax or tribute) and, in legal terms, 
to transfer persons from one jurisdiction to another. The origin for all these 
uses of the term is the Latin reddere: ‘to give back.’ However, as Steyerl’s de-
scription makes clear – and the current salience of the term ‘forced rendition’ 
also highlights – rendition can operate in ways that are deeply challenging 
to artistic practice. More widely, Steyerl’s description of the changing con-
ditions of editing provides a way to identify some of the issues facing any-
one concerned with the individuation of a problematic of the contemporary. 
Among many others, these include: the ‘auto’ of auto-spatialisation; the 
composition of styles of reasoning; and transcontextualism and radicalizing 
contexts.
First, the ‘auto’ of auto-spatialisation. In relation to the changes in epis-
temic infrastructures described earlier, the provocation provided by my in-
troduction of the notion of rendition makes visible the political importance of 
negotiating the tension between auto-as-autonomy and auto-as automatism. 
This concern is perhaps most evident in discussions of algorithms in general 
and machine learning in particular (Mackenzie 2017), since the evaluation of 
these methods relates to how they operationalise recursion (Fuller and Gof-
fey 2012; Totaro and Ninno 2014). What is of concern is the kinds of control 
– the new kinds of normal, for example – that are established as recursion is 
used to ‘organise heterogeneous material into a continuous, self-consistent 
pattern’. And while ‘each recursive event is different, in terms of its scale, 
location in time, in the complications it may entail, and in terms of its place 
in relation to its nesting within other recursions or to those in which it is in 
turn nested’, it is still by no means clear whether and how these methods are 
able to automate statistical induction to meaningful effect (Pasquinelli 2017). 
This point leads onto the second issue – composite styles of reasoning. 
Simondon is keen to distinguish transduction from both deduction and in-
duction. He says that, unlike deduction, transduction ‘does not seek else-
where a principle to resolve the problem at hand; rather, it derives the re-
solving structure from the tensions themselves within the domains’ (1992: 
315). And transduction is not comparable to induction, he says, ‘because in-
duction retains the character of the term of the reality as it is understood 
in the area under investigation – deriving the structures of analyses from 
these terms themselves […] it only retains that which is positive, which is to 
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say, that which is common to all the terms, eliminating whatever is singu-
lar’ (1992: 315). Abduction – as it is commonly understood as the formation 
of explanatory hypotheses – has more affinity with transduction insofar as 
it is often explicitly defined in terms of inventiveness or creativity (Schurz 
2008). However, the examples of auto-spatialisation outlined above suggest 
that transduction need not be restricted or reduced to any of deduction, in-
duction or abduction, but that – in the individuation of specific problematics 
– all such styles of reasoning may play a role, in different ways, in different 
phases. Perhaps this is one way to think of a moving ratio? 
Certainly the changes in epistemic infrastructures described above in-
vite and support re-combinations of styles of reasoning: they allow, for ex-
ample, for a variety of kinds of feedback, reciprocity and repetition. These, 
in turn, enable a more explicit engagement with what Simondon describes 
as the allagmatic dimensions of individuation, in which the concern is with 
description rather than explanation, or perhaps better, there are more ways 
to link description and explanation (Uprichard 2013; Mackenzie 2015). These 
include ongoing (epistemologically diverse and heterogeneously compos-
ite) experiments in anticipation (Ramírez and Selin 2014), speculation (as 
above and see Wilkie, Savransky and Rosengarten 2017), prototyping (Corsín 
Jiménez 2017), agent-based modelling, and simulation (Gilbert 2008; Gilbert 
and Troitzsch 2005). At the same time, the questionable epistemological sta-
tus of, for example, ‘narratives after the fact’, the unstable evidential value of 
the possible rather than the probable, and concerns about whether and how 
anticipation comes to be associated with a pre-emption of the future all point 
to the political as well as epistemological dilemmas involved in the individu-
ation of a problematic of the contemporary. 
The third issue provoked by the notion of rendition and shared by the ex-
amples above can be understood in terms of the genus of syndromes that 
Gregory Bateson describes as transcontextualism. By this term, Bateson re-
fers to a variety of cognitive tangles sharing common features, which he says 
are a result of the ‘weaving of contexts and of messages which propose con-
text – but which, like all messages, whatsoever, have ‘meaning’ only by virtue 
of context’ (1972: 275-276). He says that most of these syndromes are not to be 
regarded as pathological (although his own thinking about the transcontex-
tual relates to his attempts to understand schizophrenia), but should rather 
be understood as ‘double takes’ of a variety of kinds. Examples include when 
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‘[e]xogenous events may be framed in the context of dreams, and internal 
thought may be projected into the contexts of the external world’ (1972: 200). 
While Bateson’s discussion of the implications of transcontextualism is 
largely confined to the level of the individual organism, his observations have 
considerable relevance in relation to the individuation of a problematic of 
the contemporary insofar as there is now an increased potential for contexts 
to be multiplied, and for heterogeneous cultures of contexting (Seaver 2015) 
to collide as well as for contexts to be equipped so as to be able to be interac-
tive (Lury and Marres 2015).6 As Bateson notes, there are a variety of ways to 
respond to or inhabit the transcontextual, including minimizing encounters 
with the transcontextual and actively resisting transcontextual pathways. 
However, neither way seems adequate at a time of ‘radicalizing contexts’. As 
Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns point out, ‘action based on the an-
ticipation of individual behaviours could in the future be increasingly lim-
ited to an intervention on their environment, especially if the environment 
itself is reactive and intelligent, that is, if it collects data in real-time through 
multiple sensors, and shares and processes them to constantly adapt to spe-
cific needs and dangers, which is already the case at least during the signif-
icant part of life that individuals spend online’ (2013: 172). Moreover, as both 
Bateson and Simondon acknowledge, (knowledge) propositions are always 
affective and have the potential to be pathological. Bateson writes, 
[p]sychologists commonly speak as if the abstractions of relationship (de-
pendency, hostility, love, etc.) were real things which are to be described or 
expressed by messages. This is epistemology backwards: in truth, the mes-
sages constitute the relationship, and words like ‘dependency’ are verbally 
coded descriptions of patterns immanent in the combination of exchanged 
messages. (1972: 201)
6  For Cooley, communications provide for not only an extension, but also a possible multi-
plicity of environments. As a consequence, selection emerges as a formative, infrastructur-
al dynamic in which ‘a million environments solicit’ the emergent individual (Cooley 1897: 
23). A mundane example of this is the situation in which wifi networks solicit you (or your 




This discussion has addressed a subsidiary but integral dimension of Simon-
don’s thinking: the individuation of a problematic. It introduced the term 
compositional methodology to draw attention to the methodological dimen-
sions of this process, focusing on the temporalities involved in what was de-
scribed as the activation of the present or the folding of process into practice 
as part of the individuation of a problematic of the contemporary. It further 
sought to demonstrate that the methodological aspects of the individuation 
of a problematic of the contemporary cannot be separated from the affective, 
moral and political aspects of this process by introducing the notion of ren-
dition alongside the term auto-spatialisation. 
In conclusion, I want to return to the understanding of the contemporary 
and its significance for an understanding of the individuation of a problem-
atic. On the one hand, if we wish to avoid the present-ism of which Osborne 
speaks it is important to acknowledge Simondon’s relation to the cybernetic 
theory that was emerging at the time of his writing (see Hörl 2012). He him-
self recognised the importance of doing so, distinguishing between what he 
considered to be his own qualitative interpretation of information and the 
quantitative understanding operationalised by Shannon and Weaver (Hay-
ward and Geoghegan 2012). But still the question remains: Does Simondon’s 
use of the concept of in-formation rely on an understanding that is insuf-
ficiently distinguished from that which is operationalised in the practices 
which are, very often, the object of study? That is, does his reliance on a no-
tion of in-formation make him unable to challenge cybernetic thinking and 
practice and so make his understanding of individuation inadequate for un-
derstanding the contemporary? On the other hand, to avoid the pitfalls of a 
deterministic historicism, perhaps we need to recognise that the individu-
ation of a problematic of the contemporary has potentials that can only be 
actualised in relation to the impersonal power of a shifting present (Esposito 
2012). While being aware of the possibility of foreclosure of thought implied 
in rendition, the analysis above suggests that we should not retreat to the 
(un)certainties of a knowing subject, but rather assess what it means for un-
certainty about to be distributed unevenly, and what conceptual personae 
– the idiot (Stengers 2005), the lurker (Goriunova 2017), the digital subject 
(Wark 2018), the machine learner (Mackenzie 2017) – might be adequate as 
we ‘individuate, individuate ourselves and in ourselves’. 
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From Critique to Problems and the Politics  
of the In-act with Bergson, Deleuze and James
Christoph Brunner 
Taking down our critique, our own positi-
ons, our fortifications, is self-defense all-
oyed with self-preservation. That take-
down comes in movement, as a shawl, 
the armor of flight.
We run looking for a weapon and keep 
running looking to drop it. And we can 
drop it, because however armed, how-
ever hard, the enemy we face is also 
illusory.
(Harney/Moten 2013: 19)
Introduction – the problem of critique
I want to start with a productive paradox (or, a problem): In their work on 
The Undercommons Stefano Harney and Fred Moten begin their exploration 
of collective forms of resistance from a postcolonial, post-structuralist and 
post-operaist perspective with the problem of critique. They tie such a con-
ception of critique to politics as it emerges with the process of building en-
closures (as governable or knowable entities) in the process of settler colo-
nialism: ‘Politics is an ongoing attack on the common’ (2013: 17). Such politics 
based on enclosure mobilize critique as an instrument that is representative 
of institutional power, as a form of positioning in defense of the enclosure 
(read as domain, discipline, institution). At the same time, ‘critique lets us 
know that politics is radioactive, but politics is the radiation of critique […] 
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Critique endangers the sociality it is supposed to defend’ (2013: 19). By stag-
ing this double-edged impasse of critique as necessary and radioactive, the 
authors erupt the idea of a politics of enclosure and its defense of critique 
through the image of allied movements: the taking down of critique as a 
‘movement’ as the ‘armor of f light’, ‘looking for a weapon and keep running 
looking to drop it’ (2013: 19). These minor gestures (Manning 2016) of move-
ment, f light, the looking for and dropping of a weapon for self-defense all 
contest a critical thinking based on positions and a politics of enclosures. 
The movement of f light, a concept well-known from the works of French 
feminist philosopher and poet Hélène Cixous (1976) and those of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987), underscores a general activity, a reso-
nance of tendencies, a movement that relates to other movements. Flight 
and escape as derived from the French notion fuite in the works of Deleuze 
and Guattari take on multiple meanings: ‘Both words translate fuite, which 
has a different range of meanings than either of the English terms. Fuite 
covers not only the act of f leeing or eluding but also f lowing, leaking, and 
disappearing into the distance (the vanishing point in a painting is a point de 
fuite)’ (Massumi in Deleuze/Guattari 1987: xvi). A takedown of critique as a 
movement of f lowing, leaking and disappearing from politics and its captur-
ing critique, radically alters the conception of political practice understood 
through a logic of oppositions. Such oppositional politics are based on prac-
tices of identification and order, they are ref lexive and built on a casting of 
the real and truth built on common sense. The practice of forming enclosures, 
of naming and identifying fixes positions and overcodes the actual move-
ment. It separates past from present and future, putting them into causal 
relations. The takedown of critique, as movement, disrupts the natural sense 
of how to seize a situation in all its complexity by putting things in place and 
establishing orders, enclosures and domains. Understanding the constitu-
tion of the real as based on non-linear movement, that is, activity, allows the 
real to be understood as the realm where actual problems occur.
The focus on movement, on f light as foundational activity of existence, 
stages politics as a question of continuous difference and critique as a way of 
tapping into the process of continual differentiation that resists terminal en-
closure. This article will explore how to resist a politics that instrumentalises 
critique built on enclosure, common sense and presumed opposition, pro-
posing an affirmative engagement with the invention of problems instead. 
According to French philosopher Henri Bergson the refutation of a politics of 
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critique built on enclosure and common sense can only be contested by the 
constitution of real problems. Such problems, Bergson suggests, engage in a 
field of movements rather than entities resonating with each other to form 
what constitutes the real. While Moten and Harney are explicitly drawing 
on a variety of theories and references, including voices critical of the West-
ern philosophical tradition, their emphasis on movement and f light links to 
a reconceptualisation of time as a colonising and colonised concept in mo-
dernity.1 One might think of Afrofuturism’s notion of the future, which is 
anything but a transcendent imaginary and rather a multiplicity of ‘counter-
memories’ of the future stalled in the present (Eshun 2003: 288). Such futures 
are the movements of the takedown of critique Harney and Moten point at. 
The dropping of the weapon means not to succumb to the temporality of the 
present but to engage in a ‘resistance to the present’ (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 
108; Stengers 2010). The present to be resisted is one of a reactive mode of 
critique, of a temporality in which critique knows its outcome in advance of 
its utterance. It is Bergson who was most explicit in his assertion that most 
of modern Western philosophy has misunderstood truth as what builds on 
common knowledge and its orders, rather than something that needs to be 
sought after in experience.
The problem of critique is its mooring in a past that it claims to know and 
from which it stages its attack in order to colonise the future in a self-righ-
teous manner. Harney and Moten do not refuse critique in general but ask 
how critical practice can take shape while not knowing in advance what the 
enemy might look like, or from which position of critique one speaks. The 
question of a politics built on movement not on enclosure immediately be-
comes a time-sensitive concern beyond linear succession, asking what con-
stitutes a political act beyond a negative mode of critique. An affirmative 
practice of problematisation, ‘dramatizing the creation of problems’, be-
comes a liberating act from the fetters of a dominating and dominated pres-
ent (Stengers 2019: 1). 
In a first section the text will situate Henri Bergson’s notion of critique 
and clarify his own thinking as a pragmatist. Exploring, secondly, the differ-
ent yet mutually resonating ways of problematising the concept of common 
sense in Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and William James, I will expose their rad-
1  On the relation between coloniality and modernity, see for instance Anílbal Quijano 
(2007). In relation to time and colonisation, see Mark Rifkin (2017).
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ical intervention into the philosophy of knowledge and experience (During 
2004) leading towards a movement thinking able to state real problems. The 
creation of problems, however, is neither an affair based on a formerly agreed 
conception of common sense nor of language but of intuition. The third part 
will treat Bergson’s particular method of intuition as an alternative to crit-
ical philosophy based on common sense. Intuition as the method of stating 
real problems, takes movement or duration as the grounding operation 
which enables a conception of the real as compositions of time and space. 
The engagement with such a real from the perspective of human activity be-
comes an act of invention. Similar to afrofuturist temporality, it generates 
novel and singular perspectives capable of resisting the present based on 
common sense. The final section engages with the compositional ground of 
intuituton’s activity of stating problems which are tendencies as the minimal 
existence of the real. Making tendencies the only thing that can be known 
turns the emergence of the real into a polyrhythmic dynamism. From here 
the notion of the in-act will allow to distinguish real encounters with tenden-
cies’ movement from acts based on the prefixed couplings of linear causation 
such as before–after, subject–object or present–absent. Politics, as I want to 
suggest, relates to what one considers an act capable of ‘producing […] lines 
of singularity, its own cartography, in fact, its own existence’ (Guattari 1996: 
136). Such an act is not of a single being but traverses vast distances and thus 
draws novel engagements with the real as the realm of activity.
False and real problems — from metaphysics to pragmatism
The question of the problem, and related to that of false problems, defines 
Bergson’s critique of the negative as a category of division. Bergson’s res-
ervations about the classic metaphysical stance are clearly stated by Gilles 
Deleuze: ‘His fundamental criticism of metaphysics is that it sees differences 
in degree between a spatialized time and an eternity which it assumes to be 
primary […]: All beings are defined on a scale of intensity, between the two ex-
tremes of perfection and nothingness’ (Deleuze 1988a: 23). At the same time 
Bergson himself clarifies that he has no intention of giving up metaphysics, 
but would rather develop ‘a truly intuitive metaphysics, which would follow 
the undulations of the real’ (Bergson 1946: 29). The problem of metaphysics 
as philosophical practice ‘leaves no room to force metaphysics to speak of 
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extrabeing’ in the overall conception of the real as Foucault states (Foucault 
1998: 347). Extra-Being is outside of the divide between being and Being, the 
false problem confusing a substantialist account of matter and its succes-
sive persistence over time. Bergson, as taken by Deleuze, would push meta- 
physics to speak of such extra-Being. Extra-Being describes a ‘minimum 
of Being common to the real, the possible, and the impossible’ and thus a 
domain outside of space and time, while informing both (Deleuze 1990: 
180). Rather than wondering whether Bergson’s philosophy would align 
with empiricism or positivism, the notion of Extra-Being as introduced by 
Deleuze, positions him as the proper philosopher of the virtual as existence 
outside of Being and being. The virtual as a domain of existence in tenden-
cies guides the production of the real while neither reducing it to a given 
(data) nor to being able to fully abstract it in consciousness. Extra-Being is 
the realm where tendencies relate and thus shape the ground of experience 
from which perceptual events emerge. It is in this sense that Deleuze under-
lines that problems need to be considered ‘as ideal “objecticities” possessing 
their own sufficiency and implying acts of constitution’ instead of being in-
ferred from anything prior or deduced through logic and reason (1994: 159). 
It is an ‘objecticity’ of the event as its very own mode of becoming expressive 
in actualisation. The temporality of extra-Being is ideal, because it does not 
need to actualise in order to be real – it has purchase in the real. A proper 
problem consists of embracing a real beyond actuality. However, extra-Being 
presumes no beyond the real but postulates an immanent temporality that 
is utterly untimely to both the past and the present, rendering them both 
as invested in future potentialities. In the entry quote the takedown of cri-
tique in f light is paralleled with the need for self-preservation, the looking 
for a weapon paired with the dropping of it. These acts are not opposites or 
contradictory, they rather constitute a politics of the real as tensed field of 
relating tendencies. 
For Bergson, false problems relate to a mistaking of differences in kind 
for differences in degree. Questions such as ‘Why is there something rather 
than nothing, order rather than disorder?’ (Deleuze 2004: 25) are constitu-
tive of false problems. Why? Because such questions pose a problem in the 
image of the negative, whose refusal Deleuze attributes to Bergson’s ‘repu-
diating critical philosophies’ (2004: 23). The image of the negative, the lack, 
or the opposed would only ever contend itself with systems of order based 
on differences in degree (Deleuze 1988a: 17–20). Such differences are mere 
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placements of duration in space, of a substantialism that knows where to 
put things and how to tell this from that. Real problems, on the contrary, ask 
‘Why this rather than something else? Why this tension of duration? Why 
this speed rather than another?’ (1988a: 25). For Bergson, the emphasis on 
the problem resides in the paradox beyond the binary as the negative and 
thus a dominant image of thought. Such an image, as Deleuze develops 
throughout his entire work, lacks a proper account of the real as productive 
of ‘encounters forcing us to think’ (1994: 139). Similarly, Bergson writes ‘phi-
losophy, thus understood […] will have no difficulty in explaining everything 
deductively, since it will have been given beforehand, in a principle which is 
the concept of concepts, all the real and all the possible’ (1946: 34). 
The figure of the negative is potentially the most common conception of 
critique that is at stake for Bergson and Deleuze – and in their aftermath 
Moten and Harney. The false problem, as the one that always constitutes 
an identity in the image of another, places these oppositions into a perpet-
ual loop of classifications and orders ignorant of Extra-Being as the actual 
ground of emergence. These orders are helpful as orientations – they con-
firm and comfort but they do not leap into unknown territories. It is here, 
in the naming of false problems, that one of Bergson’s most rebellious traits 
comes to the fore. If ‘truth and creation are reconciled at the level of prob-
lems’, problems replace the traditional logic of concepts and theories as prior 
to or deduced from experience (Deleuze 1988a: 15; During 2004: 19). In a very 
different register, which is more Deleuze’s than Bergson’s, false problems 
disregard the real according to singularities, turning each instant into a 
moment of particulars rather than accounting for their differential nature. 
False problems are problems operating by degree or intensity, while real 
problems only ever operate by the differentials expressed through singular-
ities or singular points. This means that there is a uniqueness in each ex-
pression or manifestation but not only to the matter formed, but also to that 
formed in relation to its past and its future. Accounting for the process of 
becoming rather than placing beings into space means to radically rethink 
what critique and analysis mean for philosophical practice – but also for po-
litical practices. It requires to take Extra-Being into account as an affirma-
tion of a time beyond order and enclosure into a reductive present. 
Empiricism aligns with a projection of time into space, a positioning 
of sorts. Idealism points at the primacy of duration over space, thus fore-
grounding movement rather than substance or position. Going back to the 
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initial quote of Moten and Harney, one finds such a productive paradox of 
processual thinking beyond a terminal conception of critique. To take down 
one’s critique as self-defence and self-preservation, looking for a weapon 
while looking to drop it, the illusion of the enemy, these are tension and vari-
ations of speed rather than finite acts. In f leeing they manifest their exis-
tence as extra-Being, not a mere surplus or excess, but a different register 
of opening encounters that force us to think. The question of the problem is 
then how to engage with or stage such encounters, and how to account for 
their singular and enduring, yet continuously differentiating, qualities. 
While more recent philosophical debates have delivered insights into 
Bergson’s concept of the problem in relation to the history of philosophy, dis-
cussing its difference from epistemology and positivism in the French tra-
dition of the 19th and 20th centuries (During 2004, Bowden 2018), Bergson 
himself clarifies his own position in his praise for early pragmatist philoso-
pher William James.2 In a preface to a translation of James’ work on pragma-
tism Bergson states that real problems emerge when ‘we confine ourselves 
purely and simply to what is given us by experience’ (Bergson 1946: 249). 
However, this is not a positivist or empiricist stance, but a radical empiri-
cism in the Jamesian vocabulary (James 1996) or a transcendental empiricism 
2  For the sake of clarification: Both articles by During (2004) and Bowden (2018) are crucial 
for the thinking of Bergson’s notion of the problem and the writing of this chapter. How-
ever, their adherence to the French philosophical tradition requires further critical inquiry 
if one takes the more recent developments between 20th century French philosophy and 
early North American pragmatism into consideration (see for instance Savransky in this 
volume). Another important analysis, even though too close to the gestures of common 
sense as refused by Deleuze, relates Deleuze as a reader of James and relayed through 
Bergson (Madelrieux 2015: 89-91). The reading of Madelrieux exposes the philosophical 
gesture which Bergson and Deleuze would refute as false problems, when claiming that ‘in 
three dif ferent and complementary ways, Deleuze misunderstood pragmatism. He mis-
understood it firstly in that he assimilated pragmatism to pluralism. He missed it a second 
time since he borrowed the definition of pluralism from Bertrand Russell and not from 
William James. And he missed it a third time because his own version of pluralism does not 
stand up to the pragmatist method for making ideas clear’ (2015: 89). From the get-go the 
article presents itself a severe misunderstanding of the Deleuzian philosophical project 
which af firms rather than criticizes ideas beyond a presumed common sense established 
by traditional philosophical reason. For a quite diverse exploration of the resonances be-
tween Deleuze and dif ferent strands of early and later pragmatist strands, see Bowden, 
Bignall, Patton 2015.
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in Deleuze’s work (1994). Bergson describes this radical empiricism attentive 
to the infinite nature of existence: 
While our intelligence with its habits of economy imagines ef fects as strictly 
proportioned to their causes, nature, in its extravagance, puts into the cause 
much more than is required to produce the ef fect. While our motto is Exactly 
what is necessary, nature’s motto is More than is necessary – too much of this, 
too much of that, too much of everything. Reality, as James sees it, is redun-
dant and superabundant […] there are no sharply drawn situations; nothing 
happens as simply or as completely or as nicely as we should like; […] things 
neither begin nor end; there is no perfectly satisfying ending, nor absolutely 
decisive gesture, none of those telling words which gives us a pause: all the 
ef fects are spoiled. (Bergson 1946: 249, emphasis in the original)
Following the abundant character of experience, Bergson further outlines 
what will lead towards his very own conception of problems and the meth-
od of intuition as a technique of problematisation. He refers to James’ well-
known attestation that relations need to be experienced as real as the things 
related, and adds that such relations are directly observable as ‘the things 
and facts themselves’ (1946: 250).3 The acknowledgement of relations’ fac-
ticity resonates strongly with Bergson’s own claim that ‘one must get back 
into duration and recapture reality in the very mobility which is its essence’ 
(1946: 35). Relation is not an entity but a movement or trajectory, a tendency, 
of which many in attunement form reality.
The consequence of such a view, as outlined by Bergson, requires a com-
plete reversal of the image of thought that philosophy held of reality up until then. 
Conceiving of reality as ‘no longer finite or infinite, but simply as indefinite’ 
renders ‘reason […] less at ease in a world where it no longer finds, as in a 
mirror, its own image. And certainly the importance of human reason is di-
minished. But the importance of man himself – the whole of man, will and 
sensibility quite as much as intelligence – will thereby be immeasurably en-
3  From James’ Essays in Radical Empiricism (1996: 42): ‘To be radical, an empiricism must nei-
ther admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude 
from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that 
connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced 
must be accounted as “real” as anything else in the system.’
From Critique to Problems and the Politics of the In-act 161
hanced!’ (1946: 250-251). Such an immersion into the relational fabrication of 
the real, qua Extra-Being, cuts across prior orders of enclosure, the extrapo-
lation of human consciousness and embodiment in an empirical world, and 
puts duration at the centre of its conception. Why? Because it is through 
duration that things become different, not only from each other in a world 
of material experience, but also in relation to themselves, their own gene-
sis. Bergson’s embracing of James’ conception of experience is not a mere ac-
knowledgement of a world of experience much vaster than the human scope 
of sufficient reason might want to admit and capture, but also a plea for a 
more precise account of such a reality in its complexity and texture which 
common sense, as I will explore now, always accounts for insufficiently.
Beyond common sense
Bergson’s critique of critical philosophy operates by affirmation and not ne-
gation, and thus requires a different mode of thinking about problems in 
their capacity to refuse a commonsensical agreement over norms and judge-
ment. Unpacking the meaning of common sense leads us towards the intui-
tive method as the key junction between an actively self-affecting world and 
the composition of a thinking and acting subject. One could say, rather than 
deciding between empiricism and idealism, Bergson’s speculative meta-
physics is deeply rooted in a specific pragmatist understanding of experi-
ence and a refutation of a theoretical common sense.
A critique of common sense appears to define not only a particular shap-
ing of the notion of the real based on duration and relations as facts but also 
functions as a major point of conceptual conf luence between Bergson, James 
and Deleuze. For Deleuze, common sense is ‘a moral or orthodox’ image of 
thought tied to good sense (1994: 132). Common sense cannot conceive of 
paradoxes as problematising – the paradox here being the infinite character 
of experience, which is not a mere excess but a doubling of the very processes 
of encounters with a problem. In that sense, a problem does not appear out 
of thin air – it is fabricated, a constitutional act that takes hold of a singular 
situation. In the process of fabrication, a problem puts existence on the line, 
or to the test and renders it into a tensed field of resonant yet heterogeneous 
tendencies (Stengers 2019). It makes the situation of problematic emergence 
‘pointy’ (Massumi 2015: 126), actualising its singular characteristics by shift-
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ing its emphasis to its very limit. This limit-character that problematisation 
foregrounds is the very act of becoming itself, at the limit, or inhabiting the 
limit.4 Conceiving of the problem as a paradox means to emphasize its sin-
gular logic of infecting the real through its movement, its way of continuous-
ly referring to its specific mode of problematizing.
The rule of the paradox is what Deleuze poses against the allied reper-
cussions of good sense and common sense in The Logic of Sense. The paradox 
is a reversal of common sense and good sense, it turns them upside down, 
queers them out of their operational alliance and plants the problematic 
amidst their impoverished accounts of the real. Good sense, the way Deleuze 
casts it, is unidirectional orientation from the ‘most differentiated to the 
least differentiated’ (1990: 75). In doing so, it generates an order of time, 
where the most differentiated is the past and the least differentiated is the 
future, thus colonising the present as oriented in that arrow of time. Such a 
concept of unique direction constitutes an image of thought whose orienta-
tion is foresight (1990: 75–76). One can glimpse how the directed orientation 
of the present under the ‘principle of a unique sense’ aligns with Bergson’s 
critique of the subsumption of duration under space, turning duration into 
a reduced conception of a forward-moving present (1990: 76). The first major 
critique of this unique direction of time occurs through the assertion that 
the paradox consists of another sense moving into both directions simultane-
ously, thus extending into the past and the future while infinitely subdivid-
ing the present (see Deleuze 1989: 81). An example of the paradox operation 
of duration would be the use of polyrhythmic patterns in electronic dance 
music. While there is a driving beat (mostly 4/4) for which such music is best 
known, the temporal complexity of more sophisticated productions occurs 
through the layering of soundscapes, up to the level of granular sonic frag-
ments. The ground beat could be seen as an utterly chronological driver of 
such music. On the contrary, I would conceive of it as the a-temporal ground 
through which different sonic elements as temporal patterns can move into 
specific constellations which are heard and felt. Based on the infinite a-tem-
porality of the beat different sound events revolve and merge across this sur-
4  Deleuze points to such a concept of the limit in the ‘Fif teenth series on singularities’ in The 
Logic of Sense, referring to Simondon’s own conception of singularity and his understanding 
of individuation as a process of ontogenesis. The temporal or duration nature of the limit 
defines a key link to the notion of the problem in Bergson (Deleuze 1990: 100-108).
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face of the beat, and thus co-composing the musical experience. The paradox 
here is in the event of music in resonance but beyond synthesis, contracting 
temporalities on an infinite plane of the beat as its surface. The problem of 
multilayered sonic experience occurs through the durations that are con-
stantly contracted without unifying, thus making space an element of time 
and not the other way around.
In Bergson’s writings, the doubling of time refers to a spatialised time, 
which is matter, and a differential time of duration, found in memory. The 
paradox is, while duration has been falsely subsumed as spatialised in the 
conception of the real or the present, matter itself lends itself to such a tem-
porality while actually being derived from duration. It is not the case that 
one has to solely align with duration to distill the true nature of differences 
in kind. In experience, we are confronted with mixtures and composites. The 
fabrication of a problem occurs when matter is directly related to memory, 
that is, its differentiation relays through the past (in general) that is simul-
taneous with the present. This simultaneity of present and past is crucial in 
order to account for the mixed states of existence that are neither just spatial 
nor temporal but contain two multiplicities – of differences in degree and of 
kind (see Bergson 1910: 110).
The doubling of time in Deleuze goes hand in hand with the doubling out-
lined in Matter and Memory (Bergson 1988). Therein Bergson clarifies the two 
fundamental differences at the heart of each existing as a mixed composite 
of both a spatialised time expressed in matter and a differential time inher-
ing or insisting through duration or memory. The struggle over the present, 
the things and states of affairs, is a false struggle for Bergson and Deleuze 
as long as matter, spatialised time and differences in degree or intensity 
dominate the concept of experience. Put differently, as long as things are 
conceived in their substantialist casting as mere givens, they overcode the 
genetic nature that defines their differential essence. What counts, accord-
ing to Deleuze and Bergson, is how ‘things’ differ in relation to themselves 
– this is the untimely temporality of becoming or extra-Being, which cannot 
be subsumed under the time of spatialised matter in Chronos. 
The resonances with James cannot be underestimated here. When point-
ing at experience’s abundant nature, Bergson agrees with James, manifest-
ing a critique of philosophical reason of common and good sense content 
with the present’s reductive representation and spatialisation rather than 
embracing a mode of encounter inclusive of the multiple durations exceed-
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ing such a present. The real becomes the terrain for the invention of real 
problems when they are posed in a way that they attend to the elements that 
sidestep the present without being absent from it.
Good sense, to maintain such an image of thought tied to foresight, re-
quires another operation, which Deleuze attributes to common sense. Com-
mon sense is a ‘faculty of identification that brings diversity in general to 
bear upon the form of the Same’ (1990: 78). It defines the capture and en-
closure of the predictive politics of critique that Harney and Moten prob-
lematise. In that way, common sense and good sense are the operations of 
an image of thought that is the constitution of a real solely based on a hu-
man-centered experience and consciousness. In its operation of foresight, 
good sense installs a temporal regime which allows it to colonize the future 
from the vantage point of the present. Common sense, on the other hand 
produces systems of resemblance and derivation without accounting for the 
real differences in kind based on duration. 
Both Bergson and James link their refusal of common sense to a notion 
of economy. Bergson writes about the ‘habits of economy’, meaning the ra-
tionalised logic operating in critical philosophy ready to judge and classify 
according to order (1946: 249). James, for his part, uses the term as the ‘tri-
umph of economical thought’ expressed in laws derived from scientific mea-
surement. Such an economy, however, is not enough to account for reality. 
Accordingly, James claims: ‘Profusion, not economy, may after all be reality’s 
key-note’ (1963: 85). Towards the end of his lecture on Pragmatism and common 
sense, he reiterates his suspicion of such an economic reason: ‘Its [common 
sense’s] categories may after all be only a collection of extraordinarily suc-
cessful hypotheses […] by which our forefathers have from time immemorial 
unified and straightened the discontinuity of their immediate experiences, 
and put themselves into an equilibrium with the surface of nature satisfacto-
ry for ordinary practical purposes that it certainly would have lasted forever.’ 
(James 1963: 85) 
James’ insistence on the discontinuity of immediate experiences signals 
a crucial political quest outlined in relation to philosophy as a practice that 
potentially engages with or encounters problems. Approaching things with 
respect to their differentiating qualities, that is, their duration, means to 
account for the discontinuities of immediate experience as singularities be-
yond their discrete measures. It is the ‘fissures and cracks’ that co-ordinate 
a relational becoming, not an essence (Deleuze/Guattari 1987: 224). And it 
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is the critique of such an economy that foregrounds the problem as a key 
concept – to resist a certain present and to ‘experimentally think with the 
“situational provocation” of the present’ (Stengers 2019: 2).
If good sense, as Deleuze writes, ‘determines the contribution of the fac-
ulties in each case, while common sense contributes the form of the same’ 
then the political question of the paradox and the problem is, how to reen-
ter experience’s engagement with Extra-Being. As I have tried to show, good 
sense and common sense are primarily temporal operations. They align dis-
parate and divergent temporalities into coherent order of moments which 
lead from a past towards the future while inhabiting the present. Under-
neath this reduction, the actual compositional activity of duration under-
lines that everything already moves and that it is movement which renders 
emergence possible. What occurs through a problem is difference, a ‘differ-
ence which forces us to think’ (Deleuze 1994: 136). Problems engage the real 
beyond ‘recognition, today or tomorrow’ and tie the process of an embodied 
experience into the overall welter of experience expressive of activity (ibid). 
The pragmatist method of posing or stating problems then requires a 
certain adjustment to the situations to which these problems provide pos-
sible solutions. These solutions are infinite and function as different shades 
of a broader colouring that is the problem. To state or pose a problem is a 
veritable invention, in the sense that the one stating it is not imagining but 
seeking while f leeing, becoming a ‘helpmate to [its] emergence’ rather than 
the originator (Massumi 2009: 40). Invention in relation to experience, the 
way James and Bergson conceive of it, is happening when a new tone enters 
a refrain, shifting the manner in which the overall musical landscape was 
conceived so far. While the old way of tuning into this musical landscape was 
continuous, a new texture arrived leading to different ways of encountering 
the musical piece. The past of a certain experience occurs at the same time as 
the present takes its turn. In a similar way, I would want to pose the problem 
of politics that resides in both looking for a weapon while looking to drop it 
in the act of f leeing. The illusion Harney and Moten talk about is an illusion 
tied to critical thought and economies of critique. Assuming one knew and 
identified the enemy and thus had the right weapon might be a misleading 
conception of resistance and self-defence to begin with.
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Intuition and invention 
Starting with a critique of the notion of common sense, as staged by Wil-
liam James, allows us to emphasise the bifurcation in the modes of thought 
that Bergson proposes through the concept of intuition. While the critique 
of Kantian common sense reverberates throughout the works of Deleuze, 
James’ pragmatist hinge allows us to conceptualise intuition against com-
mon sense in relation to Bergson’s conception of difference. James’ prag-
matism engages with both dimensions: an epistemological shift towards 
processes of problematisation replacing knowledge and reason, and an on-
tological shift that casts every actualised thing as the object of its very own 
durational subjectivity – thus exploring such formations in their becoming 
(as well as their repetition) rather than their being. From here a first casting 
of the method of intuition goes hand in hand with Deleuze’s more general 
critique of the image of thought dominated by the order of the essence, the 
what is, which he opposes with insisting on the minor questions ‘Who? How? 
How much? Where and when? In which case?’ (2004: 96).5 These minor questions 
are the ones aligned with the f leeing and looking gestures in Moten and Har-
ney. Based on a need to f lee, as the historical fact of suppression and violence 
against delegitimised parts of society, the gestures of looking for a weapon 
and the need to drop it are instant evaluations – they problematise, based on 
the overall movement of f light and the movement of singular instances (sub-
jectivities) in light of their need for self-defence and self-preservation. There 
is a difference in kind between an economy of knowledge and the activity of 
instantaneous or immanent evaluation. Intuition pertains to such an evalu-
ation as the continuous refrain of a practice that is defined by its genesis, its 
variation, rather than by its essence. How to think and feel the movement of 
a problem can neither be answered through knowledge nor through subjec-
tive experience. Intuition as a method has to relate to experience’s pure state 
consisting of tendencies and their resonances.
While Bergson’s refusal of critical philosophy might seem to remain in 
an abstract realm, its radicalness as a pragmatist gesture challenges the sep-
aration of first and second nature, the given in experience and its ordering 
5  The text On the Method of Dramatization (2004 [1967]) is part of a set of tightly interwoven 
works starting with Bergsonism (1988a [1966]), Dif ference and Repetition (1994 [1968]) and The 
Logic of Sense (1989 [1969]), which form the foundation of Deleuze’s notion of becoming.
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through abstraction. Politics of a problematising kind do not just account 
for what is given in experience as always exceeding the conscious grasping. 
On the contrary, this ‘existential grasping’ traverses the mental and embod-
ied poles of existence (Guattari 1995: 112). Such a relational understanding 
ensures that things conceived differentially, along their duration, render 
matter into an image of the duration in which it inheres, thus foreground-
ing the ontogenetic character of its very becoming. The auto-affection and 
‘self-abstraction’ (Massumi 2011: 130) inherent in duration as process defines 
the notion of life in the works of Bergson and Deleuze. It is an utterly imper-
sonal and more-than-human conception of life, a life that is animating and 
in movement, a creative energetics in the sense that it engages with becom-
ing. Matter is included here as actively moving with and through duration 
as ‘numberless vibrations’ (Bergson 1988: 208). Intuition outlines Bergson’s 
humbling proposition to tune into these animating activities of life by ac-
counting for one’s own duration ‘to affirm immediately to recognize the ex-
istence of other durations above and below us’ (Deleuze 1988a: 33).6 To couple 
life and experience as existential dimensions beyond the organic prepares 
the ground for a pragmatism based on durational encounters at the core of 
intuition as a method. 
Rather than addressing experience as a sensuous immersion in the here 
and now, leading towards an abstract order of classification and categori-
sation through common sense, James foregrounds a pluralist conception of 
experience as rigorous analytic method. Similar to Bergson’s notion of in-
tuition, he insists on making experience not a mere empirical ground from 
which to abstract in order to obtain generalised notions commonly agreed 
upon. On the contrary, experience is the only ‘stuff’ the world is made of, 
making thoughts and abstractions the same matter as things (James 1996: 4; 
Bergson 1946: 251). James insists on the mixed states in which human experi-
ences occur. Criticising the objectivist notions of Cosmic Space and Cosmic 
Time as one Time and one Space he writes: ‘The great majority of the human 
race never uses these notions, but live in plural times and spaces, interpen-
etrating and durcheinander ’ (1963: 79, emphasis in the original). This durch- 
einander brings forth James’ refusal of any separation between first and sec-
6  A critical elaboration on two types of vitalist conceptions of life, one of process and one 
of pathos, in relation to knowledge, problems and their solutions has been developed by 
Monica Greco (2019). 
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ond nature that also pertains to Bergson and through which we can under-
stand the very realm for intuition to become active. 
Known as the problem of the ‘bifurcation of nature’ into primary and 
secondary qualities in Whitehead, Bruno Latour explains the casting of one 
nature where thought and perception co-emerge:7 
If the bifurcation of nature is impossible, then it means that every entity has 
to explore what, in the rest of the world, may of fer it some grasp on life in or-
der for it to continue existing. This grasp is intensely objective, since it mobili-
zes so many other entities; but it is also intensely subjective, since it represents, 
like Leibniz‘s monads, a very particular version of what the world looks like, 
that is, an interpretation, a bet, a risk taken, a confidence shared, a choice. 
(Latour 2005: 234)
The real as developed in James’ conception of experience resonates with 
Latour’s Whitheadian take on experience before the bifurcation of nature 
into primary and secondary qualities. Bergson carves from such a common 
ground of the real as experience a conception of truth, which conceives of 
nature as neither a mere given and bearer of facts to be distilled nor an imag-
inary of the human mind. 
‘For him [James] those truths it is most important for us to know, are 
truths which have been felt and experienced before being thought. It has 
at all times been said that there are truths which have to do with feeling as 
much as with reason; and that along with those truths we find already made 
there are also others we assist in the making of, which depend in part on our 
will.’ (Bergson 1946: 253)
In order to access this domain of existence, while not making it a subject 
of human consciousness, susceptible to good and common sense, Bergson 
introduces the concept of intuition as method. Following his explorations of 
experience and the real in James, intuition must be conceived as an affirma-
tive method.8 Affirmation is not a mere positivism but a way of proceeding 
by encounter and movement. In affirmation reality provides a ‘grip upon 
it’ in moving with it and its f lows (1946: 255). Affirming and thus getting a 
7  On the notion of the ‘bifurcation of nature’ see Whitehead’s The Concept of Nature (1920).
8  On the notion of af firmation in philosophy, Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche is most informa-
tive and highly relatable to Bergson’s own use of the term (Deleuze 1983). 
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grip on reality that ‘places us under more favorable conditions for acting’ is 
quite different from knowing in advance how things will play out based on 
common sense (1946: 255). Tied to experience as the constitutional domain 
of reality, knowledge follows feeling and intuition is the way to make feel-
ing not a sentiment of the human but a general technique of becoming rela-
tionally.9 ‘Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as 
reality itself […] For intuition the essential is change […] Intuition, bound up 
to a duration which is growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted continuity 
of unforeseeable novelty’ (1946: 39). This unforeseeable novelty is manifestly 
bound up with Bergson’s understanding of James’ conception of truth as not 
based on what already exists but as bearing a sense of ‘what will be’ (1946: 
255). Intuition then is not a mere mirroring of what nature presents – on the 
contrary: ‘truth, which can be attached only to what we affirm about reality, 
is […] created by our affirmation. We invent the truth to utilize reality […] 
While for other doctrines a new truth is a discovery, for pragmatism it is an invention’ 
(1946: 256, emphasis in the original). 
The inventive power of intuition becomes clearest in relation to the stag-
ing of problems. The problem of critical theory, as During underlines, is 
that it cannot account for the problem that does not presuppose a solution. 
During himself highlights this issue and refers to the positivist concept of 
problems tied to problem-solving rather than problem-stating (During 2004: 18). 
He cites Bergson: ‘For a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is well 
posed’, hinting at the inclusion of the solution in a well-posed problem, from 
which the truth can be uncovered (Bergson in During 2004: 19). In resonance 
with intuition as the method to not uncover but to invent problems, During 
refers to the most crucial statement in Bergson’s refutation of critiques of 
problems as uncreative: ‘But stating a problem is not simply uncovering, it is 
inventing […] Invention gives being to what did not exist; it might never have 
happened’ (1946: 59). In this inventive power of the problem resides the very 
paradox of intuition and with it the tension between matter and memory or 
duration. Invention is the term Bergson uses to avoid any relapse into com-
9  While there are certainly dif ferences between Bergson’s concept of perception and feeling 
and Whitehead’s deployment of the terms, I conceive of feeling as a mode of prehension, 
the way the term is developed in Process and Reality (Whitehead 1987). Therein feeling des-
ignates an activity of relational resonance between heterogeneous and varying tenden-
cies entering a process of actualisation. 
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mon sense. An invention cannot be willed by an individual thought but must 
be assembled along heterogeneous tendencies and their singular durations 
– as immanent to experience. 
On the one hand, experience occurs before thought, based on feeling, 
that is, based on a state of being-with before any division into primary and 
secondary qualities can occur. On the other hand, the stating of problems 
as inventive acts is tied to affirmation, fabricating a truth to utilise reali-
ty. Again, we encounter the logic of the paradox beyond good and common 
sense. It is clear that Bergson would not diminish his own praise of the prag-
matist conception of truth as parsed out through an immediate encounter 
with the real by conceiving of the future as what can be known through con-
forming to an established order of knowledge. Truth then, is beyond knowl-
edge, and intuition is tinkering, productive of ‘fictions […] pushing beyond 
experience a direction from experience itself’ (Deleuze 1988a: 25). 
Deleuze’s very own transcendental empiricist account of a time of expe-
rience that itself explodes experience as any given state of affairs is the very 
time of the event. It is a time smaller than the most minute instant and larger 
than any conceivable magnitude – what Bergson himself names ‘intensive 
magnitudes’ (Bergson 1910: 106). This time outside of any measurable time is 
the heterogeneous rhythm of durational activity throughout the universe. It 
is repetition, the very quality of difference as the non-foundational essence 
of the real. It expresses itself in degrees, in matter, but it can only do so in 
f leeing, that is, in movement, which contains absolute speeds and slowness 
but never stillness. 
The challenge of the productive paradox of intuition resides in making 
thought not a faculty of the mind, or rather, to make the mind an aspect of 
experience. Bergson insists on the co-emergence of a present in its matter-
ing inherence and the past as actively shaping not just the present but its 
very own tonality as ‘memory that prolongs the past in the present’ (Deleuze 
2004: 28). Conceiving of the past as ‘surviving in itself’ (as virtual) casts 
both past and present ‘as two extreme degrees coexisting in duration’ (2004: 
29). For intuition as ‘an activity that sets up and organizes problems’, this 
means accounting for things in their difference in duration moving through 
an alignment to the encompassing duration of which one’s own duration is 
similarly a part of. It further requires us to conceive of thought as immersed 
in experience and of experience as pushing thought to the boundary of the 
present by way of accounting for the past’s self-sufficiency. In concrete terms 
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this means engaging in a process of becoming, seeking the differential qual-
ities in the encounter of participating and sharing a present at the same time 
as a past and thus a potential futurity. This futurity, however, lies not beyond 
the actual present but inhabits its limits. Such is the bounded ecology of ex-
perience, a stretching of the limits of the present while acknowledging the 
multiplicity of tendencies producing and inhabiting such a present. In that 
sense, as During shows in his account of Bergson’s problems, intuition as an 
activity of stating problems is never outside of history, but its account of the 
past cannot privilege a commonsensical assumption of what defines the past 
that is relevant for this singular expression of the present. 
For the very same reason, Moten and Harney adhere to a different im-
age of thought that cannot operate in the reactive mode of critique but that 
nonetheless needs to be inventive in terms of drawing on heterogeneous 
temporalities – this is not an unsolvable knot of eternal complexity, but rath-
er a sobering procedure for effective politics. How so? In the way that the 
invention of a problem is neither entirely new, that is, ahistorically emerging 
out of thin air, nor derived from any commonsensical agreement on the past. 
On the contrary, for problems to preside as political operations, they need 
to take effect. This hinges on their inventiveness, not as a solely human act 
but as a co-compositional processing of tendencies in their contribution to 
an event. Accordingly, ‘the mode of the event’, in the way Deleuze launches 
the concept in The Logic of Sense, ‘is problematic’ (1990: 54). As problematic the 
event adheres to its very own temporality, that of Extra-Being, which oper-
ates the real and actualizes partially in the inf lexion of a well stated problem. 
Tendencies and the politics of the in-act
In his Essays in Radical Empiricism James states that ‘the experiences of ten-
dencies are sufficient to act upon’ (1996: 69) and Deleuze writes, ‘what differs 
in nature is never a thing, but a tendency’ (2004: 27). Bergson himself un-
derlines, ‘for life is tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in 
the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among 
which its impetus is divided’ (1910: 99). If intuition as the inventive method 
of stating problems has to move beyond idealism and realism, it has to con-
front a world made of tendencies. How, one would ask, can any action based 
on tendency ever have any purchase in terms of truth? As I have emphasised, 
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the notion of truth requires a radical recasting in light of Bergson, James and 
Deleuze. It is not just a situated truth but an objectivity that gains relevance 
because of its singular power to activate the relay between matter and mem-
ory as co-emergent. Tendencies are the minimal elements through which the 
world expresses itself. A tendency is defined by its tending, its movement 
and its capacity to move in resonance with other tendencies. What needs 
to be followed through intuition is not ‘the presence of characteristics’ but 
the ‘tendency to develop’ (Deleuze 2004: 34). To know things by their nature 
means to parse out their very movement of becoming, their tendency. Po-
litically, this means to engage in states of affairs through a ‘sense’ – which 
means also direction or tendency in French – of its movement rather than its 
substantial appearance. Such politics are not ahistorical but rather interlace 
movements and their sheaves of diverging directions across vast times and 
territories. Such a tracing, or rather accounting for the heterogeneous emer-
gence of different nuances, is the formation of real problems. The art of such 
politics resides in the challenge of accounting for new and different nuances 
that alter the setting, shape the formation and thus provide new perspec-
tives on a concern that seemed to be known. 
Coming back to the initial quote, the refusal of critique is paired with 
a picking up of a weapon while f leeing and dropping it again. The enemy 
that is an illusion, in a way, is a false problem. How to think about such an 
abstract coursing concretely, that is, as a problematisation that matters in 
political practice? Deleuze mentions the term nuance as ‘being [which] is the 
difference itself of [a] thing’ as often deployed by Bergson. It actually occurs 
most notably in La Pensée et le Mouvant in the last chapter on Ravaisson and in 
relation to colour and light (Bergson 1946: 261-300; in the English unfortu-
nately translated as shade). Nuance as differential becomes expressive while 
always hinting at its ‘unifying’ ground – which is the past as coterminous 
with the present (Bergson gives the notion of diffracted light breaking up 
in colours while still carrying its resonance with white light as the unifying 
ground). Inserting nuance into the earlier development of intuition, the 
question of affirming nuances while giving an account of the encompassing 
problem – an extensive and dynamic complexity – allows us to explore con-
crete ways of rendering problems into ethical intercessors. 
In the takedown of critique, intuition occurs in moving with the situa-
tion. The f light is a movement that resonates with a cause but does not re-
semble it. It senses its quasi-materialisations without reducing it to one or 
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another cause. And further, it re-invents the problem, for instance of sup-
pression, while moving. In the movement it occurs that the cause is in itself 
an affective field of potential effects – a tendency of its divergent directions. 
The political activity of intuition concerns the way of engaging with a tenden-
cy as it diverges, acknowledging its energetic field while accounting for the 
occurrent difference in the midst of the present. I would term such politics 
not the mere act of a volitional subject but an in-act (Manning 2016). It abides 
by the quest for tendencies as the only real elements from which embodied and 
conceptual effects emerge (see Deleuze 2004: 35). In-acting in a world made 
of tendencies rather than distributions in time and space affords a specific 
concept of the subject of action. As much as Harney and Moten refuse the 
volitional subject of critique, they do not presume that the subject as a social 
and material conf luence of forces is irrelevant. Intuition as a veritable meth-
od, however, positions the process of problematisation at the core of any act 
of creativity. The ontogenetic ground of matter, organisms and thought can-
not evolve and endure without an intuition capable of relating tendencies. 
In-act is the force or an orientation of tendencies towards emergence – it 
draws on their temporal differences and activates their capacities of reso-
nating with other such differences. Their heterogeneous compositions form 
the factual outline of embodied and felt experiences, and of thought. 
How to become active rather than how to act would be the question I 
want to raise in relation to politics. Concerning intuition as tied to dura-
tion, a pragmatic twist is needed: ‘One never commences; one never has a 
tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle [milieu]; one takes up or lays 
down rhythms’ (Deleuze 1988b: 123). Acting is without beginning and end 
– it becomes a slipping-in rather than a defined act.10 The notion of the in-
act is itself a takedown of action as the political paradigm of a future cause 
– which would be another variation of the economy that James and Bergson 
dismissed. Is there a mode of politics that operates through the tending of 
tendencies and nuances, a speculative-pragmatic practicing in the milieu of 
process formation? In an untimely fashion, such speculative-pragmatic acti-
vations resist common sense logics of what constitutes a problem and how to 
10  Such an infinitive concept of the act is similar, yet dif ferent, to Hannah Arendt’s develop-
ment of the term (Arendt 1958). In another article, I explore the relation between Arendt’s 
conception of the act and Judith Butler’s performative take on Arendt’s ‘spaces of appear-
ance’ in detail (Brunner forthcoming). 
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receive it, while foregrounding the inventive powers of shape-shifting that 
present intuitively. 
The politics of problematisation reside in activating capacitations that 
intuition is capable of ‘inserting’ into the unfolding of an event.11 Politics, 
or political practice, qua intuition, addresses the question of how to engage 
with the complexities at stake, not undercutting their diverging tendencies 
while making these differentiating lines apparent beyond foreclosure. How-
ever, such an opening of the differential powers of existence is not arbitrary 
but directed as the inventive threading of a problem. The ethics of the in-act 
then, address how to insert and relay heterogeneous tendencies in the event’s 
unfolding. It means to engage in the very power of problems as transversal 
operators capable of activating forms of resistance across various modes of 
sense and sense-making with their differentiating durations.
In relation to activism, depression and neurodiversity, Erin Manning 
speaks of the ‘art of alignment’ (2016: 173), which I see as being in close prox-
imity to the method of intuition. Alignment here is not a submission to an 
exterior force (in the sense of ‘Get in line!’). It means to practice insertion 
by way of durational resonances and to ‘sense’ the multiple dimensions of 
the real capable of co-composing what comes to be expressed as a problem. 
Manning writes: ‘These alignments are not given. They must be crafted. 
Opening the way for a co-composition that potentially aligns itself to times 
in the making requires, I believe, a rethinking of the act of alignment itself.’ 
Manning further suggests, qua Guattari, that such alignments require the 
‘account of a collective that exceeds the personal’ (2016: 173). This collective 
is not a group of human subjects – it can be, but more crucially it is the dif-
ferential quality in tendencies productive of divergent directions. It is also 
the impersonal that links and courses through divergent tendencies in order 
to shape a problem and to generate the intersections of matter and memory, 
past and present. Again, this is not a logic of quantity: 
For the collective as a mode of existence in its own right is not the multiplica-
tion of individuals. It is the way the force of a becoming attunes to a transindi-
viduation that is more-than. To become-collective is to align to a chaosmosis 
in a way that prolongs the capacity of one body to act. (Manning 2016: 173)
11  On insertion see Gilbert Simondon (2005: 29).
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Problematisation can be viewed as an alignment through encounter with the 
in-act, as a way of practicing slipping in without a claim to mastery, but with 
a joy of entering the interplay of durations.12 In such politics, time matters – 
it is all about time. It requires the collective activating power at the heart of a 
problem. Intuition is like a blind-seeing since it does not have a form yet but 
it very much knows that something is out there. Such is the double nature 
of f leeing. Writing in the face of the history of violence that takes its roots 
in the transatlantic slave trade and extends to the deployment of critique 
as a practice of mastery trained by the whiteness of the Western university, 
Moten and Harney’s hint at f leeing accounts as much for the f light that man-
ifests a genealogy as well as the f light from critique as the redundant return 
of a hegemonic image of thought. Finally, f leeing is a general movement, a 
radiation of time that escapes its very capture, it is aion or duration – virtu-
al. The problems of self-defence and self-preservation are well staged in the 
initial quote. Both are required as forms of maintaining differential lines of 
existence that resist being subsumed under narratives of common sense or 
good sense. This is the relentless work of Black Studies to which Harney and 
Moten refer. But more than that, the looking and dropping of the weapon 
contains further speculative and pragmatic elements that I conceive as being 
at the heart of a politics of the in-act.
The in-act is not an act, it is what allows acts to become differentially 
while aligning to a problem. The problem of institutionalised critique as a 
continued activity of stating false problems is also a problem of a false con-
ception of the act. It turns the act into an individualised and economic logic, 
thus rendering it reactive rather than active and affirmative. If the in-act is 
that continuous ritornello of coming back to a problem’s divergent creativity, 
then the ethics of the in-act is always a collective activation along duration’s 
differential powers. In f leeing, the subject is defined by its mode of travers-
ing, not by its position. In looking for a weapon, a crafting of alignment hap-
pens, and in dropping the weapon this alignment passes on into a different 
situation. The ethical concern or act resides in the differential attunement to 
the diverging directions, probing them in their shaping of the present, and 
thus becoming a practice of experimentation. The formation of such collac-
tives exceeds the intersubjective scope. Intuition provides a way of tuning 
12  On a decolonial and feminist critique of modernist narratives of mastery see Julietta 
Singh’s Unthinking Mastery (2018).
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in to such collactive processes reinventing themselves and becoming uncon-
tainable since they are always in the act and beyond the human (see Manning 
2016: 180). The enemy becoming an illusion is not a relativisation of the in-
act but of the individualised economy to re-act. Such an affirmative casting 
of ethics poses challenges to the practice of and need for resistance against 
powers of capture, violence and extraction. The challenge of the real prob-
lem of resistance is one of moving sideways, entering from the middle, ex-
panding the divergent directions of a problem as it meanders and manifests 
across a variety of past-presents. The logic of the ‘counter’ – such as count-
er-powers or counter-effectuation – also requires alternation. It cannot op-
erate by presuming the problem or the enemy in manifest places. It must 
engage in a plethora of activating f lights from capture, in minor gestures, 
as Manning suggests, and activate their very own durations. The ethics of 
the in-act as collactive process generates relays, resonances and encounters 
in alliance, that is, with a felt joy of amplification through tendencies. The 
future then is nothing utopian to adhere to, but in alignment with the in-act 
coursing through the past-present intersecting in intuition. 
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Pragmatics of a World To-Be-Made
Martin Savransky
Paradoxes
We might as well begin with a paradox. After all, how is the problematic ex-
pressed if not through a sort of paradox of our present, one whereby the pres-
ent becomes fugitive, boiling over itself, constituting a time ‘while passing in 
the time constituted’ (Deleuze 1994: 79)? So does the proposition of this book, 
of thinking the problematic, confront us with a paradox in which the problem-
atic makes itself manifest, from which it cracks open, proffering itself fugi-
tively in search of new presents. And the paradox is this: What does thought 
ever do, if it does not think the problematic? What is thinking if not the event 
of becoming possessed by a problematic one cannot shake, let alone properly 
state, a problematic that spurs the thinker into thinking, feeling and doing? 
This is what William James (1890: 401) alluded to when he suggested that 
‘the thought is itself the thinker, and psychology needs not look beyond’. For 
the thinker is constituted as such by a problematic for which it becomes a 
means.1 James expounded on this idea with his concept of a ‘fringe’, a fringe 
of felt relations on the edge of which thoughts – which is also to say, thinkers 
– swim. The fringe constitutes a vector of indetermination, and in ‘all volun-
tary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of 
the thought revolve. Half the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet fill 
with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described 
some time back, inf luences us in an intensely active and determinate psy-
chic way. Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we 
feel their relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our thought’s destiny.’ (James 
1890: 80)
1  I am thankful to Isabelle Stengers (2014) for this expression.
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If the problematic acts as the generative force, the paradoxical impera-
tive of adventure of which the thinker becomes not its hero but its path, what 
kind of gesture, which sort of operation, might be at stake in thinking the 
problematic? Which is to say, to what kind of adventure are we propelled to 
when we ask of thought to fold onto itself, to complicate itself in order to think 
that which makes it think? What difference might this complication make? 
To which new paradoxes might it give rise to? And what new possibles may 
such paradoxes crack open? Of course, learning to appreciate this generative 
recursion of paradoxes requires, in the first instance, that we consent to a 
radical reversal concerning the problematic itself. This is the radical reversal 
to which Gilles Deleuze (1994: 158) submitted the very notion of a ‘problem’, 
when he sought to dissociate it from that ‘grotesque image of culture’ which 
infects and glosses over, with equal force, both the constitution of our pres-
ent and the very mode of passing of the present in the time it constitutes. 
A grotesque image of culture that has been at the heart of modern colonial-
ism and global capitalism, and has infiltrated modern state politics and de-
velopment programs, environmental policy and global health, but also ‘ex-
aminations and government referenda’ as well as ‘newspaper competitions 
(where everyone is called upon to choose according to his or her taste, on 
condition that this taste coincides with everyone else)’ (Deleuze 1994: 158).
This is the image that turns the problematic into an obstacle to be over-
come, and renders problems mere shadows of their eventual solutions. Un-
der such an image there is indeed no apparent paradox involved in thinking 
the problematic. The proposition becomes equivalent with solving problems. 
This is because, according to this image, problems are not just given – they 
are given ready-made. All that matters is to find the right solution, the one 
that will eventually make the problem a mere figment of the unlearned world, 
an irrelevance, an innocent vestige of our past ignorance. Even as problems 
become ‘wicked’, ‘fuzzy’, or ‘complex’, the sense of the problematic that our 
culture espouses is one that treats it exclusively as an epistemic puzzle – an 
obstacle posed to our knowledge, to our methods; a matter for thought and 
science alone (followed by the acknowledgment that the more sciences in-
volved, the better in driving the problem to its own exhaustion). Here, think-
ing becomes an act of exhaustion of problems in solutions for which thoughts 
and sciences are never their means but their masters. And indeed, just as the 
problems are given ready-made, so are the solutions. They may not be appar-
ent to the ignoramus who is confronted by the problem that a teacher sets 
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out in an examination, or to the state that is confronted with a response to 
a referendum on an ill-posed question it did not even understand, but the 
very staging of the problem presupposes that a solution must exist, that it is 
a matter of picking the problem apart so as to find it, a matter of identifying 
the solution with a truth that the problematic itself occluded – the people have 
spoken. It is always, in the end, a matter of puzzle-solving. The image of the 
completed puzzle is printed on the box which contains it – all one needs to 
do is to copy, to imitate, to find the corner pieces that already determine the 
contours of the puzzle or problem and simultaneously enable the derivation 
of the only true solution, the one that reproduces an image that is identical to 
the one given at the very outset. Indeed, that is what this grotesque image of 
culture turns the problematic into – a puzzle, a veil, a blockage, a temporary 
obscurity, a shadow of knowledge, an obstacle to be overcome by following 
the right example, by deploying the appropriate methods.
Deleuze’s gesture would then consist, in the first instance, in noting that 
inside and in spite of this grotesque image of culture the paradoxes persist 
and insist. The puzzle is never finished, and the solutions the moderns come 
up with never quite exhaust the problematic. This is why he associates such 
image of culture with the notion of ‘stupidity’, la bêtise, characterizing it after 
Bergson as nothing other than a ‘faculty for false problems’, the ‘evidence 
of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem as such’ 
(Deleuze 1994: 159; see also Debaise 2016). Because this culture of puzzle-solv-
ing, which is our own, cannot but continue failing to accomplish that which 
it sets out to achieve – the complete exhaustion of the problematic as such, 
the dream of a universally valid Reason, of a perfectly frictionless world, the 
perpetual peace of a permanently smooth present. The paradox is of course 
that the problematic presses on, ‘it insists and persists in these solutions’ 
(Deleuze 1994: 163) such that the latter do not ever solve problems without 
also making them proliferate in new ways, provoking new imperatives to 
which thought is forced to respond. This is why it ‘would be naïve to think 
that the problems of life and death, of love and the differences between the 
sexes, are amenable to their scientific solutions and positings, even though 
such positings and solutions necessarily arise without warning, even though 
they must necessarily emerge at a certain moment in the unfolding process 
of the development of these problems.’ (Deleuze 1994: 107)
If paradoxes constitute sites where the problematic cracks open, from 
which it creates a line of fugitivity, the second aspect of Deleuze’s gesture is 
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precisely to trace this line, to follow the problematic outside of this image of 
culture that has sought, and failed, to contain it. And it is there, outside, that 
the problematic can no longer designate a mere state of ignorance or imper-
fection, for it can never be contained in the knowledges that would seek to 
dissipate it in their solutions. Outside of this grotesque image of culture, the 
problematic becomes ‘a state of the world, a dimension of the system, and 
even its horizon or its home’ (Deleuze 1994: 280) – an occasion of experience 
boiling over onto a new occasion, the thought streaming through the thinker 
it has brought into being, the present passing in the time it has constituted, 
the world opened up to its own becoming. ‘Let anyone try’, James (1890: 608) 
wrote prefiguring this gesture, ‘I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend 
to, the present moment of time. One of the most baff ling experiences occurs. 
Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, f led were we could touch 
it, gone in the instant of becoming.’ 
In this other culture of paradoxes, this culture without image that James’s 
and Deleuze’s gestures help us conjure, the problematic can no longer merely 
correspond to a shadow of knowledge, for it is the present itself that crum-
bles in our grasp. How to characterise this crumbling present, which is also 
the calling forth of the present moment by the insistence of another present 
that urges the fugue? In what sense may the problematic constitute, in pass-
ing, the home and horizon of the world if it does not designate a specific mode 
of existence, the generative mode of existence of a world to-be-made? It is this ver-
sion of the problematic that I am seeking to think, or rather, to try and explore 
some of what might be at stake in our thinking it. This version in which the 
term ‘problematic’ conjures, with a word, the lure of the world’s own fringes, 
the sirens of what is in the process of being brought in, of a buzzing possi-
bility, of a difference to come (Savransky 2018a). To actualise it is the world’s 
destiny. But here’s another paradox: such destiny is never guaranteed. And 
so we may propose, as a working hypothesis that relays the paradox we start-
ed with, that perhaps the task involved in thinking the problematic is no other 
than a gesture of learning, experimentally, how to relate to the fringe, how 
to sustain and dramatise the process through which a possible makes its in-
sistence felt with the character of an imperative, by which the an insistent 
possibility irrupts and reconfigures the world made. The task might be, in 
other words, that of developing a pragmatics of a world to-be-made.
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Metamorphoses
An attentive reader may have noted an air of familiarity in this notion I have 
just associated the problematic with, that of the mode of existence of a world 
to-be-made. It is, of course, borrowed, in homage and in relay, from the ex-
pression used by another philosopher, Étienne Souriau (2015), in his lecture 
titled ‘Of the Mode of Existence of the Work To-Be-Made’. And such borrow-
ing is quite deliberate. For if Deleuze’s gesture enables us to trace the prob-
lematic along its fugitive lines, outside the false problems of our puzzle-solv-
ing culture, it seems to me that Souriau’s essay dramatises with unique taste 
and ability the task before us here – that of learning how to characterise that 
process by which a possible makes its insistence felt with the character of an 
imperative. In a sense, Souriau’s (2015: 220) problem is of course quite differ-
ent – ‘Is existence ever a piece of property that we possess? Is it not rather an 
objective and a hope?’ One might hasten to see this as a mere permutation of 
the perennial problem we call ‘ontology’: What does it mean for something 
‘to exist?’ And it is that, but not only.2 For once again, under the auspices of our 
puzzle-solving culture, we have treated most philosophical ontologies as so 
many solutions to this problem. With Souriau, by contrast, the resonances 
are made possible not least by the fact that he is concerned, above all, with 
ensuring ‘that [his] problem is well-posed’: how to think the problem of char-
acterizing something as existing? 
Attempting to pose the problem anew, to think the problematic that forc-
es him to think, Souriau (2015: 220) experiments with a dramatic hypothesis: 
that the problem of existence may not involve a binary choice, but may after 
all be better approached as a problem of intensity, such that, ‘in response to 
the question, “Does that being exist?” it is prudent to admit that we can hard-
ly respond with the Yes-No couple, and that we must instead respond in ac-
cordance with that of the More or Less’. Once ‘being’ ceases to be a question 
of ‘yes or no’ and becomes a matter of intensity and degree, the entire sense 
of the problem of ontology changes, for it becomes a question of a plurality of 
modes of existence, of the varying degrees of (in)completion of things, and 
crucially, of the pragmatic question of their genesis – that is, of the creative 
accomplishment of their existence. It is this process of creative accomplish-
ment – of instauration, as he calls it– that makes it possible to ask the question 
2  For a very generative use of the ‘not only’ see Marisol de la Cadena (2014).
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of the mode of existence, and therefore also of the generative force, of that 
which is still in the making, of ‘the work to-be-made’. It is important to note, 
however, in which sense Souriau conceives of this generation of existence 
that implicates all relatively existing things (for indeed, when existence is a 
matter of intensity, one only exists relatively): ‘We all know’, he writes, ‘that 
each of us is the sketch of a better, more beautiful, more grand, more intense, 
and more accomplished being, which, however, is itself Being to-be-realised, 
and is itself responsible for that realization’ (220). In other words, when existence 
is a matter of intensity, a possible still in the making must nevertheless have 
some dim existence of its own, an existence whose generation is neither a 
case of spontaneous ‘self-realization’ nor one of the wilful ‘construction’ of 
one being by another. As such, just like a thinker is brought into thinking 
as it becomes the means of responding to a problem that makes her think, 
‘the accomplished existence, here, is not only a hope, but also responds to a 
power’ (Souriau 2015: 220).
Indeed, I would like to suggest here that the problematic may have some-
thing of this character too, of a yet-unmade world that nevertheless makes 
itself felt with imperative force, that ‘imposes itself as an existential urgency 
– which is to say: both as deficiency and as presence of a being to be accom-
plished, and which manifests itself as such, as having a claim on us’ (Souri-
au 2015: 223). But is this not just a spurious analogy? Is Souriau not dealing, 
after all, with an altogether different problem? I don’t think so, not entirely.3 
And the reason for this is that, if when ontology is treated as a binary prob-
lem (this exists, this does not) the question is where to draw the line, when 
it becomes a problem of intensity and degree the question is how to think 
the intensification of existence. Which is also to say, how to characterise one’s 
relationship to the fringe – the relationship of the thinker to the thought for 
which it is in process of becoming a means, of the constituted present to the 
one that is passing in the time constituted, of the world made to the world 
to-be-made. Not unlike ours, Souriau’s problem is, in other words, a prob-
lem of heterogenesis, of the actualisation of a possible, of the determination 
3  The resonances are also not entirely coincidental either – Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 
220, n, 6) indeed acknowledged their debt to Souriau in What is Philosophy?, and as Isabelle 
Stengers and Bruno Latour (2015: 13) note in their introductory essay to Souriau’s The Dif fer-
ent Modes of Existence, there are already hidden references to Souriau in Deleuze’s Dif ference 
and Repetition –references to the work of art to-be-made, and to the virtual as a task to be 
performed– that are ‘as plain to see as the famous purloined letter of Edgar Allan Poe’. 
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a problem, of the generation of a being that is ‘only able to be accomplished 
completely through the power of another being’ (Souriau 2015: 223).
It is in order to dramatise this process that Souriau (ibid: 225) pays at-
tention to the very activity of making, and provides us with a most dramatic 
account of the process of sculpting:
Watching the work of the sculptor, I see how with each blow of the mallet 
and chisel, the statue, at first a work to-be-made, absolutely distinct from 
the block of marble, is gradually incarnated in that very marble. Little by little, 
the virtual work is transformed into a real work. Each of the sculptor’s actions, 
each blow of the chisel on the stone constitutes the mobile demarcation of 
the gradual passage from one mode of existence to another.
At stake in this process of sculpting is not, therefore, a mere act of ‘human 
creativity’ or of ‘imagination’, a simple process of projection, of the impress-
ing of a human will on an amorphous thing by means of the chipping away of 
the marble. To put it more bluntly, it would be entirely wrong even to suggest 
that the marble, the sculptor, and his instruments constitute the only char-
acters in play. Of course the statue will not be made by itself, and neither ‘will 
future humanity. The soul of a new society’, Souriau (2015: 227-228) wrote, ‘is 
not made by itself, it must be worked toward and those who work toward it 
really effect its genesis. […] If our sculptor – weary, having lost faith in his 
work, incapable of resolving the artistic problems that stand between him 
and the possibility of advancing – lets the chisel fall or stops striking it with 
the mallet, the work to-be-made remains in limbo.’ Nevertheless, the statue 
is present too, from the very outset, as a work-to-be-made, as a generative 
problem that turns the sculptor into its means. It is sculpting’s own destiny, 
yet it is never guaranteed. What’s more, its dim existence is highly demand-
ing, a veritable test, pressing on the sculptor not with ready-made gestures 
that the latter may simply apply on the marble, but with ‘the ever recurring 
questions of the sphinx: ‘work it out, or thou shalt be devoured.’ But it is the 
work that blossoms or vanishes, the work that progresses or is devoured.’ 
And yet, the work remaining in limbo is not the only risk that such hetero-
genetic process is faced with. Heterogenesis is a thoroughly experimental 
process, and one can only proceed piecemeal, ‘groping our way forwards like 
someone climbing a mountain at night, always unsure if his foot is about to 
encounter an abyss’ (ibid: 229).
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In other words, this statue to-be-made, this being-of-the-fringe, consti-
tutes a real character in the process of its own heterogenetic intensification. 
Tempted yet reluctant to conceive of it as a ‘person’, Souriau decided to call 
this character ‘the Angel of the work’. But the experiment of sculpting the 
statue may well fail to respond to the Angel of the work, to the statue to-be-
made, thereby leaving the sculptor frustrated: just as those of us who write 
may feel the sense of frustration at the accomplished reality of a text that, 
when on the page, is not what it could have been; just as we feel a sense of 
diminishment when the words we utter in a conversation seem unworthy 
of the idea that we are trying to conjure. This is because the Angel of the 
work does not constitute an answer to our problem, one that would be given 
ready-made. Unlike the experience of being unable to solve a simple problem 
of arithmetic, the frustration that comes from the failure of an experiment 
in intensification is not one that reveals our ‘ignorance’, but the feeling of a 
certain devaluation, a poverty, a barrenness, of that which has been made 
actual. And such a feeling makes present that, rather than designate an an-
swer to our problem, the Angel of the work constitutes the very problematic to 
which we seek to respond, establishing with us a ‘questioning situation’ that 
demands a response but does not dictate what that response shall be. As 
Souriau (2015: 232) puts it, ultimately unable to shake the temptation to char-
acterise the Angel as a person, the work to-be-made never says ‘“Here is what 
I am, here is what I should be, a model you have only to copy.” Rather, it is a 
mute dialogue in which the work seems enigmatically, almost ironically, to 
say: “And what are you going to do now? With what actions are you going to 
promote or deteriorate me?”’
Which is also to say that, insofar as the problematic demands a response, 
insofar as it makes itself felt with existential urgency but does not say what 
the correct answer will be, every intensification of its existence involves a 
process of metamorphosis. That is, at one and the same time, a heterogenetic 
transformation: of the world made, whose actuality progressively becomes 
torn at the seams by the demanding insistence of a world to-be-made; and 
of the problematic itself, transformed in its being drawn in, in its concrete 
intensification as a member of this world, in its progressive development into 
a specific problem and its associated field of solvability – always necessary, 
always insufficient, ‘for in every realization, whatever it may be, there is al-
ways a measure of failure’ (ibid: 236). Indeed, I would suggest this is how 
we could read Deleuze’s (1994: 107) own remark, that it ‘may be that there 
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is something mad in every question and every problem, as there is in their 
transcendence in relation to answers, in their insistence through solutions 
and the manner in which they maintain their own openness.’ Because the 
generative force of the problematic always comes from the fringe, from an 
otherwise, another world in this world, from somewhere else than its de-
terminations into propositions and solutions. As Arundhati Roy (2005: 44) 
once proposed to the World Social Forum: ‘Another world is not only possible, 
she’s on her way. Maybe many of us won’t be here to greet her, but on a quiet 
day, if I listen very carefully, I can hear her breathing.’
Conjurings
Coming from another world in this world, the insistence of a world to-be-
made cannot be satisfied by reasons capable of explaining why a problem 
has presented itself with such intensity, turning one into its very means of 
intensification. Persisting, after every attempt to respond, after every ges-
ture of intensification, with its nagging question, ‘And what are you going 
to do now? With what actions are you going to promote or deteriorate me?’, 
the problematic acts as a vector of generativity introducing an after to every 
ending. This is what plural and collective movements trust, those who, in 
various non-colonial languages like Quechua, Guaraní, or Urdu, experiment 
with a plurality of efforts and calls to protect and intensify our relation to 
food, land, water, Pachamama, dignity, or buen vivir (e.g. Fisher and Ponniah 
2015). What they trust is that this other possible world which they seek to 
intensify is not only a hope or the endpoint of a project, but a world under-
way that insists with existential urgency, that makes a claim upon them. In 
other words, their calls too are responses to a power, they are attempts to 
induce a metamorphosis that, in laying siege to the imperial, corporate force 
of what has come to be known as ‘globalization’, might become capable of in-
tensifying a multiplicity of other worlds to-be-made. And if their efforts and 
claims sound ‘mad’ or ‘naïve’ to the modern ears that hear them, this is be-
cause, whatever their fate, they already begin to rip the very culture of ‘puz-
zle-solving’ at its seams. It is, in other words, because their calls and efforts 
already make present that, to borrow Deleuze’s (1994: 158) words again, we 
risk remaining ‘slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, 
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so long as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and 
management of the problems’. 
We have to stress this point; the openness of every question and problem 
would constitute a form of ‘madness’ only within that grotesque image of 
culture which makes the very task of ‘thinking the problematic’ something 
of a non-starter. For indeed, if as Souriau (1948: 226) suggested once, ‘culture 
is a style of thinking and doing that guides, towards a certain form of feeling, 
everything that is mobilised and elaborated by the instaurating forces of a 
human group’, it may well be that, in reducing the problematic to a mere 
state of ignorance, it is the puzzle-solving style of our culture that cannot 
but confuse the feeling of existential urgency of a world to-be-made with a 
kind of disorder. As Thomas Kuhn (2012) said of the periods of ‘normal science’ 
which he, not innocently, characterised as fundamentally concerned with 
‘puzzle-solving’:
Perhaps the most striking feature of normal research problems […] is how litt-
le they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal. Someti-
mes, as in a wave-length measurement, everything but the most esoteric de-
tail of the result is known in advance, and the typical latitude of expectation 
is only somewhat wider. Coulomb’s measurements need not, perhaps, have 
fitted an inverse square law; the men who worked on heating by compres-
sion were of ten prepared for any one of several results. Yet even in cases like 
these the range of anticipated, and thus of assimilable, results is always small 
compared with the range that imagination can conceive. And the project 
whose outcome does not fall in that narrower range is usually just a research 
failure, one which reflects not on nature but on the scientist. (2012: 35)
This may be striking, or it may not. For if it is this style of puzzle-solving that 
also leads us ‘to believe that the activity of thinking, along with truth and 
falsehood in relation to that activity, begins only with the search for solu-
tions, that both of these concern only solutions’ (Deleuze 1994: 158), then the 
very possibility of a problem that insists and persists in its solutions, a prob-
lematic that demands to be thought, one whose demands often burst into 
the world in the form of completely unexpected results, would become a sign 
not of novelty but of error. Because the gesture of responding to the problem 
of another possible world, of intensifying a world to-be-made, can no longer 
be a matter of coming up with a truth capable of making the problem disap-
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pear. By contrasts, it involves the development of a veritable art of conjuring 
the being-of-the-fringe, of learning how to attend to the demanding ques-
tions it poses. 
Not coincidentally, this is precisely what other styles of thinking and 
doing, those ‘cultures’ that – as is for instance the case in some corners of 
contemporary Cuba – live with both, scientists and oracles, are sometimes 
aware of (see Holbraad 2012). Because of their self-cultivation as artful con-
jurers, oracles of the Cuban Ifá tradition cannot but speak the truth – indeed, 
they cannot but speak a form of truth that our culture of puzzle-solving has 
banished as a chimera, namely, a truth that is fundamentally indubitable. The 
oracle’s practice of veridiction consists precisely in conjuring a response to 
the consultant’s concern, one that becomes intensified as they, in their do-
ings, progressively bring together different, dynamic paths of existence 
and meaning – the mythical path of Ifá gods, the meaning emerging of the 
manipulation of the material powders and paraphernalia used during the 
consultation, and the personal path of the consultant – such that a metamor-
phosis of all such trajectories can be accomplished (Holbraad 2012). 
And yet, when the oracle speaks the truth, the verdict is often bewilder-
ing to those that consult them.4 The truth is itself a problem to which the 
consultant must invent a response, inducing yet another metamorphosis – 
of their own life, affected by the verdict of the oracle, and of the problem 
the verdict has posed, eventually actualised in the situated actions that the 
consultant takes in relay and return. The test, in any case, is what kind of 
transformation the oracle’s problem gives rise to. For if the problematic acts 
as a generative vector, as a demand for intensification of a possible, a call that 
lures the world and one’s life to keep on going differently at the fringe, the 
challenge facing any solution is not whether it is true or false, but whether, 
with its response, it promotes or deteriorates the intensity of the possible 
that insists at the edge of the present. If solutions there will be, the task is to 
ask of them how they might make the world go on. The pragmatic test insists 
again: What difference will they make?
4  Interestingly, Deleuze (1994: 63) made a very similar point in relation to the oracles of an-
cient Greece: ‘Myth tells us that it [a grounding] always involves a further task to be per-
formed, an enigma to be resolved. The oracle is questioned, but the oracle’s response is 
itself a problem.’
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To dissociate the notion of solutions from the dream of truth, to recog-
nise that there ‘are no ultimate or original responses or solutions’ (Deleuze 
1994: 107), does not, then, lead to a free-for-all attitude, a ‘whatever works’. 
The test of truth disappears from the nature of solutions only to multiply 
itself on other levels. For if a ‘solution always has the truth it deserves ac-
cording to the problem to which it is a response’, truth and falsehood are 
engendered in the problematic itself, such that it ‘has the solution it deserves 
in proportion to its own truth or falsity – in other words, in proportion to its 
sense’ (Deleuze 1994: 159). Is this problem genuine? Does it effectively pres-
ent itself with existential urgency, making a claim on us, leaving no stand-
ing place outside of the alternatives it creates? This is why, when the oracle’s 
verdict is too far removed from anything that may enable consultants to 
feel its presence with intensity, the concerns the latter may develop are not 
whether the verdict is actually true, but whether the oracle has conjured a 
genuine problem – in other words, whether the one conjuring it is in fact an 
oracle (Holbraad). In this way, what displacing the genesis of truth to the 
problematic makes possible is a metamorphosis of the very relationship be-
tween problems and solutions, harnessing the irrepressible generativity of 
problems and questions while submitting solutions to a pragmatic challenge. 
If the best that a solution can do is to develop a problematic, to promote its 
existential intensity, what is required is a participation in the conjuring of 
problems themselves. Which is to say, an experimental cultivation of the arts 
and operations of conjuring that a problematic may require for the vectoriz-
ing of a metamorphosis – one that redraws the contours of what a generative 
formulation of the problem might be, and what it may demand of us on this 
day that, if successful, will no longer be ‘today’.
Presentiments
What is at stake in this pragmatic metamorphosis of problems and solutions, 
then, is a different kind of responsiveness to the problematics that make us 
think, feel, and do – a kind of responsiveness that might situate a multiplic-
ity of divergent practices and collectives in the face of a shared perplexity, 
articulating responses that comprehend and appreciate without demanding 
salvation, responses that can refuse participation in settled modes of prob-
lematisation without their refusal coinciding with a cynical dismissal of the 
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reality of the problematic as such (Savransky 2018b). And what this pragmat-
ic metamorphosis perhaps enables, in turn, is the elaboration of responses 
whose task is neither to be ‘right’, nor to achieve a definition of a problem 
that no one could refuse; but responses, instead, that may seek to collectively 
experiment with the imperative that the problematic itself creates at the age 
of the present – practices capable of conjuring, intensifying, and consenting 
to the metamorphic process of generating and responding to worlds to-be-
made. And here we can see another multiplication of the question of truth: 
for the test of those practices involved in the generation of such responses 
will not be a test of adequacy, controlling whether, with their solutions, their 
intensification corresponds to the state of affairs of the world made. By con-
trast, it will be one of verification in the pragmatic sense, that is, of their even-
tual success or failure in ef fecting such metamorphosis, in making a transfor-
mation of our world true.
William James (1988: 237) once said that the distinct mark of pragma-
tism is, precisely, that whereas other philosophies postulate a pre-existent 
and absolute truth that our ideas must imitate, ‘the pragmatist postulates 
a “reality” for our ideas to be become true of.’ A pragmatics of a world to-
be-made, after all: the crafting of a response, to the tearing at the seams 
of our present, by the intensification of a fugitive present that passes in the 
time it has constituted. Indeed, ‘if those who think about a future world to be 
made to come into being did not, in their dreams of it, find some wonderful 
presentiment of the presence for which they call, if, in a word, the wait for 
the work was amorphous, there would doubtlessly be no creation.’ (Souriau 
2015: 230) Which is also to say that, if learning to cultivate generative and 
heterogeneous relations to those beings-of-the-fringe involves consenting to 
a pragmatic metamorphosis of the passing, into one another, of our world 
made and a world to-be-made, then this consent can never be a matter of 
‘thought’ in abstraction from the feeling of a fringe that this fugitive pres-
ent, this yet-unmade world calling the world made forth, makes felt with the 
character of an imperative. 
Thus, whenever it is a matter of thinking the problematic, thought can 
never become a well of originary gestation, but is always a vector of transfor-
mation of a problematic field – the gesture, at the edge of the present, of dra-
matizing the feeling of the fringe, of enabling the passing of another world-
in-this-world to become a vector of thought. And in this sense, it is entirely 
apposite, it seems to me, that Souriau would call this feeling a ‘presentiment’ 
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– for here the prefix is not attached to the sentient experience itself, but to the 
dim existence of that which makes us feel. To call it a presentiment is to em-
phasise that this sentience corresponds to the feeling of an ‘if ’ rather than an 
accomplished ‘is’. It is the feeling of a possible that demands to be honored, 
that calls for its own intensification. To think the problematic, then, may well 
amount, quite simply, to trusting those presentiments. It may amount to giv-
ing to the ‘if ’ that makes us feel the tools it may need, so that, at the edge of 
a present that wonders how to go on, it may paradoxically introduce, in the 
world made, the difference required for the invention, always at risk, always 
unfinished, of a different sense – of another world to-be-made. 
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